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ABSTRACT
In the summer of 1975, the City of New York experienced
great difficulty in meeting financial commitments to- its
creditors and employees. Doubts about the economic well-
being of the City and dissatisfaction with its financial
policies caused the municipal bond markets to reject the
debt offerings of New York. As a result of that rejection,
payless paydays and a default on City notes appeared- unavoid-
able. The Temporary Commission on New York City Finances
was established in August 1975. Its mandate was to examine
the length and breadth of city governmental operations, and
to make recommendations for needed changes.
A major emphasis of the Commission, and the subject of
the thesis, is the financing of government operations. The
policies adopted by recent city administrations were not
consistent with generally accepted principles of municipal
finance. These inconsistencies were a factor contributing
to the market's boycott of New York obligations.
The thesis presents an analysis of New York City tax
and debt policy. The unorthodox fiscal policies of the
city are described as are the steps taken to implement those
policies. The thesis also describes the successful attempt
to avert a technical default by the city. All levels of
government had some involvement in reconstruction efforts-
whether managerial, financial or otherwise. Important in-
stitutions and procedures created during the three-year
recovery period are reviewed.
The Commission made a number of policy recommendations
concerning public finance and other areas of city government.
The thesis takes a critical look at the major recommendations
of the Commission. The Commission's tax program, for exam-
ple, seems to be based on an overestimation of the impact
local taxes have on business' locational decisions. The
political and economic obstacles to the implementation of
the proposals are reviewed. In addition, the important
public policy issues raised by the fiscal crisis are eval-
uated. Among them are: the role of banks in local public
finance, the proper governmental response to a revenue
shortfall, and the lack of public awareness of basic fiscal
concepts.
Karen R. Polenske is an Associate Professor in MIT's Urban
Studies and Planning Department. She directs the Multi
Regional Input-Output research project of that department
and was the principal advisor for this thesis.
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INTRODUCT'ION
The Mayor's Temporary-Commission on New York City
Finances was established by local law in August, 1975.
Organized at the height of the city's fiscal crisis, the
Commission was mandated to investigate several issue areas
including management, fiscal policy, and other aspects of
City government.
The Commission issued a total of 19 interim reports
analyzing specific public policy issues. The final report
includes material not covered within the narrow focus of
each interim report. It comprehensively examines the city's
population, economy, and political/governmental institutions.
The work of the Commission should be viewed in the
overall context of combined public sector/private sector
efforts to avert a 'technical' default by New York City.
Contributions from all levels of government and from banking,
labor, and academic institutions have been indispensible,
financially and otherwise.
The news media's coverage of New YorkCity finances
has been oriented towards the crises that are just the out-
ward symptoms of the problem-layoffs, the moratorium, bond
boycotts, etc. Similarly, most governmental actions have
been concerned with 'crisis management' of these media
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events. Necessary though they are, such activities do not
identify the underlying causes responsible for the fiscal
crisis.
From this perspective, the work of the Commission is
seen to be complementary to the crisis management efforts
of other agencies. This is because the Commission's focus
was on the future direction of the city. Its recommendations
suggest certain paths for New York policymakers to follow.
The absence of any 'line responsibility' gave the Commission
the freedom to analyse past mistakes and to prepare a much-
needed, internally conducted form of criticism.
The internal or municipal nature of the Commission is
as significant as its future orientation. Analysis by state,
federal, and private agencies have already described the
general nature of the city's fiscal/economic problems. The
Commission's analysis represents the city's own admission
(belated though it may be) of its past errors. The publica-
tion of such a critical report might help to increase the
credibility of the local government.
A major concern of the Commission, and the subject of
this thesis, is the fiscal policies of the city and the part
those policies played in the fiscal crisis. The 'fiscal
policy" in this instance is defined so as to include both
the debt-contraction policy of the city and its revenue pol-
icy as well. The tax system is, of course, the revenue side
of the capital and expense budgets. Together these two
- 3 -
structures finance the operation of the city government.
The Thesis
A few words might be necessary to distinguish between
the thesis document and the final report submitted to the
Mayor. My original intent was to complete one document that
would, with minor modifications, serve both the needs of the
Commission and of the Urban Studies Department of M.I.T.
As work progressed it became clear that such an arrangement
would be impossible.
The report of the Commission is, in the final analysis,
a very politically oriented statement. It is not a coinci-
dence, I believe, that the final report was scheduled to be
published during what is usually the month of the Mayoral
Primary race (June, 1977). An unexpected action by Governor
Carey (determined by his political agenda) changed the date
of the primary to September, 1977. In spite of this shift,
the Commission's report still had considerable impact on the
Mayoral campaign.
The political considerations of the Commissioners often
were not consistent with the legislative admonition to impar-
tially analyze recent governmental operations. One of the
major themes emerging from the analysis is the conflict
between the political/short-term perspective and the econ-
omic/long-term viewpoint. Too often, recent city adminis-
trations responded to political imperatives. I feel the
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Commission may be guilty of the same crime.
Many of their policy recommendations are not consistent
with. the problems identified by the time-series analysis of
local fiscal trends. At the same time the recommendations
are totally consistent with the business/political interests
of the Commission members.
After many meetings and more than a few drafts, a doc-
ument acceptable to the Commission was completed. This
report was not, however, an apolitical description of the
local revenue structure. The thesis:then, came to be a sort
of revisionist view of the final report document. The parts
common to both the Commission final report and the thesis
are the quantitative analysis of revenue trends, and the dis-
cussion of policy implementation measures. The recommenda-
tions of the Commission are listed and critiqued with indi-
cations of economic and/or political obstacles to the imple-
mentation of the suggestions.
Data Sources
The basic data source for the thesis was the annual
report of the New York City Comptrollers office. The time-
series analyses were developed using the revenue and debt
sections of these reports. The main reason for using the
reports, was the need to have a consistent data base for all
Commission staff members to use. There were many conflicts
between the Mayoral annual budget and the budget as audited
by the Comptroller, for example. And there were even greater
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discrepencies between city records and the calculations of
the Financial Control Board and the Municipal Assistance Cor-
poration. The decision to use one source for all revenue
and expenditure figures was the most convenient/consistent
path available.
Additional sources of information were the Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) and the Citi-
zens Budget Commission. ACIR data were used in the discus-
sions of comparative tax burdens and of the extent to which
particular tax measures are utilized nation wide. The Citi-
zen's Budget Commission is a real estate industry-related
organization, most of whose members I presume are citizens
of New York. They prepared the calculation of capitalized
expense budget items.
Working Definitions
The usage of a number of terms should be discussed to
hopefully minimize confusion. Throughout the report, all
references to "years" mean the New York City fiscal year,
which starts on July 1st and ends June 30th. Revenue is an-
other frequently used word. In the thesis, "Total revenue"
refers to all local, state, and federal funding for municipal
operations. The term "Local revenue" refers to the portion
of "total revenue" that is raised within the city. "Tax
Levy" funds refer to the property tax levy, although the city
"levies" many non-property taxes. The word "levy" is also
used in.its verb form, in which case it may refer to any tax
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measure. The term "report" refers to the Final Report of
the Temporary Commission, as. opposed to the Thesis document.
Organization of the Thesis
The thesis is organized into four chapters. Additional,
quantitative analysis of the revenue and debt structures of
the local government are included in an appendix section.
Chapter one of the thesis describes the debt management poli-
cies adopted by recent New York City administrations. It
relates the city's debt contraction activities to the increas-
ing level of expenditures occurring in recent years. The
political and economic motivations for the debt management
policies are reviewed, as well as the steps taken to implement
the designated policy.
Chapter two presents essentially the same discussion
concerning the tax policy of past city administrations. The
overall tax policy goals are listed and the steps taken to
implement the chosen policy are reviewed. In addition, the
effects of the city's tax burden on individuals and busines-
ses are analyzed.
Chapter three of the thesis idescribes the fiscal reor-
ganization programs instituted in 1975 and 1976. All three
levels of government participated in the effort to avoid a
technical default by New York City. Chapter three discusses
the institutions and policies adopted to bring the city's
budget back into balance.
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The fourth and final chapter of the thesis is an analy-
sia of public policy issues raised by the fiscal crisis and
by the government's response to that crisis. The first sec-
tion of the chapter presents a critical evaluation of the
recommendations developed by the Temporary Commission on
City Finances. It describes the political and economic con-
siderations that might block implementation of the Commis-
sion's proposals. The second section raises other important
issues that are not addressed or inadequately addressed by
the Commission.
A number of documents are included as an appendix to
the text of the thesis. Appendix A is a detailed analysis
of the city's bond and note holdings over the 1961-1975 per-
iod of concern. The various types of debt instruments util-
ized by the city are listed. Then, a time-series analysis
of the changing size and composition of the city's funded
debt is presented.
Appendix B includes similar information concerning the
city's revenue structure. Each of the major tax measures are
described and catagorized as either a property/non-property
based or a personal/business oriented tax. Then, a time-
series analysis of the revenue structure is presented. The
contribution of individual taxes to the total revenue budget
is listed.
Appendix D consists of a summary of the report adopted
by the Temporary Commission on City Finance. The intent
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here is to provide an overall context in which to place the
thesis document.
Appendix C includes the revenue data for the city over
the 16-year period of concern. In addition, the tables and
charts referred to in the text are included.
CHAPTER ONE: DEBT MANAGEMENT POICIES
INTRODUCT ION
Chapter One describes the public policy decisions that
shaped the growth patterns of the city's funded debt (ana-
lyzed in Appendix A). The city decided to use its borrowing
capacity to finance current operating expenditures. The
steps taken to implement that decision are described. In
addition, the state government's role in approving the incor-
rect policies is discussed. Finally, the municipal bond mar-
ket's rejection of city paper is seen to be the "crisis
event" that brought about much needed reforms.
The management policies of a locality are often the
most crucial facto determining the cost of borrowing. The
bond rating agencies supposedly reflect the likelihood that a
bond offering would go into default. Since relatively few
od
defaults have occured, a secondary judgement criterig weighs
the honesty and efficiency of local government officials.
A municipal government that is rated more reliable would con-
sequently have less difficulty selling its bonds. The chap-
ter points out that many practices adopted by New York City,
while not illegal, were inconsistent with. the policies of most
localities. This undersirable form of uniqueness raised the
- 9 -
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interest rates charged on local debt.
A.: DE FACTO POLICIES
There were four major policy decisions most directly
responsible for abuses of the municipal borrowing power by
New York City. Two of the policies concerned long-term debt
instruments; two dealt with short-term notes.
A. The city failed to retire its short-term notes
within the fiscal year in which they were issued. Instead,
short-term notes were used as additional revenue.
B. The city liquidated its short-term notes by the
contraction of new debt instead of by allocating sufficient
amounts of funding from anticipated revenue sources.
C. The city borrowed up to its maximum capacity and
sought means of enlarging its debt ceiling to the greatest
extent possible.
D. The city financed some of its operating expenses by
the sale of long-term bonds instead of by recurring revenues.
The improper debt management policies adopted by the
city were the primary cause of the bond market's rejection of
New York City obligations in 1975. In many respects, the
city's lowered bond ratings and eventual exclusion from the
bond market represented a lack of confidence in the municipal
government's financial policies. Dissatisfaction with these
policies was perhaps a more crucial determinant-of the market's
boycott than was the likelihood of a payment default.
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The ability to market short-term and long-term debt is
an absolutely indispensible requirement for the proper func-
tioning of local governments. And the contraction of debt
and its retirement directly influences and is influenced by
the city's tax and expenditure levels.
The most basic concepts of municipal finance describe
these interrelationships, pointing out the functions of the
capital and expense budgets, the sources of revenue for each,
and the safeguards or management procedures developed to
insure the efficiency, effectiveness, and solvency of munici-
pal government.
In brief summary, the expense budget consists of the
annual operating expenses required by the subject locality
in the delivery of public services. This budget is funded
from the annual revenues generated by the city's tax system,
along with intergovernmental aid from federal or state sources.
The capital budget funds those infrastructure needs
(roads, schools, etc.) that have a useful life extending over
many years. These facilities are financed by the contraction
of long-term debts that are paid off over many years. The
capital budget is also funded by the recurring revenues of
the city. Debt-service payments sufficient to cover the
gradual retirement of debts are properly included as an oper-
ating expense in each year's.budget.
Another part of the capital budget is the short-term
note. With this debt instrument, the city can borrow money
- 12 -
based on its expected revenue yields. This facilitates the
operation of local government before tax collections are
complete. As revenues are received, the short-term debt is
retired. The "short-term" refers to the fact that such debt
is paid off within the same year that it is contracted. The
debt policies of New York City often were not consistent
with the practices described here, as the following paragraphs
explain.
The city, over a period of years, included increasing
amounts of what were actually expense budget items in its
capital budget. This was, in effect, a decision to pay for
part of its annual operating costs from borrowed funds. The
practice had become so entrenched in the city's accounts that
an immediate end to the policy was considered impossible by
the control or monitoring agencies working with the city's
government since 1975. Instead, the gradual phasing-out of
this practice over a ten-year period was considered the most
practical way to eliminate that area of abuse. 2
Every local government unit has established limits on
its capacity to borrow money. These ceilings are designed to
insure that, except for statistically improbable circumstances
or occurrences, the city will be able to finance government
operations and retire bonded debt from the amount of local
revenues raised from all sources.
The New York City government consistently borrowed at
or beyond its legal limits. In addition, the city sought
- 13 -
authorizations or put forth definitions of limits so as to
allow for increased borrowing wherever possible. The State
Legislature was the body responsible for setting limits on
borrowing. They were also required to approve any relaxation
of or exemptions to the ceilings established.
The decision was made to use the short-term note as a
means of deficit financing. That is, instead of using the
short-term note as a cash-flow adjustment mechanism the city
used its short-term borrowing as additional revenues. Two
related practices were used to implement this policy decis-
ion. First, the city refused to retire its short-term debt
in the year in which it was contracted. Secondly, the city
would "roll over" its short-term debt by the issuance of
new obligations to pay for the retirement of notes.
The short-term obligations of any municipality are
usually retired in the year of their issue. The law allows
for an additional year or two, (5 years for tax anticipation
notes) in what are expected to be unusual and infrequent cir-
cumstances. The Cityhowever, institutionalized a practice
whereby the exceptional case became the everyday case. Most
or all of the city's notes were left outstanding for the
maximum period allowed by law. Few if any of its short-term
obligations were retired within the same year of issue.
The. retirement of short-term obligations was also han-
dled in an improper fashion. The city would not pay off its
- 14 -
note holders from the revenue sources against which the notes
were issued. Instead the city would "roll-over" its debt.
Rolling over described the practice where maturing obliga-
tions are paid off by the issuance of new debt. obligations.
The city would sell new short-term notes to acquire the funds
to pay the holders of these notes outstanding for the long-
est period allowed by law.3 Given the higher interest rates
charged for more recent city paper, the roll-over practice
sharply increased the cost of short-term borrowing.
The postponement of debt obligations does not provide
additional funds, either to facilitate proper cash flow or
to finance additional operating expenditures. Therefore,
the city borrowed more in each succeeding year than it did
in the previous year. The amount of short-term debt out-
standing increased almost every year, causing increased
amounts of "rolled-over" obligations. This was one city prac-
tice utilized for both short and long-term debt; the refusal
to reduce the amount of outstanding obligations over the
course of the fiscal year.
Table I-1 expresses new short-term debt obligations as
a percentage of obligations redeemed in the same fiscal year.
Whenever the ratio of new issues and redemptions is at unity
(1.00 or 100 percent), the City has, in effect, rolled over
its entire debt, since the outstanding amount remains un-
changed. When the ratio is greater than unity, the outstand-
ing debt has increased. The data show that in only two years
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during the 1961-75 period did the City actually reduce its
short-term debt. In fiscal 1966 outstanding debt was re-
duced by almost $59 million from the preceeding year and
fiscal 1973's outstanding short-term debt was reduced by
$132.7 million. In every other year the City issued more
short-term debt than it redeemed; that is, it rolled over
its entire short-term debt and increased that debt by some
amount. 1971 was the year of the greatest margin of new
issues compared to redemptions. In that year new issues ex-
ceeded redemptions by almost 19 percent.
The same policies governed the contraction of long-term
debt by the City. (See Table 1-2) 1961 and 1968 were the
only years where the City reduced its funded debt by redeem-
ing more obligations than it issued. The ratio of new issues
to redemptions for long-term bonds was greater than for
short-term notes. In 1962, the City's borrowing exceeded its
redemptions by 37 percent. In 1963, the margin was 39 per-
cent. The year of the greatest excess in borrowing was 1971
when the City issued 79 percent more long-term bonds than
it retired.
The excessive use of short-term financing is reflected
in the increased percentage of total local debt represented
by short-term instruments. Table 1-3 shows the increase to
be substantial. In 1961 the City's. total short-term debt
of $100.4 million was less than 3 percent of its long-term
debt of $4.2 billion and an even smaller percentage of its
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combined short- and long-term debt. In fiscal 1966, five
years later, outstanding short-term debt had grown to over
9 percent of long-term debt and 8.5 percent.of total debt
outstanding. In fiscal 1971 the ratio had increased fur-
ther to 41 percent of long-term debt and almost 30 percent
of total debt obligations. In fiscal 1975, the year of the
fiscal crisis, short-term debt represented more than 1/3 of
the total city debt.
When viewed as an extension of or complement to the
expenditure decisions made by the New York City government,
the viability of the debt policies adopted are clear. These
policies provided the maximum of flexibility and possibili-
ties. The combination of the four policies discussed, in an
almost infinite number of variations, changed the impact
of the capital obligations held by the city on its annual
budget.
Under what might be called orthodox municipal finance,
the capital budget acts as a constraint on expenditures for
municipal services. That is, the greater the. amount of debt,
the greater the required debt-service payments and consequent-
ly the smaller the percentage of total revenues available
for operating expenses. In the New York City context, the
capital budget became a source of funds against which addi-
tional expenditures could be matched. The city's actions,
in effect a deficit finance policy,.expanded the level of
expenditures and debt simultaneously and far in excess of
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what the city's recurring revenues could finance.
B. INSUFFICIENT FISCAL CONTROL MECHANISMS
To facilitate the efficient management of the city's
general obligation debts, a system of controls was estab-
lished to insure that the city could properly dispose of its
obligations while at the same time allowing for the delivery
of vital municipal services to residents. This system of
debt management was based on three factors. First was a
limitation on the amount of debt that the city could have
outstanding at any one time. The second limit was on the
type of activities that could be funded by the issuance of
debt instruments. The third constraint was the requirement
for legislative approval of alterations to established safe-
guards.
The limitation on' the amount of debt the city could
have outstanding was constitutionally mandated. The city's
debt ceiling for each year was equal to ten percent of the
average full value of the city's taxable real property as
4
calculated over the five preceeding years. This limit, gen-
erally called "the 10 percent limitation", was established
at a time when most local revenue was raised through the
property-tax levy, tius, the indexing of the city's borrowing
capacity to the value of its real property. There is a sep-
arately calculated borrowing limit over bonds issued for the
construction of housing. The borrowing limit for housing
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purposes Ccalled the 2 percent limitation) is equal to two
percent of the average value of the city's taxable real prop-
erty as calculated over the preceeding five years. The
housing limit is different from the general debt limit in
that, while the average at full value is used to calculate
the general obligation limit, the housing limit is determined
by the average assessed value, which is considerably lower.
The second major limitation on the city's cdntraction
of debt is based on the definition of what could properly be
included in the capital budget, that is, what activities
could be financed through the marketing of long-term debt.
According to the generally accepted principles of municipal
finance, proper capital budget items should include the
acquisition, construction, or improvement of "major perma-
nent facilities having a relatively long life."5 By this
definition, the intent is clearly to-limit debt financing
to activities directly related to construction of buildings,
roads, bridges, or similar efforts. Labor costs directly
contributing to the design or construction of valid capital
projects are appropriate capital expenses. However, labor
costs associated with the staffing of a building, for exam-
ple, are expense items that should be funded through recur-
ring revenue sources and included in the annual expense bud-
get.
Discrimination between capital expenditures and
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operating expenditures limits the range of activities that
can be financed through borrowing. In this way the size of
the capital budget is minimized. The "useful life" of an
item is an important determinant of its proper classification
as an expense item or a capital item. The municipal bonds
issued by New York City may not remain outstanding for a per-
iod of time that is longer than the useful life of the pro-
ject that is financed through the sale of such bonds. 6
The third constraint on the city's debt-incurring
ability is the state legislative approval necessary for any
borrowing inconsistent with the limitations on the permis-
sible amount of debt or the activities financed through
municipal bond sales. By requiring the approval of the
state legislature, an external and hopefully impartial exam-
ination of city proposals could be achieved. The need for
state approval also highlights the character of the city as
a "creature of the state." This appellation points to the
fact that New York City is an administrative device created
by the state. The city is delegated certain powers as a
convenient method of discharging the functions of the state.
Requiring state approval confirms the ultimate responsibility
of the state for the conduct of its created sub-divisions.
The expenditure decisions and policy of recent New
York City administrations have been described in the Commis-
sion 's final report. It has been pointed out that expendi-
ture decisions were the major determinants of city revenue
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and debt policies. The city decided to use capital borrow-
ing to finance noncapital, expense budget items. The imple-
mentation of that decision required the nullification of
the external constraints or ceilings on the city's ability
to contract debt. For each of the three state-mandated
controls on debt financing, the city was able to secure ex-
clusions, exceptions, or favorable interpretations that would
allow for increased borrowing of funds.
The "10 percent limitation" for general purposes (non-
housing) proved to be an ineffective limit on the city's out-
standing debt. This was due to the liberal use of the "ex-
cluded debt" classification as the focus for additional bond
issues. The excluded debt classification includes municipal
borrowings which, for various reasons, are permitted in ad-
dition to the allowable outstanding debt under the consti-
tutional, 10 percent limitation. Capital projects that are
expected to be self-sustaining are a major portion of the
excluded debt. These are public enterprises whose user char-
ges or fees are projected to be sufficient to cover the debt
service (interest and principal) on the financing. Since
these projects are assumed not to require debt-service pay-
ments from the expense budget, they are not included within
the debt ceiling.
The city made use of this excluded debt classification
to substantially increase its borrowing. And while the
city's total debt far exceeded the general 10 percent limit,
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the use of the different accounts permitted the city to
maintain an "unencumbered borrowing capacity" in each year
up to and including fiscal 1975 when the market for city
obligations evaporated.
Table 1-4 shows that the debt ceilings were an inef-
fective means of limiting the city's contraction of debt
obligations. The statutory debt ceilings were exceeded in
every fiscal year reviewed. The excluded debt category and
increased short-term borrowing were the major instruments
used to expand the city's outstanding debt beyond constitu-
tional limits. And state legislative approval made the poli-
cies legal. In 1971, for example, the city's outstanding
debt was almost $8 billion, or $1.4 billion (21 percent)
greater than its supposed debt ceiling of $6.6 billion.
More recently, the 1975 city debt of $12.3 billion was over
$4 billion or 50 percent larger than the legal debt limit
of $8.2 billion. In spite of the overextension of the city's
borrowing, the city technically did have an "unencumbered"
margin within its housing and general debt limit.
The city was also able to obtain a relaxation of the
limitations on the types of activities that could be funded
in the capital budget. This change in policy was perhaps
more significant than was the increase in the amounts of
debt the city could contract. An increase in the city's
capital funds would be useless if the additional funds were
not able to finance operating expenditures - wages, non
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capital equipment, costs, etc. Since the operating budget
was the intended area for increased expenditures, and the
area where revenues were insufficient, the capital financing/
operating expenditure shift was an integral part of the fis-
cal policy.
The city's objectives were met with the passage of
the Local Finance Law. This law contained a much more lib-
eral definition of what activities could be funded through
the capital budget.8 By using this statute, the city was
able to finance many expense items from the capital budget,
that is, through borrowed funds. The language of the Local
Finance Law spoke of capital financing for "various municipal
purposes." The city, in its annual report on outstanding
debt, used the same terminology to list the expense items
it financed through borrowing. Such activities accounted
for almost 50 percent of the city's capital budget in recent
years. The practice was so firmly entrenched that its immed-
iate elimination would have resulted in serious hardships
for the city and its residents. A ten-year time schedule was
adopted to facilitate the gradual elimination of expense
items from the capital budget.
Table I-5 shows the increasing amounts of capital funds
being used to finance current operating expenditures. The
practice began in fiscal 1965 when $26 million was used to
finance manpower training programs. The original rationale
for this procedure was the "human capital" nature of
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employment programs. Since job training would have long-term
positive effects on a person's earning potential, this was
used as a justification for calling the expenditure a "capi-
tal" item. The next major extension to this policy was the
use of capital funds to finance a retroactive pay increase
for City employees.
The size of the capital budget/expense item shift grew
rapidly, especially after fiscal 1969. By the start of
the fiscal crises, nearly 50 percent of the City's capital
budget, more than $700 million, was being used to finance
expense budget items.
The third constraint on the city's debt management
policies was the state legislature. In spite of the well-pub-
licized upstate/downstate antagonism and the presence of a
distinct anti-New York City majority among the state legis-
lature, that body must accept a major responsibility for the
New York crisis. There was a clear failure of the legisla-
ture to exercise its proper role as the supervisor of local
governments when necessary. The above-described increases
in the city's debt-incurring powers would have been impossible
without legislative approval. Similarly,.the use of capital
funds for operating expenses would have been impossible
without legislative sanction. The state refused to say no
when clearly improper policies were proposed by the city.
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CITY-STATE RELATIONS
The state's reluctance to exercise its proper over-
sight function is a result of the peculiar relationship
between New York City and State. From the City's perspective,
the legislature was a gathering of an anti-city majority of
upstate farmers. The City did not receive its fair share
of state aid but got more than enough meddling in local af-
fairs, fiscal and otherwise. If only the upstaters would
leave the city alone, all would be well. Greater autonomy
was demanded under the slogan of "home rule."
The noncity portion of the legislature saw city/state
relations in a different light. The City was felt to receive
an excessive amount of state aid while constantly claiming
discrimination in the allocation of funds. In addition,
New York City was seen as the spendthrift of the state, pro-
viding exhorbitant wages for City workers and too liberal
welfare and other social programs. All of these expenditures
the City sought to finance through the taxes of upstate New
York residents.
Of course, neither perspective was all true or all
false. However, the reconciliation of these views at budget-
adoption time was in part responsible for the City's difficul-
ties. The. City would,. as a matter of course, request addi-
tional state aid to finance the expenditures it felt neces-
sary. When sufficient state aid was not forthcoming, the
City's fallback position was the "home rule" argument. It
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requested the authorization to raise money locally in order
to finance their expenditure programs without increased
state aid.
It was this situation that permitted the development
of the city's tax structure and its debt management policies.
The state agreed to let the city cut its fiscal throat as
long as such activities were contained within the five bor-
oughs. This sentiment caused the state to approve the impo-
sition of a tax structure that would contribute to the city's
economic decline as surely as it would increase operating
revenues in the short run. It authorized the city's borrow-
ing of monies far in excess of its capacity to repay.
The state legislature incorrectly felt that New York
City could go its own harmful way with little or no negative
effect on the rest of the state or nation. But instead, the
state (Urban Development Corporation) UDC's default contrib-
uted to the market's rejection of city bonds. And the city's
fiscal crisis contributed to the difficulty in (and high
costs of) marketing the state's obligations in spring 1976.
These developments reaffirm, if painfully, the indivisibility
of the state and its created subdivisions.
C. THE BOND MARKET REACT ION
The constitutional and governmental constructs on New
York City's debt policies were proven to have been an ineffec-
tive means of controlling its. long-term borrowing. However,
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the workings of the marketplace, specifically the municipal
bond market, provided a different set of constraints on the
management of municipal obligations. In fact,.the dramatic
event that marked the "birth" of the fiscal crisis was the
rejection of New York City Notes by the bond market. That
rejection was not engineered by the proverbial "invisible
hand" but by the quite visible and articulate hand of the
NYC clearinghouse banks, the traditional underwriters of
New York's municipal bond offerings.
The municipal bond market provided early criticism of
NYC policies in the form of the less than optimal bond rating
given to recent note offerings. The lowered city ratings
resulted in increased borrowing costs for the city as inter-
est payments necessary to attract investors increased. The
major bond-rating services were two institutions most direct-
ly involved in the market's evaluation of NYC paper.
The two major bond-rating agencies are the Moody's In-
vestors Service and the Standard and Poor's evaluation.9
Both groups evaluate the thousands of tax-exempt bond issues
annually offerred by state and local governments nation-wide.
The ratings analyse the quality of bond issues as compared
to the offerings of other governmental bodies. The ratings
assigned after the completion of their analysis are the stan-
dard criteria utilized by investors when deciding among var-
ious municipal offerings. As such, the attainment of a
higher or lower bond rating can have a measurable impact on
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the cost of borrowing money. The rating agencies utilize
a number of objective and subjective criteria in their ana-
lysis of a particular bond offering.10 Among the objective
criteria examined are the overall economic conditions of
the municipality, the legal constraints on the contraction
and uses of debt, the efficiency and reliability of the lo-
cality's debt management policies. In each of these areas
the conditions of New York City (from the rating agencies'
point of view) did not argue for the granting of the highest
bond rating.
The city's economy had suffered from the loss of pri-
vate sector jobs and a drastic increase in social welfare
expenditures. Retail sales were declining and the city's
share of regional income had declined. In addition, the
city's revenue system was extremely sensitive to fluctuations
in economic trends. The relatively greater reliance on non-
property taxes meant that revenues were less stable over the
short run.
Municipal bond analysts also considered the impact of
New York State legislation that permitted more liberal uses
of capital funds than was the norm. The city policy of finan-
cing operating expenses with. capital funds was legally sanc-
tioned, however, the bond market frowned on such practices.
There was also a widespread belief that the city used a num-
ber of accounting gimmicks to hide the existence of a revenue
deficit. This practice and the city's excessive issues of
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short-term debt raised questions about the fiscal management
of New York City.' 1
D. THE EFFECTS
There were a number of unfavorable outcomes that resul-
ted from the improper debt management policies followed by
the city. As described above, the abuses of. the municipal
borrowing power contributed to the deterioration of the city's
physical plant, it increased the cost of municipal service
delivery, and it siphoned additional funds from the expense
budget in order to pay rising debt service charges.
The use of a substantial p10tion of capital funds for
operating expenses meant that there was less money avilable
for legitimate capital needs. The viability of any locality
is in part determined by the maintenance of public facili-
ties--buildings, roads, bridges, etc. The maintenance of
old facilities and the construction of new ones were neglec-
ted since much of the capital budget was being used to finance
expense budget items. Certain types of capital expenses,
bridge or tunnel maintenance, pot hole repair and the like,
can be delayed for a while without immediate negative impact.
But a consistent policy that ignores the depreciation of the
city's. capital assets over the long run will surely result
in greatly increased costs as continued neglect renders cer-
tain assets useless. The City's West Side Highway is the
best example of this process.
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The. policy of using capital financing to fund operat-
ing expenditures had the effect of substantially increasing
the cost of municipal service delivery without producing any
corresponding improvement in the quantity or quality of such
services. The use of borrowed funds for such.expenditures
meant that the city would also have to pay the long-term
interest costs associated with such borrowing. Therefore,
while the city might use one million dollars of capital funds
for an operating expense, the actual cost to the city's resi-
dents is one million dollars plus whatever interest charges
were required. Over the life of a 10-year bond, for example,
such interest costs are substantial.
The increase in the outstanding amount of city debt
causes less of the operating budget to be avgalable for the
funding of municipal service delivery. The long-term debt
of a municipality is an obligation of the city's full faith,
credit, and taxing power.12 This means that bond obligations
must receive first priority in the expenditure of city funds.
The required debt-service payments are an uncontrollable
budget item in the same way that welfare and Medicaid costs
are since the city cannot unilaterally diminish. debt service
payments. The increasing amount of outstanding debt meant
that required debt-service payments also had to increase.
And the effect is that a larger and larger portion of the
city's operating budget is utilized for uncontrollable debt
service payments. This also means that a decreasing portion
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of that budget is available to fund the programs that actu-
ally provide services to the city's. residents.
SUMMARY
Chapter One described the debt policy decisions of
recent city administrations. It presented a picture of very
innovative or very incompetent managers who were coping with
a consistent pattern where expenditure needs (legitimate or
illegitimate) far exceeded the available amount of revenues.
The reaction to this mismatch of supply and demand was to
violate the standard operating procedures utilized in the
financing of governmental entities. The city used a number
of unorthodox procedures to increase the available amount
of current operating expenditures and to create the appear-
ance of a balanced budget.
One often-heard criticism of New York City concerns
the alleged incompetence of its fiscal managers. The develop-
ment of its revenue structures is pointed to as an indication
of this incompetence. A close look at the City's revenue
operations suggests that this is not the case. It is clear
that the decision to substantially increase expenditures was
the "independent variable" that determines the level of all
taxes and the extent of borrowing. It is also clear that
this policy is the exact opposite of the. usual public finance
situation wherein the amount of available revenues determined
expenditure levels. However, if one momentarily ignores the
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rightness or wrongness of the basic fiscal policy (and it
was an unwise choice) its creativity is undeniable. The
City decided to extract the maximum amount of revenue from
itts tax and debt systems. And, the seemingly "incompetent"
fiscal policies adopted were in every instance consistent
with the furtherance of that policy.
The assertion, then, is that, far from being incompe-
tent political hacks (or more precisely, aside from being
hacks), the City's fiscal management really was efficient,
really did "know the buck" as the Mayor's campaign slogan
stated. Their policies were both market-conscious, and poli-
tically conscious, as they had to be to get past the state
legislature. Part and parcel of the revenue generation strat-
egy they followed was the tradeoff involving long-term con-
traction of the tax base as the price for increased revenue
in the short run.
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CHAPTER TWO:' : LOCAL TAX POLICY
INTRODUCTION-
Chapter two describes the tax policies developed by
recent New York City administrations. The overall objectives
of city policy are listed, and the steps taken to implement
those policies are discussed. The effect of the local tax
burden on individuals and on the business community is assess-
ed. Political considerations, it appears, determined much
or all of the city's tax policies. Some of the policital
rationales behind the development of the local revenue struc-
ture are reviewed.
A. DE FACTO POLICY
An increase in the revenue generating capacity of the
municipal tax system was the primary objective of the city
tax structure. The city's tax policy was based on two prac-
tices;
a. The city substantially increased the rate of taxa-
tion on the major revenue-producing city taxes.
b. The city imposed new levies on previously untaxed
forms of income or wealth.
A large part of the increased expenditures in recent
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New York budgets was financed through increases in the rate
of taxation on all major taxes levied by the city. The prop-
erty tax rate, for example, has been subject to annual in-
creases for each of the last fifteen years. The tax on busi-
ness incomes has been increased three times since 1965, re-
sulting in a rise in the effective tax rate of over 100%.
The combined city/state cigarette tax is the highest in the
nation. And, there were substantial increases in the sales
tax, and the personal income tax over the past 15 years.1
All of these levies are major components of total local tax
revenue. The combined effect of these tax increases has
raised the New York city tax burden higher than that in any
other municipality nationwide.
The introduction of new taxes helped to finance expen-
ditures that were in excess of those funded by tax rate in-
creases. The city developed a number of new revenue sources,
in some instances taxing activities no other municipality does.
Many of these taxes were directed at particular segments of
the economy, such as the hotel occupancy tax which is diff-
erent from the more broadly-applicable commercial occupancy
tax. Similarly,.the tax on horse race admissions is another
example of a very narrowly based tax. These are representa-
tive of other "gimmick" taxes levied by the city.
From a policy point of view, the benefits of having
the ability to combine (in various proportions), tax rate
increases with new taxes are obvious. The arrangement
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provides the maximum amount of flexibility to local govern-
ment officials in the preparation of the budget.
Further increases in the tax rates of major local rev-
enue sources were not feasible either politically or econ-
omically. Each major revenue source had a city-wide tax base
and therefore a city-wide constituency opposed to such a
policy. At the same time, the reaction of market forces to
past tax increases strongly suggested that the city was at
or near the limit of its ability to make further increases
in the percentage rates of the major taxes. Each increase
in the property tax rate contributed to the abandonment of
taxable property and to an annually increasing percentage of
uncollected property taxes.2
In summary, the most widely utilized forms of local
finance (the property tax, and, increasingly, the sales and
income taxes) were not capable of producing the amount of
revenue necessary to finance the city government's expendi-
tures.
It was this situation that created the need for the
new, revenue-producing taxes, imposed by the city government.
The primary reason for the imposition of the new, gimmick
taxes, is that the levies provide additional revenue without
requiring increases in the more broadly based tax measures.
The logic behind the imposition of the tax on horse
race admissions is exemplary of the way in which the city's
tax structure was developed. This levy produces revenue for
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the city and has the added political attraction of affecting
the relatively small group of individuals who frequent race
tracks.
In the same fashion, excise taxes, such as coin oper-
ated amusement device tax or the annual vault charges, were
imposed. The introduction of any one nuisance tax, when
proposed separately, may seem insignificant. But the combin-
ation of many small taxes can produce very significant
amounts of revenue and can have significant and unanticipated
effects on the city's tax structure and tax payments structure.
The implementation of the city's tax policies, espec-
ially after fiscal 1965, created a number of cause/effect
relationships, with the result of one action becoming the
cause of another. First, the increasing rate of taxation
caused the tax burden borne by New York City residents and
businesses to become the highest in the nation. The New York
City tax rates became increasingly non-competitive with those
in neighboring local government entities. Then, the loss of
a competitive tax burden caused the out-migration of many
businesses and individuals to those localities with lower
tax rates. The decline in jobs and local personal income
caused a drop in the value of the city's tax base. Finally,
the losses in the tax base caused the need for higher tax
rates to produce smaller amounts of revenue, .at which point
the cycle begins again.
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B. THE INDITVIDUAL' S TAX BURDEN
The tax policies adopted by the city government placed
a low priority on maintaining competitive rates vis-a-vis
neighboring municipalities. This in spite of evidence sug-
gesting that high taxes were a contributing factor to the
economic decline of the city.
Table II-1 illustrates the un-competitive nature of
New York's personal taxes compared to national and urban aver-
ages. The so-called big three taxes (property, sales, and
income) are the major revenue sources utilized by local gov-
ernments. The data show that for low, moderate, and upper
income levels, NYC taxes are significantly higher than nat-
ional or urban tax levels.
For the $7,500 income level family, the three major
taxes claim 12.4 percent of total income. This tax burden
is almost 30 percent greater than the average for U.S. cities
and is almost twice the average for the U.S. as a whole.
The same pattern holds for middle ($12,000) and upper ($50,000)
income groups.
Of particular significance is the fact that the dif-
ferential between average urban and New York City tax bur-
dens is much greater for the upper income than for lower-
or middle-income groups. While the low-income New York City
tax burden is 3Q percent above the urban average, upper-
income tax burdens are over twice as high as the average.
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Persons in the upper-income group are more mobile than
lower-income persons, and are more likely to consider tax
differentials as a basis for a locational Cresidential or
business) decision.
While a tax rate that is near or below the national
average is desireable, it is even more important for a
municipality to be competitive with regard to the tax rates
of neighboring localities. In the tri-state metropolitan
area, no city or county had a local tax burden or, a total
tax burden as high as New York City's. When considering the
total tax burden or specific tax measures, the New York City
tax structure encouraged the relocation of taxable activi-
ties outside the city limits.
Table 11-2 compares the liability for the same "big
three" taxes in New York City and neighboring localities in
the Metropolitan area. It shows that the city is worst or
next to the worst in each tax category. While Connecticut's
property taxes are higher than New York's, the absence of a
personal income tax serves to partially explain the high
real property tax rate.
C. THE BUSINESS TAX BURDEN
The business community also was impacted by the rev-
enue generation policy that overshadowed the economic dev-
elopment/maintenance function that is properly a role of a
local tax system. The erosion of the city's tax base, was
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in part caused by the structural deficiencies in the region's
economy,. These structural problems were aggravated by the
negative effects of the New York tax system. The manufac-
turing industry, for example, had been on the decline due
to high wage costs, an obsolete physical plant, and the
increased costs of energy. However, the City's tax system
increased the speed of the manufacturing exodus instead of
slowing the departure rate as much as possible. That indus-
trial sector paid a disproportionately high share of the
city's sales and commercial occupancy taxes. This contrib-
uted to the departure of manufacturing firms.
The burden of business income taxes also increased over
the 16-year period of analysis. Table 11-3 contains data
collected by the New York State Economic Development Board
(EDB). In a study prepared for the Governor, the agency
compared the rates of return on. a hypothetical investment in
various New York counties. Since the applicable federal
and state taxes were identical in every location, the differ-
ence on "bottom line profits" is considered to be a function
of the local tax burden. As the data indicate, New York City
is in every case the least profitable location in which to
invest. An investor from California, for example, could
earn as much as 12.15 percent on his investment if he located
in Onondaga county. The same investment in New York City
would yield 10.95 percent, almost 10 percent less.
Each increase in the sales tax rate has been responsible
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for reducing the value of taxable retail sales in the city.
Shoppers preferred the lower sales tax rates charged in West-
chester County, Connecticut or New Jersey. The excise tax
on cigarettes, when combined with state taxes, is the high-
est in the nation. This has resulted in an estimated $50
million worth of tax losses to the city annually. This loss
is partially caused by out-of-city purchases of cigarettes
by individuals. The majority of lost taxes are caused by
the massive importation of untaxed cigarettes by organized
crime. The uncompetitive nature of the city's cigarette tax
provides the incentive for these activities.3 The city is
also non-competitive in regards to its personal income tax,
property taxes, and, of course, in its enactment of nuisance
taxes.
The loss of middle- and upper-income residents was
also caused in part by the city's tax burden. The flight to
the suburbs caused further declines in retail sales in the
city. There were also losses in the New York City income
tax as a result of movements out of the city.
The adoption of many new taxes has caused the structure
of the city's tax system to change. Local finance nation-
wide has changed considerably in the last 30-40 years, from
the time when the property tax financed almost all local gov-
ernment expenditures. aowever, .even with that qualification,
the New York local tax structure has evolved into something
unique among American local government bodies.
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The use of common definitions for income, deductions
and exemptions, etc., has been found to be more convenient
for the 'tax collector and the tax payer. By conforming to
the definitions used by higher levels of government, local-
ities' collection costs are indirectly subsidized by the
greater efficiency of the state or federal governments.
The New York City tax system, by its reliance on unique
tax measures, enjoys none of the advantages of conformity.
Many of its taxes require special forms and separate calcu-
lations of income, credits, and exemptions. For each unique
tax the city must pay for the collection of information that
will ensure compliance with the tax measure. The costs for
collection of such taxes is much higher per dollar than is
the cost for collecting more widely used tax instruments.4
SUMMARY
Chapter Two reviewed the public policy decisions that
influenced the shape and size of the local revenue budget.
The decision to increase municipal expenditures created a need
for additional tax revenue. City officials decided to gen-
erate the maximum amount of revenue from the local tax base.
To increase revenue collections, the City utilized two pro-
cedures, namely, increasing tax rates on old tax measures
and, introducing new tax levies. The city created "pack-
ages" combining tax increases and new taxes. The maximum
political flexibility was assured by targeting tax increases
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towards a politically weak constitutency. Additional reve-
nues were generated in this way.
The combined effect of the City's tax policies caused
the local tax burden to become the highest in the nation.
For both businesses and individuals, a very uncompetitive
tax structure was in place.
Many of New York City's fiscal problems can be ex-
plained by the so-called, "captive of events" theory. Accord-
ing to this conception, actions of the state or federal gov-
ernment, as well as the operations of the bond market have
been most responsible for the city's difficulties. Local
governments, in New York or elsewhere, are powerless to
counteract the effects of these powerful forces, it is argued.
At the same time, many scholars maintain that the
local tax structure is at best a secondary consideration when
firms make locational decisions. Other, more important fac-
tors, include the availability and cost of energy, labor
costs, and proximity to markets and transportation. Only
after these more crucial inputs have been analyzed are local
tax burdens evaluated.
Both of these points are raised to suggest that, in
the absence of changes in more important cost areas, reduc-
tions. in the local tax burden will not significantly reduce
the outflow of businesses from any city. However, the local
tax structure is still the most powerful economic tool in
the hands of the city government. Therefore localities will
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continue to manipulate the local tax system, acting as if
that system were the deciding factor in making locational
judgements.
FOOTNOTES
1. See Interim Report on Nonbusiness Taxes.
2. See Table B-3.
3. See the discussion of cigarette smuggling in Inter-
irri Report #11.
4. See Interim Report on Personal Taxes (Report #11).
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CHAPTER THREE: FISCAL RECOVERY EFFORTS
INTRODUCTION-
Chapter three discusses the fiscal reconstruction pro-
gram created during summer and fall, 1975. As the extent of
the financial crisis became known, additional and more ex-
tensive procedures and institutions were developed. The
chapter analyzes the political and financial considerations
that determined the shape of the governmental response to
the crisis. In the tax area, shifts in the local revenue
structure and proposed reforms are reviewed. The institu-
tions created to address the debt management problems of
the city are also discussed.
The three-year period beginning with fiscal 1975-76
was designated a transition period for the City of New York.
This time frame was established to permit the city to right
itself fiscally and to reorient its operating procedures.
The major aim of the three-year transition period was for
the city to balance its budget in fiscal 1978. In addition,
the city was to analyze its fiscal, managerial,.and political
processes, in order to function better when "home rule" was
reinstituted. All three levels of government had some part
(fiscal, managerial or analytical), during the three-year
period of transition.
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A. FEDERAL/STATE/LOCAL CONTRIBUTIONS
The Federal government's role was primarily fiscal.
Its major involvement was as the sponsor of the seasonal
financing agreement, a piece of legislation whose life coin-
cides with the three-year reorganization program of the city.1
The agreement allows the U.S. Treasury to lend a maximum of
$2.3 billion to New York annually. The loan was for the
purpose of regularizing cash flows since the short-term bond
market was closed to city offerings. The extension of the
loans was made contingent upon the city's repayment of out-
standing borrowings within the same fiscal year that the loans
were made. In other words, the city had to follow the short-
term borrowing practices that were normal for most other
governmental entities. New York City's debt policies in
recent years, however, were not consistent with those norms.
This created the need for an independent audit of city ac-
counts before the Treasury would renew the loans.
In addition to its financial impact, the loan program,
and the federal involvement it represented, had substantial
impact on local politics. When negotiations concerning the
financing of the city's moratorium settlement stalled, the
Treasury'a threat to "turn off" the seasonal loans was the
major factor that brought the banks and pension funds toge-
ther, .thereby facilitating the redemption of the debt pre-
viously in moratorium. It was widely rumored that, public
protestations not withstanding, the Mayor privately urged
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the Treasury Department to make the cutof f threats, as a
means of forcing the banks -and unions to reach. *an agreement.
Newt York State's role in the fiscal 1975-78 -transition
period was implemented primarily through the Emergency
Financial Control Board. That entity, which has state and
local representatives (although the state clearly dominates)
was delegated the power to accept or reject the financial
decisions made by the New York city administration. The
EFCB's power is based upon the city's position as the "crea-
ture of the state." Given the city's apparent inability to
responsibly manage its affairs, (as evidenced by the fiscal
crisis and the unmarketability of city bonds) the EFCB is
the state's delegated oversight body for New York City af-
fairs. 2
Since the major item in the city's budget is personal
services (wages, salaries), a large part of the Control
Board's attention is directed to the review of labor contracts.
In addition, fiscal relations with the covered organizations
have been a major area of concern. These are agencies whose
funds come from the New York City Budget, but over which
the Mayor has no direct control (Board of Education, Health
and Hospital Corporation, etc.). The financial decisions of
these semi-autonomous bodies have been subject to Control
Board review.
Tax and debt management policies have also been re-
viewed by the Control Board. For both of these areas, the
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deliberations have been concerned with the impact of policy
decisions. on the city's ability to balance its budget within
the designated three-year period.
As was the case with the Federal government involve-
ment, the state's role was supposedly limited to fiscal over-
sight and the preparation of a balanced budget for 1978. As
long as available revenues were sufficient to cover proposed
expenditures, the control board was to have no say in what
the expenditures were for. Within the constraints determined
by available revenues, priorities concerning expenditures
and necessary cutbacks were to be the prerogative of the city
government. In practice, however, fiscal decisions had
major impact on certain expenditure priorities that were in-
consistent with the control board's best judgement. The
management of the Health and Hospitals Corporation was one
area where the control Board's review went beyond financing
to address, implicitly at least, the policy decisions that
were ostensibly the city's responsibility. 3
The residual authority left intact and in city hands
extended over intra-city reorganization,.analysis, and reform.
With financial matters subject to a Control Board veto, the
city's :major function was to look inward. Various study
panels were created to discover what went wrong with the
city's governmental processes. The findings of the various
panels served as the raw material or analytical basis for the
drastic reorganization of municipal service delivery.
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B. TAX SYSTEM REFORMS
The major developments concerning the local revenue
system during the fiscal crisis period have been:
(a) an increase in local revenue, at a rate less than
the norm in recent years:
(b) a significant change in tax policy whereby the
emphasis is on tax cuts, primarily in the business tax area.
Fiscal 1976 was the first year under the EFCB's super-
vision. During that year local revenue collections increased,
although at an annual rate far less than the norm for recent
years. In addition, 1976 marked the first year wherein
property tax revenues were less than those realized in the
previous fiscal year. For that tax and for the major revenue-
producing non-property taxes, annual growth rates were mark-
edly different from the averages over the last 16 years.
Total locally raised revenue for 1976 was $5.9 billion.
This represented an increase over 1975 ($5.8 billion) local
revenue of 2.6 percent. The fiscal 1976 rate of growth was
the lowest for the 16-year period of analysis. Since 1967,
locally raised revenues have increased by over 6 percent in
each fiscal year except for fiscal 1974.
Property tax revenues for 1976 were $2,966 million.
This figure represents a decrease in tax levy collections of
1 percent when compared to 1975 collections of $2,986 mil-
lion.4
Although the rate of decrease and the absolute amount
- 50 -
of the decline in revenue are relatively minor, the very
existence of a revenue loss is significant. 'Property taxes,
in the New' York City context and in general, are considered
the most stable source of locally raised revenues. In New
York City, .tax levy funds increased by an average annual
rate of 7.9 percent over the 1961-75 period.
In the general fund (non-property taxes) category, rev-
enue growth for the major taxes was generally lower than
average rates of increase for the past 15 years. 1976 rev-
enues from sales, personal income, and commercial rent occu-
pancy taxes increased at a below-average rate. At the same
time, revenues from the two largest business income taxes
increased at an annual rate far above average. The general
corporation tax and the- financial corporation tax are the
major revenue producers of the six business income taxes.
(The others; the unincorporated business, transportation cor-
poration, utility tax, and insurance corporation tax pro-
duce lesser amounts of revenue).
A change in the tax policy orientation of city offi-
cials has been the most significant development of the three-
year transitional period. This shift of emphasis resulted
in the placing. a high. priority on lowering the local tax
burden as a form of economic stimulus. This policy is almost
the exact reverse of the emphasis during the last decade.
During that period, the local tax burden increased steadily
as new taxes were introduced as a means of generating
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additional revenue. That the beginning of the three-year
retrenchment period coincides with, the first reduction in
Newe York. City -taxes in the 1961-1975 period is not coinci-
dental. While the amount of reductions were relatively
minor, the symbolic importance is nonetheless evident. Even
more indicative of the new attitudes among city officials
is the abundance of tax-reduction proposals being drafted by
the local legislative and executive branches.
The apparent shift in emphasis from tax increase to tax
reductions began approximately halfway through fiscal 1976.
As late as November, 1975, the policy alternatives offered
by the City administration were focussed on new tax measures
as a revenue-generating strategy. And, an increase in local
taxes was part of the fiscal package created to bolster New
York's arguments in favor of the federal-seasonal loan leg-
islation.
The revenue proposals intended to show that intergov-
ernmental assistance, if forthcoming, would be accompanied by
an increased local tax effort. Although the proposed taxes
would do further damage to New York's economic base, the state
authorized the City to impose the tax measures. This evidence
of local "belt tightening" was instrumental in securing the
approval of the seasonal loan program.
Among the measures included in the 1975 budget-balancing
proposals was. the imposition of a new Estate tax. In addition,
the legislature authorized increases in the rates for the
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City's. personal income, cigarette, .sales, business income,
and financial taxes. Thus these early moves to address the
problems caused by the fiscal crisis were, in fact, a con-
tinuation of the very policies that had precipitated that
crisis.
The granting of economically counter-productive tax
rate increases was sharply criticized by the Commission on
City Finances, among other public and private agencies. The
criticisms of the tax increases led to the repeal of the
estate tax authorization in spring, 1976, before the measure
5
took effect.
At about the same time, a proposal granting a local in-
come tax credit for so-called "market makers" was approved by
Albany and adopted by the city government. The credit was
equal to the stock transfer taxes paid by the frequent and
substantial securities transactions of the market makers.
This legislation was passed in July, 1976.
The bond transfer tax proposal was enacted by the state
legislature in 1975. Similar to the stock transfer tax, this
levy was also repealed on the basis of arguments pointing out
the decline in bond transactions that would result. Repeal
of the authorization for this tax was accomplished in fiscal
1976.
The amount of foregone revenue resulting from the re-
peal of the three taxes discussed was approximately $100
million. While such a reduction in tax revenue represents
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less than one percent of total New York revenue, the real
significance of the tax reduction is its symbolic value as
an indication of a newly emerging tax policy. The beginning
of a tax reduction policy had begun.
Although no additional cuts in local taxes have been
enacted, the question now being debated by city policymakers
is not should taxes be cut but which taxes should be cut and
and by how much. There has been a drastic increase in the
number of tax reduction proposals by a wide spectrum of the
city/state political establishment. This suggests that the
local tax burden for New York City will be lowered as a re-
sult of a rapidly forming consensus that such a reduction is
necessary.
One question must be asked about the new tax policy or,
indeed, for any of the new management policies adopted by the
city since the fiscal crisis began. That question concerns
the impetus behind the new policies. One possibility is that
the new policies were forced upon the city by the control
board and/or the federal government. Another possibility is
that the new policies were the creation of the city administra-
tion. The answer to that question could have a serious im-
pact on the development of the city once the three-year tran-
sition period is over. The city administration may have un-
willingly adopted policies implicitly dictated by the finan-
cial decisions of the higher levels of government. If that
is the case, then the end of the transition period in
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June,.1978, will permit a shift to old policies. The city
might also be in full support of the newly developed policies
in taxes and other areas. If that is the case, then the
trend of tax reductions may continue beyond the point when
New York city's home rule powers have been reinstated.
C. DEBT MANAGEMENT REFORMS
The rearrangement of the city's debt management poli-
cies were probably a greater area of need than was the reform
of the city's tax policies. The city's dependence upon ex-
cessively large amounts of debt obligations precipitated the
fiscal crisis. Reentry into the national bond market is one
goal of city policymakers and is also an explicit goal of
the three-year transition plan.
A number of important developments have occurred con-
cerning the reform of the city's borrowing powers. Among
these developments has been:
a) the development of a plan for the reduction of the
city's short-term debt,
b) the imposition of a moratorium on the repayment of
outstanding city notes. State courts subsequently invalida-
ted that moratorium.
cl the extension of short-term loans to the city via
the Seasonal Financing Act of the federal government, and
di the development of a schedule for the elimination of
the city's capitalized expense budget items.
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The creation of the Municipal Assistance Corporation
(MACL was presumed to be the only action necessary to facili-
tate a solution to the city's fiscal crisis. As the state
was to find out shortly thereafter, New York- City's problems
were primarily, but not exclusively related to its inability
to market debt obligations. This realization led to the crea-
tion of the Emergency Financial Control Board (EFCB) a few
months after MAC's creation.
In spite of the corporation's inability to solve all of
the city's problems, it has played a central role in the al-
leviation, if not solution, of New York City's problems. The
creation of MAC was very important since that agency developed
the first coherent scheme for the elimination of the short-
term debt obligations of the city.
Prior to MAC's creation, the city had no real plan (or
intention, some have charged) to reduce its outstanding short-
term debt. That debt had increased to the point where short-
term obligations represented over 30 percent of the city's
total outstanding debt. The city's debt management policies
consisted of periodically "rolling over" its short-term debts.
New notes were issued to finance the redemption of old obli-
gations.
The MAC short-term debt strategy called for the trans-
formation of short-term notes into long-term bonds. Since
the city was excluded from the bond markets, the obligations
of the separately-financed Municipal Assistance Corporation
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were offered in exchange for the short-term city notes. This
procedure would eliminate the need for the city to immediate-
ly and completely repay the principal of the matured short-
term notes. Instead, the' city- (in the form of the MAC capi-
tal reserve fundl would have to pay only interest costs and
a fraction of the outstanding principal. 6
The success of the short-term/long-term bond swap was
dependent upon the willingness of city note holders to trade
in their city notes for MAC bonds. In order to make the swap
more appealing to holders, the state legislature enacted a
moratorium on the repayment of the city's short-term debts.
The moratorium legislation was the second major development
of the three-year transition period.
The moratorium was enacted in November, 1975. It im-
posed a three-year delay in the repayment of principal on the
city's outstanding notes. The arrangement required the city
to offer to exchange maturing notes for the long-term bonds
of MAC. Those noteholders not accepting the MAC swap were to
receive a unilaterally determined (by the same legislation)
6 percent interest payment on the notes in moratorium.
After the moratorium act was passed, the MAC immediately
offered to exchange its long-term bonds for up to $1.6 bil-
lion of outstanding city notes. This, policy, which combined
the carrot C percent MAC bonds with more secure financing)
with the stick (moratorium on principal and much less secure
financingl was only partially successful. $458 million or
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slightly over 25 percent of the hoped for $1.6 billion in
city, notes were swapped.7
Then, the New York Court of appeals struck down the
legislated note moratorium calling it unconstitutional.
This was a serious setback for a number of reasons. First,
the city, the Municipal Assistance Corporation, and the Emer-
gency Financial Control Board had all supported the morator-
ium legislation. The legality of the moratorium had been
upheld in two previous court tests. In both trials, the
city and state argued that the moratorium was an indespensi,-
ble part of the effort to avert technical default. Secondly,
all the financial plans developed by the city assumed that
the moratorium would be upheld. Therefore, no contingency
plan was created in case the moratorium was not validated.
The Emergency Financial Control Board had developed a repu-
tation as a most conservative and unsympathetic oversight
body for the city. Many city contracts and other financial
commitments were vetoed by the Control Board because of a
failure to develop contingency plans if the worst happened.
However, in spite of their conservative orientation, the
E.F.C.B. also had no contingency plan for use if the morator-
ium was overturned.
When the moratorium was judged to be unconstitutional,
the decision stated that the matured notes would have to be
redeemed but that the negotiated redemption program should
not needlessly be disruptive of the well-being of New York
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City residents.
The city indicated that the redemption of the notes in
moratorium was an impossibility unless federal and/or state
assistance was' forthcoming. The state dismissed that possi-
bility, pointing to its own financial difficulties and the
proposed expenditure cuts in its own budget. The federal
government rejected the proposal on policy grounds.
With default seemingly Unavoidable, the city adminis-
tration surprised the entire financial community by paying
off the individual note holders from "cash on hand." This
payment of almost $900 million confirmed many parties worst
suspicions concerning the lack of credibility (or basic hon-
esty) of statements by the city administration.
The city's mismanagement of its debt contraction poli-
cies were repeated in its debt expenditure policies. A major
problem addressed during the transition period was the city's
policy of using borrowed funds to finance part of its expense
budget. The city agreed to a plan to be accomplished over
a ten-year period terminating in 1985. The phase-out schedule
was developed because of the difficulty (or impossibility) of
abruptly removing the funding for almost $700 million in city
8
expenses.
The enactment of the seasonal loan program was another
major development of the city's transitional period. That
legislation allowed the New York government to acquire the
short-term loans it needed to operate efficiently.
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After initial reluctance on the part of the Ford admin-
istration and the Congress, the Federal government agreed to
some participation in efforts to avert a formal default on
the part of the city. The creation of MAC and the EFCB were
in part intended to indicate that the state and local govern-
ments were doing all they could to solve the city's problems.
Additional tax authorizations worth $500 million were passed
as a further indication of local effort.
The federal government prepared its own analysis of
the national impact on any New York City default. It was
pointed out that average interest costs for municipal borrow-
ing nationwide had increased substantially in response to
the threat of a payment default by the city. Thus, an actual
default of New York City bonds could be expected to have a
substantial negative impact on the municipal bond market,
and credit markets in general.
The seasonal financing legislation commits the Treasury
Department to loan up to $2.3 billion to New York City annu-
ally. The interest rate for the loans was set at one per-
centage point higher than the Federal government's cost of
borrowing at the time the loan was made.
SUMMARY
Chapter Three describes the three-year transitional
period created by the city and state government. The effort
to avert a "technical" default on New- York City bonds was
successful because of contributions by the city, state, and
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federal governments.
The federal governments involvement was primarily fin-
ancial. The seasonal loan program provided the cash-f low
regulating mechanism without which the City could not func-
tion. The state also provided financial assistance, but
its more significant role as "fiscal watchdog" was exercised
by the Emergency Financial Control Board. The board was
created out of both fiscal and political necessity. Some
form of oversight had to be engaged in by the state govern-
ment. And a convenient "lightning rod" was needed to deflect
criticism aimed at the administration in Albany. New York
City's role in the transition program was limited to analysis
and reorganization of local operations. The Commission on
City Finance was one agency created to provide internal crit-
icisms of local government.
In the tax area, a major development during the tran-
sition period was a sharp decline in the growth rate for local
revenues. Another and much more important development was
the shift to an emphasis on tax reductions. Previous admin-
istrations had increased the tax burden as part of the rev-
enue generation strategy.
FOOTNOTES'
1. The city government will argue for the extension
of the program when it expires on June 30, 1978.
2. See the annual report of the Emergency Financial
Control Board, 1976.
3. It was charged for example, that EFCB wouldn't
approve the HHC budget until its executive officer was
replaced.
4. See Table B-3.
5. See the Commission's interim report #3 on the
Estate Tax.
6. The annual report of the Municipal Assistance Cor-
poration (1976) describes bond swap procedure.
7. Tbid.
8. See Table 1-5.
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CHAPTER FOUR: POLICY ANALYSIS AND I4PLEMENTATION OF REFORMS
INTRODUCTION
Chapters One and Two of the thesis examined the devel-
opment of the local revenue and debt structure. In Chapter
One, the increasing use of short-term debt obligations and
the use of borrowed funds for current operating expenditures
is discussed. Chapter Two described how the city's tax
structure was altered over the period of concern. Individ-
uals and households paid a larger portion of total locally
raised revenue as a result of the changes instituted. And,
in general, the tax burden for all classes of tax payers
increased substantially. (See Appendix sections A and B).
The first two chapters of the thesis describe the pub-
lic policy decisions that influenced the shape of the rev-
enue and debt systems. In both areas, the basic determinant
of policy was the decision to increase local expenditures in
response to a changing population and the changing service
needs of that new population. An influx of poorer persons
caused expenditures for welfare, Medicaid, daycare, and other
social service needs to increase dramatically. This caused
city administrators to develop policies whereby the maximum
amount of revenue could be extracted from the local tax base.
The material contained in the first two chapters is
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mainly descriptive. It tells about the public finance poli-
cies adopted without explicitly characterizing the policies
as positive or negative. While such a description is useful
in and of itself, a complete analysis of the local finance.
structure must also relate the policy initiatives to the
"real world' of residents, businesses, city workers, and
politicians. What impact did the policy changes have, posi-
tively or negatively on various local interests and what
part did these changes play in the "fiscal crisis?" The
examination of these relationships begins with a discussion
of the recommendations of the Commission on City Finances.
The intent is to determine whether or not their recommenda-
tions were consistent with the problem areas identified in
the analysis of the public finance structure. The specific -
recommendations in the revenue and debt policy areas are re-
viewed first. Then the six-point, "developmentalism" pro-
gram is assessed. This is a group of recommendations that
present the Commission's overall strategy for solving the
fiscal crisis.
A. LOCAL REVENUE STRUCTURE
The local revenue structure grew in size due to tax
rate increases and the introduction of new tax measures. The
major use for the additional revenue was to finance the hir-
ing of more city workers. In New York City, the outflow of
private sector jobs has been and still is one of the major
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problems facing the local economy. An increase in government
spending has had the effect of partially offsetting the loss
in private employment opportunities. The increasing munici-
pal payroll has helped those who receive jobs. However,
the long-term effect has been to postpone the inevitable
"day of reckoning" when the decline in the local tax base
must be reflected in a decline in the local government sector.
The changing composition of the local revenue structure
did not contribute to a more viable system of taxation. The
major shift was an increasing utilization of non-property
tax measures. As mentioned earlier, the non-property based
forms of revenue are less stable sources of revenue. Thus,
in 1966 for example, there was a decline in revenues from
all the major general fund taxes. In the same year, however,
property tax revenues increased when compared to 1965. In
1973-74, when the severe recession/depression occurred, New
York City's economy was affected to a greater extent than
would have been the case in a more property-oriented revenue
system.
The shifting of a portion of the tax burden from the
business community to individual residents was another neg-
ative development occurring within the period of analysis.
The business community is of course, only a distributor of
the tax burden to other portions of the economy. Taxes are
a cost of doing business, and this cost is' passed on to the
consumers of each of the businesses products. Individuals
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on the other hand have no such option. By reducing the
business sectoris tax payments, the process by which the
local tax burden is exported to non-local consumers is cur-
tailed. This means that more of that local tax burden is
confined to the local area.
The tax burden on individuals is the area in which
local taxes are least competitive. While the business sec-
tor's local tax burden is heavy, the state's business taxes
are more responsible for any tax-inspired relocation of busi-
nesses.
B. COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS-TAX POLICY
The Commissions recommendations concerning tax policy
can be summarized as follows:
A. Property assessments should be equalized across residen-
tial/commercial/owner-occupied categories.
B. Rent control and rent stabilization should be phased out.
C. Corporate taxes should be cut by 50 percent over a five-
year period; manufacturers' purchases of equipment should
be exempt from sales taxes; and the commercial rent occu-
pancy tax should be reduced by two-thirds.
D. The rates of taxation on the major personal taxes (sales,
personal incomel should not be increased as long as other
localities in the SMSA have lower rates than New York's.
Commuter taxes should be doubled.
The tax policy recommendations of the commission are
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clearly inconsistent with the data presented in Appendix B.
It appears that a predilection for business tax reductions
determined, a priori, the shape of the tax policy recommen-
dations. The first recommendations C"A" and "B") present
the property tax reduction proposals also included in the
debt management area. While the effect of equalized assess-
ments would be positive from the big business viewpoint,
the negative impact on middle-income homeowners and small
businesses is ignored. In addition, the Commission's pro-
posals for equalized property tax assessments are in con-
flict with important political and economic realities that
have in the past prevented reforms.
First, the Commission proposals do not adequately as-
sess the effects of the proposed equalized assessments.
The claim of tax relief for-the "Business community" does
not distinguish between big business versus small business;
firms that own their real estate versus those that lease;
space-intensive business versus those whose use little space.
Within the undifferentiated "business community"; there are
some firms who stand to gain from equalization and some who
have a lot to lose. The Commission might have determined
which- businesses fall into which- category before adopting
such a position.
The political feasibility of the equalization proposal
is- doubtful. This is the second factor ignored by the Com-
mission. In this instance, the democratic system is seen to
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be an obstacle to the Commission's plans. Given the numer-
ical superiority of homeowners, it is: highly unlikely that
the elected governments in New York or Albany would support
a policy that taxes General Motors and Archie Bunker at
the same rate.
The analysis of the local revenue structure indicates
that the personal tax burden has increased more than the
business tax burden. A further personal tax increase (via
the property taxi would be counter-productive. Such a shift
would speed the out-migration of middle class individuals.
Their tax contribution, purchasing power, and involvement
in local affairs would be lost.
The recommendations of the Commission do not adequate-
ly sta'te the case for possible reductions in personal tax
measures. This, in spite of the fact that reductions in
personal taxes would almot immediately increase business
transactions while reductions in business taxes only indirect-
ly and over the long-run produce benefits for individuals.
The one proposal concerning the taxes paid by individuals
calls for the maintenance of present rates so long as neigh-
boring localities have lower rates in effect. While seem-
ingly a market-conscious recommendation, it is clear that a
similar logic could apply to the business-tax burden as well.
The implicit message of the Commission is that whatever
is good for business is good for New" York City. This par-
ticular sentiment is a natural outgrowth of the Commission's
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business orientation, which is, in turn a product of the
myth about "incompetent government/efficient private enter-
prise."
When the extent of the fiscal crisis became clear,
there was much discussion of the "well known" incompetence
of government in general and of local government in partic-
ular. There were calls for more "hard-nosed business-men"
to take part in a reorganization of the government. This
was followed by an influx of management consultants whose
only qualifications were their successful administration of
private corporations. Richard Shinn of Metropolitan Life
became a management consultant, Leo Oberst of Bell Telephone
was also loaned to the city by his firm. The same type of
people were selected for the Temporary Commission. Robert
Tishman and Lewis Rudin own two of the city's largest real
estate management/construction firms. Bruce Llewellyn heads
the nation's largest Black-owned supermarket chain. Given
this information, the self-interest represented by the pro-
posed policies is clear.
From the perspective of the Commission members, the re-
cent history of the city has been marked by increasing ob-
stacles to profitable business activity. These obstacles
take the form of increased local taxes and cause profit max-
imizing investors to relocate in other areas. The resultant
loss of investment and jobs (and the tax base these jobs
represent) can be eliminated only if the city would cut
A.
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expenditures, thereby permitting a cut in business taxes.
Most of the Commission members came to the assignment hold-
ing these views. They did not have the objectivity neces-
sary to weigh the relative merits of proposals that did
not provide immediate relief Cor the promise of relief) to
the business- sector, whose representatives they were. The
"what's good for busines.." slogan is not an exageration,
since that sentiment was- accepted as true by the commission
members.
C. THE LOCAL DEBT STRUCTURE
The debt structure of the city also shifted during
the period of analysis. The increased use of short-term
obligations and the "rollover" policy meant that what were
described as short-term debts had been outstanding for more
than the usual one year, that is, they were in fact long-
term debts. This required changes in the volume and fre-
quency of debt sales by the city. Where long-term bonds were
sold once or twice yearly, the redemption schedules of
"short-term notes required monthly sales; and the absence
of any sinking fund or other debt-service mechanism for
short-term notes caused increasing use of the "new debt for
old" policy.
The problem with the city's debt management policies
went beyond the amount of bonds sold. The improper uses
of borrowed funds is another distinct problem, area. By
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financing operating expenditures with borrowed funds, the
viability or marketability of New York City bonds was com-
promised. This was the immediate cause of the fiscal crisis.
D. COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS-DEBT POLICY
The Commission's recommendations concerning debt man-
agement policy can be summarized (see the appendix for the
exact text) as follows:
A. Start reducing the city's outstanding debt by indexing new
debt issues as a fraction of debt retirements in the same
year.
B. Speed up the elimination of capitalized expense budget
items by changing the present 10-year phaseout into a 6-8
year schedule.
C. Negotiate a "stretchout" of city (and MAC) bonds to fac-
ilitate lower annual debt-service payments.
D. The state should establish more effective and enforceable
limits on the uses and amount of capital funds.
E. The federal government should extend the seasonal loan
program beyond its present fiscal 1978 termination date.
The debt management recommendations are generally con-
sistent with the. problems covered in Appendix A. The rec-
commendations basically call for a return to more orthodox
uses of the debt--incurring power than the city has exhibited
in the past. The use of borrowed funds for operating expen-
ditures, and the massive size of the city's debt obligations
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are the two major problem areas. The proposed policies
would effectively eliminate these abuses if implemented.
Close examination of the proposals indicates the em-
phasis on property tax reductions- as a priority area for
the Commission. Recommendations "A" and "B" are favored be-
cause of the decline in property taxes that would occur if
these policies are implemented. Interestingly, these pro-
posals are somewhat contradictory in that "A" calls for a
speedy reduction in the total debt burden while "C" calls
for a "stretch-out" of payments, which translates into a
slower reduction in outstanding debt.
The recommendation for the faster elimination of capi-
talized expense budget items (proposal "D") is in reality a
call for further budget cuts. Since Commission proposals
argue against increased local revenue collections, no expense
budget finding would be available to replace the capital
funds. This would necessitate the elimination of programs
presently funded through the capital budget.
Recommendations "D" and "E" call for actions on the
part of the state and federal governments. The recreation
of debt ceilings or limits is a good idea. But, the lesson
of the past 16 years has been that any system created by a
political body can be changed or ignored by that same body.
That is, debt ceilings are only as rigid as is the commitment
of the state legislature to abide by the established limits.
The extension of the seasonal loan program is probably
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the most pressing need. The city is still not in a position
to market its own short-term obligations. Therefore, the
cash--flow mechanism is still important.
The same pattern of subjectivity/self-interest is evi-
dent when examining the other Commission recommendations.
The more general proposals suggest a grand strategy for hand-
ling the fiscal crisis.
The basic message of the final report suggests the im-
plementation of a "developmental strategy" that would enlarge
the city's economy. This strategy includes three major areas
from which additional revenues may be generated and three
major investment areas where the additional funds should be
used.
The sources for additional revenue would be; "load
shedding" of certain functions to the state or federal gov-
ernment, improved management resulting in the elimination of
waste, further cuts in city services and personnel. The freed-
up funds would be used for; reductions in outstanding debts,
tax cuts to promote new investment, capital expenditures for
infra-structure maintenance.
The major problem with the Commission's recommendations
is a failure to set priorities concerning which of the six
steps- would be most important to take. The commission's
refusal to set priorities is not so much the result of
naivete as- it is a political decision to ignore the difficul-
ties, inconsistencies, and obstacles associated with their
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proposals. If the Commission placed a rank order on the
six developmentalism strategies, and assigned a reasonable
dollar value to each, it would almost immediately become
obvious- that only one or two of the proposals could be imple-
mented at this time. The absence of any ranking suggests
that all six strategies should be implemented simultaneously.
For a number of reasons, that may not be possible.
Among the three revenue-generation strategies, for
example, neither the Carter administration nor the Carey
administration in Albany appear willing to assume the finan-
cing for specific "municipal overburden" services. President
Carter has reneged on his campaign pledge to quickly move
for federalization of localities' welfare costs. And, Gov-
ernor Carey has sought substantial expenditure cuts in each
state budget he has prepared.
Management improvement and additional cutbacks are two
issues so closely related that they might easily have been
included in one recommendation. Since the delivery of muni-
cipal services is a very labor-intensive undertaking, sub-
stantial savings can come about only through "increased pro-
ductivity." This means that either the same number of workers
will do more than before, or fewer workers will do the same
amount of wotj that is presently done. In either case, agree-
ments reached in labor negotiations have already committed
100 percent of any productivity savings to workers as sub-
stitutes for the COLAs (cost of living allowances) given up
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to avoid additional layoffs. This discussion is intended
to suggest that additional or unallocated revenues may not
be available for a period of time.
Of course, additional finances will be accepted from
whatever source or sources. it is in the allocation of funds
that the setting of priorities is required. Given the al-
most certainty of "scarce resources" which of the three
investment strategies should be implemented first?
Reducing the cityts outstanding debt would improve the
chances for a successful sale of a New York City (as opposed
to MAC) bond. Tax reductions might stimulate new invest-
ment. And infra-structure improvements would raise the qual-
ity of life, thereby making the city a more attractive
place in which to work or reside.
Finally, there is the question of a balanced budget
and how to implement such a budget for a number of years in
succession. As part of the fiscal 1978 budget, the Mayor
was required to submit projections of revenues and expendi-
tures through fiscal 1981. These projections show substant-
ial deficits occurring through 1981, at least. Even the
"balanced" budget approved for 1978 is not "technically"
balanced from an orthodox accounting perspective. Over $500
million in capital funds are being used in the expense bud-
get. Over $150 million in non-recurring revenues are used
to create the appearance of a balanced budget.
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E. ISSUES' OF PUBLIC POLICY
The question of a consistently balanced budget leads
into a discussion of the public policy questions raised by
the fiscal crisis and the response of government to that
crisis. The rationale behind the substantial layoffs and
cutbacks of 1975-76 was that a balanced budget had to be
developed. If such a budget was not attained (and the pro-
jected deficits show that this is the case), what was the
real reason for the fiscal reconstruction efforts undertak-
en?
Among the many important policy questions raised by
the fiscal crisis, at least three seem of primary concern.
First, what is the proper municipal response to declining
revenues at a time when expenditure needs are rising? Sec-
ond, what was the role of the financial sector in the New
York City fiscal crisis and in the life of municipalities in
general? Did their activities adequately reflect the public
interest as well as self-interest? Finally, does the creation
of EFCB-type institutions threaten the maintenance of demo-
cratic Cthat is, elected) government in New York City?
1. THE FISCAL CRISIS
Most analyses of older urban center's economies have
indicated the approach of a point at which. projected expen-
diture needs would surpass the amount of available revenues.
The 1966 Temporary Commission on New York City Finances
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predicted such- a shortfall would occur during the mid-1970s,
for example. The question then arises as to what is the
proper response to a revenue shortfall, once it is a real-
ity? Recent city administrations adopted a policy whereby
gimmicks and conveniently imprecise accounting methods hid
the existence of a budget deficit. This strategy avoided
the politically unpopular process of minor layoffs and cuts
as finances dictated. However, this merely postponed the
retrenchment effort, thereby necessitating the mass layoffs
of 1975-76.
It has been argued that gradual cutbacks in services
would have been preferable. On the other hand, it could
also be argued that greater benefits to the citizenry were
realized by delaying the "day of reckoning" as long as pos-
sible. Interested investigators might attempt to determine
the effects of "pro-rating" the major cutbacks of 1975-77
across the 1961-1977 period of analysis. This would simulate
the "gradual budget reduction" alternative rejected by New
York City governments. By projecting a local tax reduction
equal to the annual "budget cutback", and given present in-
formation on individual and business responses to tax rate
changes, a rough comparison of the two strategies might be
developed.
As discussed in the chapter on debt management policy,
the crisis event that served to mark the "start" of the fis-
cal crisis was the bond market's rejection of New York City
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bonds. This was the result of the New York Clearinghouse
banks refusal to act in its usual role as underwriter of
New York's municipal bonds. Two questions arise from the
financial sectors actions in the crisis. One concerns their
activities associated with this particular fiscal crisis,
the other examines the role of the municipal bond banker in
general.
Recent SEC investigations have charged that many of
the clearinghouse banks behaved unethically by attempting to
"unload" their own holdings of city debt while at the same
time not disclosing their knowledge that repayment was not
certain. The banks' unloading of their large city debt
holdings occurred at the same time as the city was trying
to market new debt instruments. This increased the supply of
city note offerings to an amount far in excess of the demand
for those notes. Not surprisingly, prices dropped and rec-
ord interest rates were needed to attract investors to the
new short-term notes. These actions suggest that the banks
were not reacting to the unmarketability of notes. Instead
they caused the unmarketability of those notes by attempting
to "dump" their city debt holdings.
The banks activities vis-a-vis the bond boycott were
based upon a recognition of their indispensible role as
the city's. creditors. New York City, any city, literally
cannot function without access to credit. The financial
community has always been politically involved, supporting
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candidates whose policies they favor. However, the use of
the bond boycott weapon goes beyond political advocacy. It
indicates- a more coercive attempt to influence ("dictate",
some would sayl city policy. Their program depends less
on political persuasion then on the banks ability to shut
off the city's credit if their fiscal retrenchment demands
are not met.
Clearly the financial/business community prefers to
maintain a low-profile political role to the extent possible.
One area for further investigation would be to look at what
constellation of events and circumstances motivated the fi-
nancial community to-however reluctantly-put forth such a
"robber baron" or "public be damned" public attitude.
The activities of the banks and the creation of the EFCB
raise another important issue, that of the effects these
institutions have on the functioning of a democratically ele-
cted local government. Does the fiscal crisis point out the
potential for eliminating fundamental democratic institu-
tions and principles in an attempt to restore "business con-
fidence" in the city? The establishment of EFCB implies,
among other things, that a democratic government is a luxury
that cannot be afforded during times of fiscal crisis. Accord-
ing to this view, city government is like open admissions
programs or low-cost day-care services - tolerable during
times of fiscal expansion but too expensive and inefficient
when revenues are low.
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A case can be made for the EFCB s temporary control
during fiscal 1975-78, but that case rests on proven irregu-
larities and illegalities Cit is- illegal for the city to
have a budget deficitl associated with a finite number of
recent city administrations. Wholesale indictment of the
democratic system itself is not justified, but one proposal
of the Clearinghouse banks called for the creation of an
EFCB-type institution to control city finances for the next
twenty years. The control body would be made up of persons
well-respected by the business/financial community (that is,
bankers, businesspeople and a minority of politicians--if
any). The proposed body would exercise veto powers over fis-
cal agreements entered into by the city government.
Although the negative public response to the sugges-
tion caused the Governor to reject the proposal, the issue
will be discussed again in fall/winter 1977, when the city
seeks to sell its own bonds. The twenty-year proposal
raises the EFCB strategy to its logical next step. The
"logic" flows from the notion that politicians are inherent-
ly incompetent and/or corrupt, a concept nurtured by events
like Watergate, the New York State Urban Development Corpor-
ation bankruptcy, and the recent felony conviction of Mary-
land Governor Marvin Mandel, just to cite a few examples.
2. THE GOVERNMENTAL CRISIS
In addition to those policy issues raised by the fiscal
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crisis itself, another distinct set of issues was generated
by the governmental response to that crisis. First there
is the inadequate assistance offered by- the higher levels
of government to New York City. This question is related
to a second issue, that of the erroneous suggestion that a
bankrupt New York would have little or no impact on the econ-
omy of the state and nation. The third and final issue to
be discussed concerns "John Q. Public's" ignorance of basic
public finance concepts. This helps explain the absence of
any historical perspective from which to evaluate the pre-
sent fiscal/political crisis.
The local government's response to the fiscal crisis
has been described earlier. Another issue concerns the fed-
eral/state response, once the crisis became impossible to
ignore. Both entities were reluctant participants in efforts
to prevent a default by New York City, even though their
own policies played a significant role in the creation of
the crisis situation. Federal Housing and Transportation
policy, for example encouraged surburban development. The
exodus by the white middle class resulted in a smaller tax
base for New York City. Similarly, the New York State leg-
islature forced the city to carry the heaviest welfare bur-
den horne by any locality in the nation. In other words,
federal and state policies were factors contributing to ur-
ban problems in general and New York's fiscal crisis in
particular. Unfortunately, state/federal involvement in the
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crisis has been more concerned with identifying and cor-
recting local causes of the problem. Insufficient efforts
have been made to redress those state-controlled or federal-
ly-controlled contributors to the city's problems. The
Albany legislature, for example has not moved to assume the
financing of county-administrated services (courts and pro-
bation, etc.) it provides elsewhere in the state. The fed-
eral government has not "moved quickly" to assume all local
governments' welfare costs as was promised during the Presi-
dential campaign.
Unfortunately for the cause of developing a national
and rational urban policy, the serious structural economic
problems of New York were compounded by inefficiency and po-
litical patronage in city government. Had these factors not
been present, the fiscal crisis would have put the spotlight
on public finance issues of national concern. Instead, the
public debate focused on less important questions, and too
much on the supposed dishonesty of politicians as the cause
of the crisis.
Part and parcel of the inadequate governmental response,
was the notion originally put forth that the city's problems
were its own problems-that a bankrupt New York would have
little or no impact on the state or nation. In fact any such
bankruptcy would have immediate, substantial, and adverse
effects on the national and international economy. The Ford
Administration put forth. this view originally, to the delight
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of the New York City hate/envy crowd in Congress. Luckily,
wiser judgements eventually prevailed and the seasonal loan
package was adopted. What is significant--and dangerous-
is the administrationIs and Congress" ignorance of the
linkages between the national economy and the local economy
of its "primate" city (to borrow the terminology of the LDC's).
An even worse possibility would be that the government knew
about the importance of "bailing out" the city but for poli-
tical or other reasons decided to ignore the necessity.
3. THE "FISCAL ILLITERACY" CRISIS
Perhaps the single factor most responsible for the
city's fiscal problems was the absence of any "fiscal common
sense" by the public. The availability of important back-
ground knowledge would have enabled the public to more intel-
ligently analyze all of the policy questions associated with
the fiscal crisis.
One of the concepts basic to economics is the notion
that information concerning available alternatives is neces-
sary in order to maximize one's effectiveness. Sadly, infor-
mation was in short supply during the fiscal crisis. On one
hand, we have the failure to properly disclose the state of
the city's finances. This led to the crisis situation.
Than there was the lack of any public education concerning
the self-interest associated with the political postures of
the unions, banks, etc.
The Securities and Exchange Commission report on the
City's financial management has been mentioned earlier. It
criticized recent administrations for inadequate disclosures
of the approaching possibility of default. The strategy of
inadequate Cambiguous, contradictory, mis leading) disclosure
had been firmly entrenched for years. Indeed, the city's
deficit finance policy would have been impossible without
some sort of cover-up. The success of this process was based
on the public's acceptence of the idea that a municipal bud-
get is a document incomprehensible to the average person.
By leaving the budget to the experts (to those who "know
the buck"), the residents accepted, or more correctly did
not recognize, an inadequate budget statement from the local
government. The vicissitudes of the city's budgetary
(political) process, for example, consistently required the
Mayor to at the same time underestimate revenues to estab-
lish a labor negotiation posture and to overestimate reve-
nues to establish a bond selling posture. Such contradic-
tions were lost on the fiscally-ignorant New York City
electorate.
Given this pattern of deceit, it was predictable that,
when the bond boycott was instituted and drastic cutbacks
were required, everyone accepted the city's crisis statements
as just the annual jockeying for a strong negotiating posi-
tion.
The other side of the disclosure question concerns the
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failure of centers of influence other than the incumbent ad-
ministration-opposition politicians, the media, academia,
etc., to provide the historical perspective so necessary for
an understanding of the fiscal crisis.
The saying about "those ignorant of history" being
doomed to repeat it is certainly germane to the discussion
of the New- York fiscal crisis. For, in addition to the pub-
lic's ignorance about fiscal affairs, there is a similar
ignorance (or more correctly short memoryl concerning the
fiscal crises in New York's past. The public's tolerance of
the EFCB and other oversight bodies is based on the percep-
tion that board members are acting in a non-political, "good
government" capacity. Adequate information about prior
fiscal difficulties would help to place the present crisis
in its proper perspective. It would also help to point out
the political self-interest that determined the shape of the
fiscal retrenchment program.
The fiscal crisis that occurred during the "Boss Tweed"
era is an excellent example of this phenomenon. That crisis
involved all of the factors (and actors) that make up the
present day fiscal crisis. In the 1870's version of the cri-
sis, an increase in the city's low-3income population caused
social service expenditures to rise. Given the political
costs associated with tax increases, the administration de-
cided to substantially increase bond sales and to convert
short-term notes into long-term debt. This meant that annual
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debt service payments, increased, requiring a corresponding
increase in property tax rates.
Eventually, the tax payers, (mainly real estate in-
terests owning taxable propertyl, and the New York City banks
formed a coalition that forced the City to make deep cuts
in expenditures. The major tool used to force a retrench-
ment program on an unwilling city government was (what
else?) the bond boycott threat. Later, after criticizing
the management of city affairs, these two interests ran a
successful candidate for Mayor. The candidate's platform was
based on "the inefficiency and corruption" of political
leaders.
What is of significance-in addition to the deja-vu
reaction to the description of the crisis--is the enduring
or repetitive nature of the strategies, group interests, and
procedures by which a fiscal crisis is created and elimin-
ated. The actors in a crisis situation, whether in 1871 or
1975 include the lower-income class which wants but cannot
pay for municipal services. There is the tax-paying group
whose major interest is in lowering taxes whenever and how-
ever possible. There are the municipal lenders, the banks
who provide the credit necessary for efficient governmental
operation. And finally there is, a survival-oriented politi-
cal leadership in office.
The lower-income group's political strategy was to
support politicians who offered the. greatest amount of jobs
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and services. The property-tax payers, on the other hand
supported candidates holding a conservative, that is, low-
spending philosophy. The. bankers profited handsomely from
increased sales* of municipal bonds, but then abruptly
threatened a bond boycott when they felt that city expendi-
tures were getting out of hand.
When making a comparison between the 1871 and 1975
fiscal crises, very little appears to have changed. Unfor-
tunately, the forgetful public cannot recognize the apoliti-
cal, good government arguments of the banks as the standard
political rhetoric of that group. Far from being "apoliti-
cal", the fiscal crisis has helped to replace one set of
political priorities with another. Significantly, while the
spend-less political philosophy was consistently rejected by
the voters prior to the crisis, after the trauma of mass
layoffs and service cutbacks, public acceptance of conserva-
tive policies has increased.
The information issue may be the most important of the
public policy issues discussed in this thesis. Unless a new
appraisal of what types of fiscal information can be compre-
hended by the public is developed, and unless the media or
others accept their responsibility to provide more informa-
tion, the cycle of local inflation, and coerced retrenchment
will continue.
APPENDIX A: THE LOCAL DEBT STRUCTURE
This appendix describes the debt obligations used
by New York City. Long-term debt is contracted using serial
bonds or corporate stock. Short-term debt is contracted
by a number of anticipation notes, (the bond anticipation
note, etc.).
The appendix explains each debt instrument and then
presents a time-series analysis of the overall debt structure.
The contribution of each debt instrument to the city's
total outstanding debt is described. And the shifting
composition of the city debt burden is traced over the
15-year period of concern.
A. LONG-TERM DEBT
The total funded debt of New York City is composed of
two types of general obligation bonds. One is called the
city's Corporate Stock. The interest on these obligations
is paid over the life of the bond, but the principal is
refunded in a lump sum upon the maturity of the debt
instrument. The city sinking funds are accounts established
to accumulate the lump sum payments needed. Annual
contributions to the sinking fund are held until the
obligations are redeemed.1
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Presently the city has four sinking fund accounts.
These are the Rapid Transit Sinking Fund, the Transit
Unification Sinking Fund, the Water Sinking Fund, and the
so-called New York City Sinking Fund.
The other long-term debt instruments issued by the
city are called serial bonds. These debts are different
from the corporate stock in that the principal amount is
redeemed gradually over the life of the instrument instead
of in a lump payment. Each payment to serial bond holders
includes earned interest and a partial amortization of the
principal loaned. The serial bonds issued by the city
have staggered maturation dates. That portion of the series
with the earliest maturation date, will have a correspond-
ingly lower revenue yield than would the bonds with later
dates of maturity. The earlier debts will be retired
months or years before those at the end of the series. A
small portion of the city's serial bonds are redeemable
from the assessment funds collected along with property
taxes. The overwhelming number, however, are redeemable
from the debt-service payments included as part of the
annual expense budget. The corporate stock and serial
bonds together constitute what is called the "total funded
debt" of New York City.
The funded debt of the city is the "general
obligation" of the government and people. The city pledges
its full faith, credit, and taxing power to insure the
timely repayment of such debt. The city is thus legally,
- 89 -
if not morally, committed to repayment of general obligations.
All of the city's revenue production capacity must be used
to repay such obligations if necessary. In a quite literal,
legal sense bonded-debt obligations are in front of such
lesser obligations as contracts with city employees,
municipal service delivery, or social welfare expenditures.
The size of the city's long-term debt grew much less
rapidly than did the amount of short-term debt outstanding
over the 16-year period of analysis. During that period,
the funded debt became a smaller and smaller portion of the
city's outstanding debt. At the same time, of course,
the portion of total debt outstanding represented by
short-term notes grew significantly. Between 1961 and 1969,
the city's long-term debt increased by 21.7 percent.2 This
was far less than the increase in short-term debt, which
totalled 744 percent over the same period.
In the 1970's the rate of growth for outstanding
long-term debt increased slightly. The rate was, however,
nowhere near equal to the growth rate for short-term debt.
Between fiscal 1970 and 1975, the amount of long-term
debt increased by 141.8 percent. This increase, occurring
over a five-year period, was seven times the overall growth
in long-term debt during the entire decade of the sixties
but was still much less than the 352.4 percent increase
in the size of the short-term debt.
The clearest evidence of the changing structure of
the city's debt obligations can be seen in the declining
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share of total debt represented by long-term bonds. In
fiscal 1961, long-term debt accounted for over 96 percent
of the city's total outstanding debt. By 1967, the share
of total debt had been reduced to 89 percent. In 1970,
three years later, long-term debt accounted for 80 percent
of outstanding obligations. The same pattern continued
through the 1970's. By fiscal 1975, long-term debt was
only 60 percent of the city's total debt obligations. The
increases in the city's short-term debt obligations caused
the decline in the long-term bond's share of total out-
standing debt.
B. SHORT-TERM DEBT
In addition to the long-term debt commitments
issued by the city, a substantial amount of short-term
borrowing is necessary for the efficient operation of the
local government. The use of short-term debt is necessary
in order to facilitate the uninterrupted delivery of
municipal services pending the receipt of anticipated
government revenues. Generally, the city's revenues are
collected annually (the personal income tax, for example)
or quarterly (as is the case with the local property tax.)
The city borrows during the early part of the fiscal year
when a smaller amount of total revenues are available.
Then, as tax receipts are completed later in the year,
the short-term debts are retired.
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The short "term" of the notes refers to the fact that
such obligations are to be redeemed within the same fiscal
year in which they are contracted. The notes are different
from municipal bonds because of their short life and also
in terms of their proper use by localities. Short-term
notes are intended to be used for current operating expenses,
while municipal bonds should properly be used for the
construction or rehabilitation of public facilities.
The city uses a number of short-term borrowing
instruments for various purposes. These include Budget
Notes, Tax Anticipation Notes, and Revenue Anticipation
Notes. These notes are issued for receivable revenues or
for revenue short-falls. Additional short-term borrowing
takes the form of Bond Anticipation Notes, Capital Notes,
and Urban Renewal Notes. These instruments are used to
finance capital projects.
1. TAX ANTICIPATION NOTES
Tax anticipation notes are issued against the receipt
of tax levy (property tax) funds. Section 2400 of the
local finance law, authorizes such borrowing. The notes
are callable, which means they may be redeemed prior to
maturity, thereby allowing a savings in interest costs. 3
While the usual life of a tax anticipation note is one
year, the renewal of such notes is permitted. This
arrangement effectively allows the notes to remain out-
standing for a maximum of five years.
- 92 -
The growth pattern for the Tax Anticipation Notes
(TAN) is similar to that of the property tax, the revenue
source against which the TANs are issued. The decline
in the property tax's share of local revenue is paralleled
by the decline of TANs as a portion of the city's short-term
debt. For the TAN, as with most other city finance
instruments, the time series analysis indicates fairly
substantial growth in outstanding commitments occuring
at the same time as the overall significance (percentage
contribution) of the instrument is declining.
The amount of TANs issued in any fiscal year is a
function of the uncollected property tax levy for that
year. Thus, the greater the percentage of the total tax
levy that is collected, the less need there is for Tax
Anticipation Notes. The amount of TANs outstanding doubled
over the 1961-1965 period, growing from $42.9 million to
$88.8 million. The outstanding amount almost doubled
again between fiscal 1965 and 1970, growing from $88.8 million
to $170 million. And between 1970 and 1975 the outstanding
amount more than doubled, this time, increasing by $210
million to $300 million dollars overall.
As a portion of the city's total short-term debt,
the TAN accounted for over 40 percent in 1961, but had
declined to less than 10 percent in fiscal 1975. The
1963 fiscal year was the locus of a great portion of the
overall decline in the TAN's share of short-term debt.
In the preceeding year, the instrument accounted for 40.6
percent of such debt, but in 1963 the debt share had
dropped to only 27.3 percent (see Table A-1).
2. REVENUE ANTICIPATION NOTES
Revenue anticipation notes (RANd) are issued against
expected receipts of inter-governmental aid or other non-
property tax revenues. The issuance of such obligations
is authorized by the local finance law, section 25.00.
Prior to 1971, revenue anticipation notes were required
to be issued against a specific category of aid, as listed
in the city's revenue budget. Subsequent to July 1, 1971
thse notes were allowed to be issued against the overall
federal and state aid total.4 As is the case with the
tax anticipation notes, the usual life of revenue notes
is one year. Renewals are allowed for two years thereafter.
The rapid increase in the use of RANs caused the amount of
notes outstanding to increase by 6400 percent between 1964
and 1975 (see Table A-2). During the same 1964-1975
period, total short-term debt had increased by a compara-
tively small 1400 percent.
The Revenue Anticipation Note began to account for an
increasing portion of total short-term debt. This occurred
simultaneously with the growth in the absolute amount of
notes outstanding. During the 1960's, the RANs were
second in magnitude to the TANs as a source of short-term
debt for expenditure purposes. Beginning in 1970 however,
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RANs became the largest component of the city's short-term
debt.
The major shift in the RANs percentage share of
short-term debt occurred in fiscal 1970. During that year
the amount of outstanding RANs increased by over 400 percent.
The instruments share of total short-term debt rose from
172. percent in fiscal 1969 to 41.7 percent in 1970. At
this time RANs became the largest single source of short-
term borrowing for operating purposes.
During the 1970's RANs have consistently accounted
for over 40 percent of the city's short-term debt. From
fiscal 1970-1974, the RANs debt share ranged from 41-47
percent of revenue. In fiscal 1974 and 1975 the correspon-
ding figures surpassed 50 percent (52.6 and 56.4 percent
respectively.)
3. BUDGET NOTES
Budget notes are the third type of short-term debt
used to finance current operating expenses. Section 29.00
of the local finance law authorizes the issuance of these
obligations. The tax and revenue anticipation notes are
issued against revenues listed in the annual budget. The
budget note, however, is intended to finance revenue
shortfalls. The shortfalls or deficits result from
unanticipated expenditures not listed in the annual budget.
Budget notes are supposed to be redeemed by an
expense budget appropriation in the year following their
- 95 -
issue. In the event that the subsequent year's budget
has already been approved, they may be redeemed in the
second year after issue. 5
The budget note was the only short-term debt instru-
ment that the City completely redeemed in a number of
fiscal years. The City retired all of these notes in fiscal
1967 and in fiscal 1975, for example, and in 1969 and
1970 the budget note was not used at all by City policy-
makers.
The occasional use pattern for budget notes contri-
buted to the large annual increases in budget notes out-
standing. The City would issue large amounts of these
obligations for a few years in succession, then retire
the total amount outstanding. Thus in fiscal years
1962-65, the amount of budget notes outstanding increased
by 88.7 percent (1962), 34.0 percent (1963), 29.7 percent
(1964), and 56.0 percent (1965). These increases raised
the amount of notes in circulation from $10 million in
1962 to over $68 million in fiscal 1965. Following the
expanded use of the budget note, the City retired all such
instruments over the next two fiscal years. In 1966 the
amount of notes outstanding was lowered by over two-thirds
(see Table A-2). The remaining budget notes were all
redeemed in fiscal 1967, leaving no outstanding obligations
of this type. The same pattern occurred in the seventies
when the amount of notes outstanding increased by 495
percent in fiscal 1972. The following year the City
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retired one-third of the budget notes. In fiscal 1975 all
$308.3 million of budget notes were redeemed; therefore,
the City had none of the obligations outstanding at the
start of the crisis period.
4. OTHER SHORT-TERM OBLIGATIONS
In addition to these cash-flow debt instruments, the
City utilizes other forms of short-term borrowing to
finance some capital expenditures. Capital notes, Bond
Anticipation Notes, and Urban Renewal Notes are used for
this purpose.
The issuance of Capital Notes is authorized by
Section 28.00 of the local finance law. They can be issued
to finance activities that are properly fundable by serial
bonds.6 This, in effect, means that the instrument may
be used for capital expenditures. The notes are allowed
a maximum life of two years subsequent to the year of
issue, for a total of three fiscal years. In cases where
the notes are used as the initial financing of a major
capital project, the amount of the capital note must be
credited against the overall debt limit (on the long-term
bonds sold) for the particular project.
Bond anticipation notes are another form of short-
term capital financing. Section 23.00 of the local finance
law authorizes the use of these notes. They are issued
in anticipation of long-term bond authorizations, and the
notes are redeemed from the proceeds of bond sales. Funds
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acquired through bond anticipation note sales must be used
for the same purpose as are the long-term bonds used to
retire the notes.7
Urban renewal notes are authorized by Section 25.00 of
the local finance law. The notes are issued against the
proceeds of specific urban renewal projects. They are
redeemed from proceeds of any real property sale associated
with the project or from the federal or state contribution
to the urban renewal effort.8
The primary focus of this section has been on the
short-term debt instruments used to finance recurring
operating expenses, that is, TANs, RANs, and Budget Notes.
Misuse of these debt instruments has been identified as
a cause of the fiscal crisis.9 In spite of this focus,
any discussion of the city's short-term borrowing policies
would be incomplete without some reference to the city's
Bond Anticipation Note.
Unlike the other short-term notes described, the
Bond Anticipation Note (BAN) is issued to finance capital,
as opposed to operating, expenditures. It has consistenly
been a major contributor to the City's outstanding short-
term debt.
The growth pattern for the BAN is similar to those
of the major city revenue sources. There was a substantial
increase in the number of BANs outstanding during the
period of analysis, but the rate of growth was still lower
than that of overall short-term debt and of the RAN in
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particular. Thus, the BANs' share of total short-term debt
gradually declined.
The total amount of BANs outstanding increased by a
factor greater than 26 (overall increase of 2,624.9%).
During the 1961-1975 period of analysis, the amount grew
from $52.2 million to $1.37 billion. As a portion of short-
term debt, the BAN accounted for over 40 percent of total
obligations outstanding during the entire decade of the
sixties. BANs outstanding increased by 15.6 percent in
fiscal 1970, as compared to a 416.7 percent increase for
RANs. It was in this year that outstanding RANs surpassed
the amount of BANs in circulation, becoming the largest
component of the city's short-term debt. In the previous
year (1969) outstanding BANs were worth $404.6 million.
RANs were worth only $128 million, over $200 million less.
In fiscal 1970, however, outstanding BANs amounted to
$467.6 million, while RANs had grown to $536 million.
C. SUMMARY
Appendix A examines the changing size and composition
of the local debt structure. During the period of analysis,
the most significant change in that structure has been the
tremendous growth in the use of short-term debt
obligations.
The major impact of the changed debt structure is
two-fold; the increase in the overall debt load meant that
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a corresponding increase in debt-service payments was
required. More importantly the increasing use of short-
term notes caused the City's temporary borrowing to take
on many characteristics of long-term debt, i.e., the need
to redeem such notes through sinking fund appropriations
or other mechanisms. Short-term notes in most cases do not
require debt service appropriations, since they are
presumably borrowed against specific revenue sources. As
the short-term debt of the city increased, even the most
optimistic projections of receiveable revenues showed a
deficit.
FOOTNOTES: APPENDIX A
1. Gordon L. Calvert, Fundamentals of Municipal
Bonds (Baltimore: French Bray Printing Co.), p. 168.
2. The time series analysis of the Local Revenue
Structure is based on data in The Comptrollers Annual Report.
3. City of New York, Annual Report of the Comptroller
(New York: 1972-1973), 422.
4. Ibid., p. 440.
5. Ibid., p. 428.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. See the discussion of debt management policies
in chapter two.
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APPENDIX B: THE LOCAL REVENUE STRUCTURE, 1961-1975
This appendix examines the local revenue structure.
Following the same procedure as in Appendix A, a time-
series analysis of the local tax system is presented. The
increasing size of the tax structure and the change in the
composition of that system is assessed. The appendix first
looks at the relationship between the local and non-local
portions of the total revenue budget. Then the analysis
of the local structure begins. The major tax measures are
listed along with a description of the coverage for each
tax and the present rates of taxation. The local revenue
structure is then divided into three categories: Personal
taxes, which are paid by individuals and households,
business taxes, those taxes paid by the business sector,
and, property taxes, paid by both residential and commercial
landowners.
The analysis of the New York City revenue structure
begins with a look at that overall structure in fiscal
1976. A look at the 1976 revenue totals shows the City's
tax system as it was structured at the start of the fiscal
crisis. The discussion of the 1976 revenue structure also
shows the portion of city revenues contributed by all
levels of government. The analysis proceeds by dividing
each level of the revenue structure into its component
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parts. Throughout this appendix, the intent is to examine
the changing size and composition of the local revenue
structure.
This analysis revolves around two factors that have
interacted to create the tax system now in effect: (1) the
absolute growth rates for the various components of the
local revenue system and (2) the shifting contribution of
these components to the total and local revenue structure.
From the perspective of the local revenue structure, for
example, the major development during the 16-year period
of analysis has been the growth in local revenue
collections. However, while locally raised revenues have
increased substantially, intergovernmental aid has increased
at an even faster pace. This has resulted in local revenue
growth rates that are lower than the growth rate for the
total revenue system (local and intergovernmental funds).
The changes in the composition of the local revenue
structure is another area of concern. In the analysis of
growth rates, the changing size of the city's revenue budget
is examined. In the analysis of compositional changes,
the shifting contribution of various classes of taxpayers
to the local revenue "pie" is assessed. The introduction
of the personal income tax, for example, represented a
policy decision to increase the portion of local revenues
contributed by individuals and households. Similarly, the
introduction of the commercial rent occupancy tax had the
effect of increasing the tax burden on those businesses
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that lease space relative to those firms that own real
property.
Much of the public debate surrounding the New York
City crisis focuses on such issues as the perceived increase
in the tax rates, and the growing share of local taxes
paid by the business community, or by individual residents.
Careful analysis of the local revenue structure shows
that not all of the perceived trends in the local revenue
system in fact exist. This in turn, might suggest that
some city tax policy initiatives may be designed to solve
problems that do not exist.
A. REVENUE BUDGET, 1976
Total revenue from all sources was $11.4 billion for
the year 1976, as shown in Table B-l. This aggregate
amount included $2.7 billion of state assistance from all
categories and another $2.6 billion in federal intergovern-
mental aid. These figures accounted for 24 percent and 23
percent of total New York City funds respectively.
The $5.9 billion raised from local revenue sources
was 52 percent of total revenue for the year. Within the
locally raised revenue category, tax levy (property tax)
funds of $2.97 billion and general fund revenues (non-
property taxes) of $2.98 billion were almost equal, with
each category accounting for 50 percent of local revenue
or 26 percent of total city funds.
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The City's General Fund is the account into which
all non-property tax revenues are deposited. It includes
the major personal taxes, the city's business taxes,
special sales/use or excise taxes, and all other city revenue
sources.
The major personal taxes are the retail sales tax
and the personal income/non-residents earnings taxes. In
fiscal 1976, these two categories represented 32 percent
of general fund revenue and approximately 8 percent of
total city revenues. Personal income tax collections were
$527 million or 17 percent of general fund revenues. Sales
tax receipts (as allocated to New York's revenue budget)
were $445 million or 14 percent of general fund revenues.
(As part of the financing for the Municipal Assistance
Corporation, (MAC), the corporation has first claim on City
sales tax revenues. After the subtraction of MAC debt
service and operating expenses, remaining sales tax receipts
are released to the City. Sales tax collections were
$825 million. The $445 million sales tax figure is the
residual after the subtraction of almost $380 million for
the so-called Municipal Assistance Tax Fund.) The various
business income taxes in aggregate contributed 26 percent of
general fund revenues or approximately 7 percent of total
city revenue for the fiscal year.
The general corporation tax was 53 percent of total
business income taxes and 7 percent of local revenue
collections. The tax on financial corporations was next in
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magnitude. That levy accounted for one-fourth of the total
business income taxes. Receipts from the financial tax
were slightly over $200 million in 1976. Utility tax
collections were 12.0 percent of business income taxes
collected and 1.6 percent of total locally raised revenue
in 1976. The insurance corporation tax and the transpor-
tation corporation tax are the remaining corporate income
taxes. These two levies provide smaller portions of local
revenue.
The selective sales and use taxes are a group of
taxes that are more narrowly based than is the virtually
all-inclusive 8 percent city/state retail sales tax. The
stock transfer tax is the largest revenue producer among
the selective sales tax category, and is one of the major
revenue sources in the city. Stock transfer tax receipts
of $269 million accounted for 60 percent of the revenue in
the selective sales tax groups. In addition, a number of
automobile-related taxes (including gasoline taxes,
registration fees, commercial motor vehicle tax and other)
generate 17 percent of selective sales tax revenues (79.5
million). Another group of taxes directed towards
consumers of cigarettes generates $50 million annually.
The balance of local revenue is generated by water
charges of over $200 million (or 3.7 percent of total
revenue), various fares, user charges, license fees (1.8
percent), tolls and other miscellaneous revenue sources
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(2.2 percent). The "other" revenue cateogry in aggregate
accounts for 6.2 percent of city raised funds.
B. LOCAL CONTRIBUTION TO TOTAL CITY REVENUE
The most significant feature of the New York City
revenue system has been the decreasing share of revenues
raised by the local government. In a section of the
Commission's final report (and in the Interim Report devoted
entirely to intergovernmental aid), the increasing amounts
of state and federal assistance are analyzed. This
external aid increased in absolute terms and also in terms
of its contribution to the total amount of revenues available
for New York City. An increase in Federal/State aid meant
that a smaller and smaller portion of total revenue was
locally raised.
Table B-2 shows that in the sixteen-year period
between 1961 and 1976, the portion of city revenue raised
locally decreased from 77 percent to 52 percent. The 1976
figure (52 percent of total revenue) was a shift from the
preceeding year when for the first time locally raised
revenue was less than 50 percent of the total revenue
available to the City. 1975 was the last fiscal year before
the imposition of financial controls on the City and its
finances. The upward shift in the City's contribution to
total revenues might therefore reflect the impact of
external controls. Two other factors may also account for
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the increasing local contribution to total revenues when
comparing fiscal 1975 and 1976. One factor is a sharp
decrease in state assistance and the other is a decrease in
total revenues during the fiscal 1975-76 period.
State assistance payments to New York City were
decreased from $3.7 billion in 1975 to $2.7 billion in 1976.
The state aid represented 31.1 percent of total city
revenue in 1976. The 1976 fiscal year was also the only
year during the 1961-76 period when total revenues available
to the city were less than those available in the preceeding
fiscal year. Total revenue was equal to $12 billion in
fiscal 1975 and had dropped to $11.4 billion in 1976.
The combination of decreased state aid, a drop in total
revenues and the presence of the financial control board,
increased the City's share of its total revenues to a level
in excess of the 50 percent margin. This is significant
because the 50 percent level of funding is often seen as a
"tipping point" signalling the continued viability of a
local government. If a municipal entity receives the
majority of its funding from outside sources, the integrity
and therefore the viability of that governmental entity is
questioned.
C. PROPERTY-BASED AND NON-PROPERTY TAXES
The local revenues of New York City are generated by
the tax levy (property tax) and the general fund (non-property
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taxes). As is the case with local revenues in general,
both the property tax and non-property taxes are declining
as portions of total revenue during the 1961-76 period.
The local property tax accounted for 41.9 percent of
total city revenue in fiscal 1961. In 1976, the property
2
tax accounted for 26.0 percent of local revenue. This
decline in the property tax's share of revenues occurred
while property taxes receipts were rising annually, if at
an unsteady rate of growth. In general, property tax
revenues are more stable from year to year than are the
proceeds from non-property tax sources.
The annual rate of growth in external assistance
(state or federal aid) was greater than the rate of growth
for the tax levy. Non-property tax revenues also
increased at a more rapid rate than did property tax
receipts. One of the effects of the varying growth rates
for different revenue sources is indicated by the declining
percentage share of property taxes to total New York City
revenues.
The General Fund revenues of New York City accounted
for 35.1 percent of total revenues at the beginning of
the 1961-76 period of analysis. At the end of that time
span, in fiscal 1976, the General Fund share of revenue
had declined to 26.2 percent of total revenues. The
proceeds from general fund taxes increased far more rapidly
than did revenues from the property tax levy over the same
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period. In addition, the growth pattern for general fund
revenues was not as consistent as the more stable property
tax levy. Increases in general fund revenues help to
explain the relatively slower decline in the general fund's
share of New York City revenues.
As was the case with tax levy funds and with the
locally raised revenue category in aggregate, major shifts
in the general fund's share of local revenue were occurring
in the middle or late 1960's.
The significance of the mid/late 1960's in any analysis
of the changing New York revenue structure is evidenced by
the greater than average rate of change in the revenue
composition occurring during that period. A combination
of local and non-local policy initiatives were in part
responsible for the changes in the city's contribution to
its own finances. -
The most important development in the local arena
was the major tax reform implemented in 1966. The Lindsay
Administration, relying in large part on the recommendations
of the previous Commission on City Finances (1966), sponsored
a revamping of the city's tax system. The changes were
successful in generating additional operating revenues for
the city government.
The increases in federal and state assistance were
the complementary and equally significant developments
occurring outside of New York. Intergovernmental aid from
both sources was increased substantially during this period.
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This led to an increase in local revenue due to city
policy and an increase in state/federal aid. Both of
these factors combined to rapidly expand the local govern-
ment sector in New York.
This section of the thesis will analyse the local
revenue structure of the city. The term local revenues
refers to the part of the city's total revenue that is
raised by the municipal government.
To facilitate the analysis of the local revenue system,
the total local revenue will be broken down into its
component parts. Generally, the local sources of munici-
pal finance are classified as taxes on real property and
all other revenues, which are called non-property taxes.
This dichotomy is based on the historical fact that property
taxes were (and are) the primary revenue source for local
government entities. New York City was the leader in the
development and imposition of non-property taxes, starting
with the sales tax in 1934. The state constitution delegates
the power to levy property taxes to its local government.
However, any non-property taxes proposed by localities
must be approved by the state legislature before they can
take effect.
The overall classification of non-property tax can
itself be further divided according to that segment of the
economy upon which the tax burden is initially visited.
Personal taxes, such as the tax on personal incomes, are
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paid by individuals. Business taxes, for example the
commercial occupancy tax, are paid by corporations, partner-
ships, or other firms.
D. PROPERTY OR NON-PROPERTY TAXES: RELATIVE MERITS
The city of New York was one of the earliest users
of non-property taxes as a significant part of the local
revenue structure. However, non-property taxes have now
become commonplace for municipalities throughout the nation
as means were sought to diversify the sources of local
revenue. The primary reason for this development was a
rapid increase in municipal expenditures, and a resultant
increase in local property taxes. In addition, the property
tax is one of the least popular forms of taxation and
is considered by some to be a very regressive or inequitable
tax.
The various types of non-property taxes have a number
of qualities that make them popular substitutes and/or
supplements to the traditional property tax levy. There
are three reasons usually cited as arguments for the use of
non-property taxes. First, the use of non-property taxes
can facilitate property tax relief. Such relief can take
the form of a reduction in the percentage rate of taxation,
or a reduction or elimination of anticipated tax rate
increases. A second rationale for non-property taxes
concerns the relatively high revenue yields associated with
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the imposition of the more widely used non-property taxes.
In the case of the income tax or the sales tax for example,
low percentage rates of taxation can produce large amounts
4
of revenue, especially in urban areas.
A third reason for the use of non-propetty taxes is
the greater sensitivity of such taxes to economic changes,
wehther positive or negative. The yield from an income
tax automatically increases as the income of those in its
area of coverage does. Similarly, losses in local income
will result in lower revenue yields. Thus the non-property
taxes are more immediately adjusted to changing economic
conditions.
Finally, the use of non-property taxes enables
localities to tax non-residents (commuters, tourists, etc.),
and in that way to partially offset the cost of services
provided to these groups. The New York City government
accomplishes this by imposing an earnings tax on non-residents
who work in the city.
While there are reasons favoring the use of non-
property taxes, there are also many problems associated
with the use of such devices.
The most important problem is caused by the local
basis of non-property taxes. The non-property taxes are
often levied by the smallest governmental subdivision instead
of on a metropolitan or larger regional basis. This
results in a tax-burden differential between neighboring
municipalities, which in turn might affect the locational
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decisions of businesses and individuals. This is clearly
the case in New York. Movements from the city to jurisdic-
tions with lower taxes have, in large part, been responsible
for the economic decline of New York.
The property tax is still the largest single source
of local government revenue for New York City and for other
localities nationwide. The use of real property as the
basis for local taxes has been a practice as old as the
United States itself. As late as 1940, the property tax
was responsible for 40 percent of all taxes by all levels
5
of government. Since the 1930's the property tax's share of
total governmental revenue has declined. The significance
of the measure as a local tax source is still considerable,
however. In fiscal 1973, property taxes produced over 80
percent of local tax revenue and over one-third (37 percent)
of combined state/local revenue. States have gradually
relinquished their portion of property tax collections as
the tax became a more exclusively local basis for taxation.
The major quality that argues for the continued use
of the unpopular property tax is its neutrality with respect
to influencing the locational decisions of businesses
and individuals. The major non-property tax revenue
sources can cause differential tax burdens within regions.
This in turn creates an incentive for tax avoidance by
relocations. Real property is an immobile asset, incapable
of relocating. Since businesses must locate near their
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markets, and workers must live near their places of work,
the property tax will therefore continue as a major con-
tributor to local revenues.
E. BUSINESS TAXES
The taxation of the city's business community was
reorganized in 1966 as part of a major tax system reform.
The use of the gross receipts type of business tax was
eliminated in favor of an income-based tax. In addition,
the taxation of business was organized around separate
taxes levied on financial corporations, unincorporated
businesses, utilities, and the general corporate income
tax.
1. GENERAL CORPORATION TAX
The general corporation tax is authorized by the
four-part city business tax. It is imposed on all corporate
entities owning or leasing property, maintaining an office,
or conducting business within the city. Firms subject to
another business income tax are exempt from payment of
the general corporation tax. 6
The basis for taxation is the entire net income of
the subject corporation. The city uses the New York State
definition of net income. The state definition is in most
respects similar to the federal standard, although there
are a number of variations between the two. For example,
- 115 -
interest on certain federal or municipal bonds may be tax
exempt for federal tax purposes, but not for city income
taxes. Such interest must be included in the computation
of income. Similarly, where the federal government requires
the inclusion of the value of gifts, such gifts are excluded
from the city's computation of net income.
After the computation of taxable income, the rates
of taxation are a flat 10.05 percent of calculated income.
There are three alternate methods of calculating the required
tax payments, involving capital investments, salaries of
corporate officers, and other weighted factors. Most firms,
however, pay the easier-to-calculate flat rate.
2. UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS TAX
The New York City tax on unincorporated businesses
was enacted in 1966 as another part of the tax system reform
package. The tax is applicable to any unincorporated entity
that engages in commerce, business, or the professions,
either wholly or partly in the city. The tax is patterned
on a similar levy imposed by New York State. One significant
difference between the city and the state measures is the
inclusion of professions--law, medicine, architects, etc.
among those liable under the city tax. The major exemption
from the measure applies to that group of unincorporated
businesses that are subject to the city's tax on utilities.
The city also imposes a tax on vendors of utility services.
Payment of this tax exempts businesses from the unincorporated
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levy.
The tax is levied against the taxable income of the
business. The federal definition of gross income is the
starting point in the calculation of city taxable income
for this levy. A number of variations from the federal
definition of income are used as is a modified federal
exemption/deduction schedule.
After calculation of the taxable income, the rate of
taxation is equal to 10.05 percent of income. Credits of
all or part of the tax are available for businesses whose
tax payments are less than $200.
3. FINANCIAL CORPORATION TAX
The tax on financial corporations is also part of the
New York City business tax. Payment of the financial tax
excludes the payee from obligations under the general
corporation tax. The financial corporation tax is imposed
on savings and commercial banks, trust companies, savings
and loan associations, and other financial institutions
7
chartered by the state. National banks, federal savings
and loan associations, and credit associations that do
business in the city are also taxed according to a calcula-
tion of their New York City-earned share of income. The
calculation of the tax-paying firm's income uses the same
definition as does the general corporation tax. Similarly,
where alternate methods of income calculation are available,
- 117 -
the alternative that produces the highest taxable income
is required to be used.
Once taxable income is determined, the tax rate is
13.8 percent of net city income for institutions other
than savings banks and Savings and Loan Associations. An
alternative method of tax payment calculation (to be used
if a higher tax liability results) figures 2.6 mills on each
dollar of apportioned issued capital stock.
For savings banks and loan associations, the tax rate
is generally 12.1 percent of New York City income. The
alternative method of calculating the tax is 2.6 percent of
the amount of interest or dividends credited to depositors
or shareholders.
4. UTILITY TAX
The city's tax on utilities is imposed on the operators
of every utility or vendor of utility services. Any
such establishment that owns property, holds a franchise,
or does business in New York must pay this tax. 8
Public utilities are those firms subject to the
supervision of the State Public Service Department. They
provide gas, electricity, steam, water, refrigeration,
telephony or telegraphy or operate omnibusses. Vendors of
utility services are those engaging in similar activities
but not subject to the Public Service Department's
supervision. Utility vendors, as opposed to operators,
are subject to the general corporation tax in addition to
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the utility tax. Utility operators, are tax exempt from
the general tax on the basis of their utility tax payments.
The tax is based on the gross income of the firm, which
consists of all receipts prior to deductions for business
expenses. The New York City acquired share of income is
the basis for collections of firms operating in other areas.
The rates for the various types of utilities are as
follows: For utilities and vendors of utility services,
the tax rate is 2.35 percent of gross income. For the
operators of omnibusses, the rate is 1.17 percent of gross
income. And, for railroads, the tax rate is 3.52 percent of
gross income.
5. COMMERCIAL RENT OCCUPANCY TAX
The city's commercial rent or occupancy tax is leveled
on every tenant engaged in business, commerce or the
professions. Although certain exemptions apply to very
small and/or unprofitable businesses, the tax is paid by
virtually all tenants in the city. 9
The tax liability is calculated from the base rent
payment of the tenant. After allowable adjustments to the
base rent are calculated, the following rate-/schedule is
used to determine the tax.
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ANNUAL RENTS
Rents Tax Rates
$ 0-2,499 2-1/2 percent
$ 2,500-4,999 5 percent
$ 5,000-7,999 6-1/4 percent
$ 8,000-10,999 7 percent
$11,000 and over 7-1/2 percent
6. OTHER BUSINESSES TAXES
The General Corporation Tax, the Financial Corporation
Tax, the Unincorporated Business Tax, the utility tax and
the Commercial Rent Occupancy Tax are the largest revenue
producers in the City's business tax structure. They are
not, however, the only taxes whose initial burden falls on the
business community. The City's corporate income tax laws
include other levies that produce lesser amounts of revenue.
The tax measures listed above, excluding the commercial
rent occupancy tax, accounted for over 95 percent of
corporate income tax payments in fiscal 1976. (The
commercial rent occupancy tax is not an income-based levy,
as are the other business taxes discussed. However, it has
been, since its introduction in 1963, a major contributor
to the local revenue system.)
The remaining income-based business taxes are the
Transportation Corporation Tax and the insurance Corporation
Tax. In 1976, these two levies produced one million and
fifteen million dollars, respectively. In addition, there
are a number of selective sales taxes that impact on the
business sector.
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The vault tax and the conveyance of real property
tax are exemplary of the smaller revenue producing taxes
utilized by the city. The vault tax is often cited as an
example of the nuisance taxes collected by New York. The
tax is imposed for the "privilege" of having a vault, which
is any subsurface opening that extends beyond the building
line and into the public streets. Collections under this
tax totalled $4 million in 1976. The conveyance of real
property tax is levied on the transfer of deeds for any
property worth more than $25,000. That tax produced $15
million in fiscal 1976.
F. THE BUSINESS SECTOR SHARE OF LOCAL REVENUE
The New York City business community pays its local
taxes through three basic measures. Along with individuals
and families, the businesses pay real property taxes. In
addition, contributions to the city's general fund are
made through the various business income taxes and the
commercial rent occupancy tax. While these are not the only
tax measures that are levied on businesses, these taxes
in combination account for the overwhelming majority of
business tax payments to New York City.
Business tax collections represented 24 percent of
general fund revenues and 10.9 percent of total local
revenues in 1961. In 1975, the year that the fiscal crisis
became public, the share of taxes paid by the business
community was virtually the same as that for 1961, 15 years
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earlier (23.7 percent). The share of total revenues was
11.5 percent.10
Although the aggregate difference of less than one
percentage point is insignificant, in fact there have been
substantial changes in the business sector's share of local
revenues. The shift to the corporate income tax base from
the previously-used gross receipts tax base was begun in
1967. That year serves as the dividing point between two
distinct patterns of tax payments by the business sector.
Prior to 1967, an increasing share of local taxes were
being paid by businesses under the gross receipts system.
The introduction of the income-based tax system resulted
in a more stable proportion of business/total local taxes.
The shift also resulted in a decline in the business
community's contribution to local revenues.
During the "gross receipts era" of 1961-1966, the
business tax share of general fund revenues increased
steadily. In 1961 business tax collections accounted for
24.0 percent of general fund revenues and 10.9 percent of
total local revenue. In 1966, the proportion had increased
to 31.8 percent of general fund collections and 13.3 percent
of total revenue.
The last fiscal year under the old business tax system
was 1966. In 1967, the newly implemented income-based
taxes resulted in the business community's share of revenue
declining substantially. The business share of revenues
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dropped from 31.8 percent of general fund collections, to
25.7 percent. The share of locally raised revenue dropped
from 13.3 percent in 1966 to 11.4 percent in 1967.
For the period from 1966-1975 the business community's
revenue share declined from 31.8 percent to 23.7 percent
of local revenue. This was almost the exact reverse of the
gross receipts era when a rise from 24 percent to 31.8 percent
occurred. The decline was fairly consistent with the
business community's local revenue share equalling about 24
percent in 1968-1969, 23 percent in 1970-1971, and slightly
more than 22 percent from 1972-1974. The aftermath of the
fiscal crisis caused an increase in the business community's
local revenue share, to the 30 percent level effective before
the income tax-based system was introduced. In fiscal-
1976, General Fund revenues included 30.5 percent of business
tax payments. The business sector's contribution was
15.3 percent of local revenue.
The impact of new taxes on the business sector appears
to have been to redistribute the tax burden within the
business sector. The introduction of major new taxes did
not cause any increase in the percentage share of local
taxes contributed by the business community.
During the 1961-1975 period of concern, the two major
initiatives in the business tax area have been the
introduction of the commercial rent occupancy tax in 1964
and the restructuring of the business tax base in 1967. As
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a result of each initiative, the local revenue share
contributed by the business sector declined.
Prior to 1964, the general corporation tax and utility
tax were the major sources of business sector revenues.
The entire business community, utilities excluded, paid
their local taxes through the general corporation levy.
In fiscal 1963, general corporation tax collections of
$235 million accounted for 11.5 percent of local tax
revenues. 1 Utility tax collections were $27 million in the
same year. In combination, the two business sector taxes
produced 28.7 percent of general fund revenue and 12.8
percent of total local revenue.
The introduction of the commercial rent occupancy
tax had the primary effect of reducing collections under
the general corporate tax. Revenues from that tax declined
by 17 percent, from $235 million in 1963 to $195 million
in fiscal 1964. Since utility tax collections maintained
a 1.3 percent share of local revenues in both years, the
occupancy tax collections served to partially offset the
decline in the corporate tax's local revenue share. It
did not increase the share paid by the business sector.
The combined general corporation and occupancy tax collec-
tions in 1964 equalled 11.2 percent of locally raised
revenue. The amount is almost identical (0.3 percentage
points less, in fact) to the contribution in the previous
year (11.5 percent).
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The business sector's total contribution to local
taxes declined slightly in 1964. As mentioned earlier,
the 1963 contribution from all business tax sources was
equal to 28.7 percent of general fund revenue and 12.5
percent of local revenue. In 1964, the corresponding
figures were 26.2 percent of general fund revenue and 12.5
percent of locally raised taxes.
In fiscal 1967, a major reorganization of the local
revenue structure took place. For the business sector,
the most significant change was from the gross receipts to
the income basis for taxation. The previously all-encompas-
sing general corporation tax was supplemented by separate
income taxes for the financial sector, the transportation
industry, etc. As was the case with the introduction of
the commercial rent occupancy tax, the system changes resulted
in the business community's share of locally raised revenues
declining. In fact, the decline between fiscal 1966 and 1967
was even more pronounced than was the earlier shift caused
by the occupancy tax. The introduction of personal income
tax as part of the tax system reform package provided
additional revenues that permitted the business community's
share of local revenues to decline.
In fiscal 1966, the business sector's share of
revenues equalled 31.8 percent of general fund monies and
13.3 percent of local revenue. This aggregate amount includes
payments under the general corporation tax (9.0 percent of
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local revenue), the utility tax (1.3 percent). The new
tax structure introduced in 1967 caused the general cor-
poration tax's revenue share to drop from 9 percent to
4.6 percent. The commercial rent occupancy tax's revenue
share also declined slightly from 3 percent to 2.6 percent
of local revenue. An increase in utility tax collections of
over 30 percent caused that levy's share of local revenue
to increase slightly, from 1.3 to 1.4 percent.
In aggregate, the business sector paid 25.7 percent
of general fund revenues and 11.4 percent of local collec-
tions in 1967. This was substantially less than the previous
year when payment accounted for 31.8 percent of general
fund monies and 13.3 percent of total local revenue.
G. PERSONAL TAXES
Personal taxes are those whose initial impact falls
on individuals or households. In New York City the major
personal taxes are the retail sales tax and the personal
income tax. These two levies are the largest non-property
tax sources nationwide.
The use of the sales tax is widespread although the
tax is levied on a statewide, as opposed to a citywide,
basis in many cases. The personal income tax is less widely
used by state and local governments.
In fiscal 1971, 13 of the nation's 48 largest cities
imposed a personal income tax. Collections nationwide
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totalled $1.7 billion, of which $1.5 billion was raised by
12
city governments. Thus, the personal income tax is
primarily a revenue source for urban areas. Often the income
tax is adopted as a means of property tax relief.
Sales taxes are second to the property tax as a source
of local revenue. In fiscal 1972, sales tax collections
totalled $3.7 billion. More than one-half (precisely 26)
of the nation's 48 largest cities, utilize the local sales
tax as a source of revenue.
1. SALES TAX
The tax on retail sales, formerly the sales and use
tax, is the original form of non-property tax used by the
city of New York. The tax was instituted during the
depression of the 1930's.3 The state legislature at that
time granted approval of the measure as a temporary means
of financing the heavy public assistance expenditures
required during that period. The original intent was to
discontinue the authorization, and therefore the sales tax
itself, when the public assistance needs of the city would
decrease to a level capable of financing from the property
tax levy. However, through a series of political compromises
and due to the lobby efforts of the New York City government,
the decision was made to let the city utilize sales tax
revenues for purposes other than social welfare expenditures.
The sales tax is imposed upon the retail purchase of
any tangible property. Sales of most services are also
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taxable. The city generally follows the definitions and
exemption schedules included in the state's sales and use
tax. 11
The most significant difference between the state and
city measures is that the city taxes the sale of manufac-
turing equipment and machinery while the state does not.
Similarly, the state exempts the sale of fuel and utility
services used in manufacturing processes while the city does
not. The present rate of the sales tax is 4 percent of the
retail price of goods. Since the state also has a 4 percent
tax, the total New York City tax on sales is 8 percent.
The city's sales tax predates the state sales tax
by quite a few years. However, the city's sales tax is
now administered by the state government. Sales tax revenues
are used to fund debt service (principal and interest)
payments for the bond issues of the Municipal Assistance
Corporation (MAC). After the subtraction of MAC's debt
service and operating costs, whatever sales tax receipts
are remaining are transferred to the city. These residual
sales tax receipts are included in the city's general fund
in the same manner as before the creation of MAC.
2. USE TAX
The use tax is complementary to the sales tax. All
tangible personal property used in New York City and not
subject to the city's sales tax is subject to the use
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tax, whose rate is identical to the sales tax.14 The levy
is intended to tax those retail purchases made outside of
New York City but used within the city. Imposition of the
tax removes the economic incentive for city residents to
shop in surburban stores in order to avoid the sales tax.
Most use tax collections are for auto sales in other parts
of the metropolitan area.
Sales tax collections have been increasing at an
average annual rate of 7.3 percent for the 1961-1975 period.
In spite of the growth rate for the sales tax, the even
faster growth of other revenue sources meant that the
portion of the city's local revenues generated by the sales
tax decreased. In 1975, sales tax collections represented
28.0 percent of general fund taxes (and 13.6 percent of
total locally raised revenue). This represents a decline
of 7 percentage points when compared to the 1961 contribu-
tion. In fiscal 1961, the sales tax accounted for 35 percent
of general fund revenues and 16 percent of total local
revenue.
The sales tax's contribution to total city revenue
also declined over the last 15 years. In fiscal 1961, the
$303 million of sales tax revenue was 12.3 percent of all
revenues. In 1975 the percentage had dropped to 6.6
percent. The distinction between the local revenue share
and the total revenue share is important to make. The
sales tax's declining share of total revenues is primarily
the result of intergovernmental contributions. The decline
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in the local revenue share is the result of policy decisions
by the city administration.
3. PERSONAL INCOME TAX
The New York City tax on residents' personal income
was first collected in 1966. Created as part of a major
revision of the city's tax system, the levy was imposed
concurrently with a tax on the New York City-earned income
of nonresidents. Thus the tax on residents' incomes can
be collected only so long as the complementary commuters
tax is in effect. The tax is similar in most respects to
15
the state personal income tax. Rate schedules are different
from the state levy, but the city uses the state's defini-
tion of income and also follows the same schedule of
deductions and exemptions.
The personal income tax is administered by the state
tax commission for the city. The tax is collected along
with the state tax and refunds are mailed from Albany.
Revenues are then transferred to New York City.
4. NON-RESIDENT EARNINGS TAX
The tax on earnings of nonresidents is the companion
measure to the city's personal income tax. The city is
authorized to impose such a tax only as long as the resi-
dents personal income tax is in effect.16 The tax must be
paid by anyone who earns a wage within the city and is not
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subject to the income tax. Salaries and the income of
self-employed persons are also subject to the tax. Once
the taxable income has been determined the tax calculated
is equal to 45/100 of one percent of total city taxable
earned income for wage earnings. The rate of taxation for
self-employed persons is 65/100 of one percent.
Personal income tax collections have grown by an
average annual rate of 16.5 percent for the 1967-1975
period. This is about 25 percent greater than the overall
revenue growth rate of 12.1 percent.
The tax was introduced as a part of a tax-reform
program designed to increase the revenue-generating capacity
of the local tax structure. In this regard the effort was
successful. The 16.5 percent average annual growth rate
is composed of a very erratic pattern of large revenue
increases and two fiscal years when collections under the
tax declined.
As a share of general fund revenues, the income tax
maintained a relatively stable share from its introduction
in 1967 until 1971. In 1972 the tax's share of general
fund revenues increased sharply. This was followed by
another period of relative stability, which continued up to
the start of the fiscal crisis period.
Over the 10 years that it has been in existence, the
income tax has grown in importance was a contributor to
total local finance. In 1967, collections of $130 million
accounted for 10.4 percent of general fund revenues and
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4.5 percent of total local revenues. By 1975, income tax
collections were $466 million. That figure represents 16.5
percent of general fund revenues and 8 percent of local
revenue.
5. OTHER PERSONAL TAXES
In addition to the sales tax and the personal income
tax, there are a number of other city tax measures that impact
upon the individual consumer. None of these older taxes pro-
duce the amount of revenue generated by the sales and income
tax levies. They remain the major components of the personal
tax area.
Another component of the personal tax burden is the tax
on the use, possession, or operation of motor vehicles. The
city has a number of different taxes that are imposed on
automobile users. These are the tax on commercial motor
vehicles, the auto use tax, and the parking tax. In addition,
there is a tax on the use of gasoline, a separate tax on
leaded gasolines, and the motor vehicle registration fee.
The taxes on gasoline and the registration fees are paid by
all state residents. New York receives a portion of these
revenues and includes these revenues in its listing of selec-
tive sales/use taxes.
Of the total amount of auto-related taxes, the auto
use tax and the gasoline and motor fuel taxes are the great-
est producers of revenues.
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The City also imposes two taxes on the purchase of
cigarettes. The cigarette tax is payable by the consumer
of cigarettes. It is a flat 80 tax per package of 20 ciga-
rettes. The tax is paid in the form of stamps that are
affixed to each package of cigarettes. The City also has
a tax on the basis of the tar and nicotine content in ciga-
rettes. The tax is progressively higher on cigarettes hav-
ing greater amounts of the taxed substances.
H. THE PERSONAL TAX SHARE OF LOCAL REVENUE
Analysis of the business tax structure indicated that
the perceived increase in the business community's share of
local taxes did not really occur within the period of concern.
A similar analysis of personal taxes indicates that there
was some increase in the proportion of local revenues con-
tributed by individual tax payers.
The combined sale and personal income tax collections
can be used as an approximation of personal tax payments.
From that perspective, the increasing share of local reven-
ues contributed by individuals is seen to be the result of
the personal income tax implemented in fiscal 1967.
Prior to 1967, the sales tax was the largest source of
non-property tax revenue and the primary means of personal
taxation. During the 1961-1966 period sales taxes accounted
for between 16 and 18 percent of total local revenue. The
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introduction of the personal income tax had two impacts on
the personal tax area. First, the levy caused a shift of
the personal tax burden from the sales tax to the new tax
measure. Second, the overall contribution of individuals to
the local revenue structure began to increase slowly. As
personal income tax collections grew, the share of local
revenues contributed by individuals increased also.
Thus, in fiscal 1967, the sales tax's share of local
revenue dropped from 16 percent to 13.4 percent. When adding
the contribution of personal income tax, however, the over-
all revenue share for individual tax payers increased from
16 percent to 18 percent. By fiscal 1972, the local revenue
share paid by individuals had increased to over 20 percent,
with the personal income tax accounting for most of the addi-
tional contribution. Income tax collections in that year
provided 9.9 percent of total local revenues as opposed to
the 4.6 percent figure in 1967. Individual contributions to
the local revenue structure were consistently greater than
20 percent in the post-1971 period. In 1976, the "MAC take
out" of sales tax funds caused the relative share of personal
taxes to decline.
1. REAL PROPERTY TAX
The property tax is the greatest single source of
locally raised revenues. The power to levy the tax is the
only taxing power specifically delegated to the City by the
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New York State constitution. New York's property tax is
administered by the Department of Finance. That agency is
responsible for assessing the value of taxable property and
with the collection of tax payents. Property assessments
form the base for the tax levy.
The annual assessments must be completed by the 25th
of January.17 Property owners are permitted to file a review
if they feel their property has been overassessed. The
City Tax Commission is the body that has the power to adjust
the Finance Department's assessments upon the complaint of
the tax payer. Applications for an assessment correction
must be filed by March 15th.
Property assessments are supposed to be made equal to
the full market value of the property. This rarely occurs,
however. Instead, property is assessed at various fractions
of its full value. In general, commercial or business prop-
erty is assessed at a higher assessed/full-value ratio than
are residential properties. And, within the residential
property category, one- and two-family houses are assessed
at a lower ratio than are multiple dwellings.
The total assessed value of the City's real property
and the amount of money to be raised by the tax levy are the
two determinants of the annual property tax rate. The
year's tax levy divided by the total assessed value of prop-
erty produces the tax rate which is expressed as a payment
for every $100 of assessed value. The property tax is paid
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quarterly on the first day of August, October, January
and April.
The State Constitution places limits upon the amount
of the property tax levy. Although localities are respon-
sible for determining the tax rate that rate must be equal
or less than the so called "2 percent limitation." This
ceiling limits the property tax levy to 2 percent of the
average full value of taxable real property as calculated
over the previous five years.
This limitation applies to tax levy funds that will
be used to finance the City's operating budget. An addi-
tional and virtually unlimited tax levy is allowed for the
debt service payments associated with the City's long-term
debt obligations. New York's general obligation bonds are
backed by the City's full faith, credit, and taxing power.
Specifically, debt-service obligations are backed by a lien
on the City's property tax revenues. Such obligations are
a major part of the city's uncontrollable expenditures.
As such, debt-service payments are categorized as tax levy
payments "outside the 2 percent limitation." The amount
of the payments are a function of the interest and amortiza-
tion payments required in any fiscal year.
Property tax collections increased at an average
annual rate of 7.9 percent for the 1961-1975 period of
analysis. The rate of growth was much slower than the growth
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in total revenues. Since overall revenue increased at an
average annual rate of 12.1 percent, the portion of the
total revenue represented by the property tax declined
steadily.
Between 1966 and 1971, property tax revenues grew by
47.6 percent, less than one-half as fast as the total rev-
enue growth over the same period. As a portion of local
revenue, the property tax declined slightly over the period
of analysis. While generating 54.4 percent of local revenue
in 1961, the corresponding figure for 1975 was 51.5 percent.
In fiscal 1966, a sharp decline in sales tax revenues and
corporate tax payments occured. This had the effects of
increasing the property tax's share of local revenue to 59.2
percent as compared to 53.6 percent in fiscal 1965. 1972
was the only. 'fiscal year in which the property tax's share
of local revenue dropped below the 50 percent level. In
that year, general fund revenue increased by over 1/3 (34%)
and property tax revenues grew by only 5.2 percent.
Of course, the general fund is complementary to the
property tax in that a decreasing local revenue contribution
by the property tax is tantamount to an increase in the gen-
eral fund category's share. The aggregate shift over the
1961-1975 period caused the general fund's portion of local
revenues to increase from 45.6 percent (1961) to 48.5 percent
in 1975.
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2. UNCOLLECTED TAXES
As mentioned in the analysis of property tax growth
trends, 1967 was the first year in which a decline in prop-
erty tax collections occurred. The $20 million dollar de-
cline in revenues have more symbolic than fiscal impact.
But, while a decline of 1 percent is marginal, the very
existence of a property tax decline is not a positive sign
for the future of the city's economy. Given the stability of
the property tax over the short run, the slight decline of
1976 may be the beginning of a series of declines in sub-
sequent years.
A problem of even greater fiscal importance is the
large amount of uncollected property taxes still owed the
city. In fiscal 1976, the amount of uncollected taxes from
prior years was more than 100 times the 1976 decline in an-
nual revenue collections. Over $240 million property taxes
18
was due at the end of fiscal 1976.
The large amount of uncollected property taxes influ-
ences the size of the short-term debt obligations issued by
the City. Tax Anticipation Notes are sold on the basis of
uncollected property taxes. The City assumes, (incorrectly
it has recently admitted), that all back property taxes will
eventually be paid off. It was this expectation that
allowed the City to issue TANS backed by the never-to-be-
collected property taxes.
In fiscal 1961 less than 5 percent of the City's
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property tax assessment was uncollected during the year it
was due. By fiscal 1975 the amount of uncollected taxes
was over 10 percent of total assessments. Disinvestments
from many areas of the City are responsible for much of the
tax delinquency. The abandonment of residential buildings
and the City's policy of taxing idle lands at lower rates
create the incentive for these activities (see Table B-3).
SUMMARY
In Appendix B a time-series analysis of the New York
City revenue structure is presented. A major trend observed
was: an increase in local revenues at a rate significantly
lower than the growth rate for state and federal aid. The
increases in intergovernmental assistance caused the locally
raised portion of total revenues to decline. This is impor-
tant because increased external assistance meant that city
officials had less control over the areas where additional
expenditures were to be made. The traditional local service
areas (police, sanitation, fire, etc.) often were not the
areas where increased state/federal aid was available. The
"categorical grant" approach to federal aid in this way
chanpeled "city" expenditures into new areas. Then when the
fiscal crisis began, the city was criticized for providing
many "non-traditional" city services.
The analysis also indicated that the business community's
share of local revenues has declined over the 16 year
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period of concern. This decline has been offset by a rise
in the portion of local revenues generated by personal taxes.
This finding is very interesting since it runs counter
to the popular notion that the business community is being
unfairly i-Ipacted upon in the local tax area. While taxes
for all sectors of the economy have increased over the years,
the impression of a relatively greater business tax burden
does not appear to be valid.
In spite of the conclusions based on the comptroller's
report data, most proposals concerning taxes call for busi-
ness tax cuts as the area of priority.
APPENDIX B: FOOTNOTES
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Annual Reports of 1961-1976.
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ton), p.67.
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Taxes (New York), p. 272.
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10. See Appendix C for business tax collections.
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p. 34.
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City Revenue Structure (in millions)
Fiscal Period 1961-1975
Fiscal Year 1961
Amount 7. of Total
REAL ESTAL'E TAX LEVY $1l028.3
SALES TAX 303.0
PERSONAL INCOME TAX -
GENERAL CORPORATION TAX 178.9
OTHER BUSINESS TAXES 26.3
Commercial Rent-Occupancy
Tax
Utility Tax 26.3
Financial Corporation Tax -
Unincorporated Business
Tax
Insurance Corporation Tax --
SPECIAL CITY TAXES 57.0
Cigarette Tax 72~5
Tar and Nicotine Tax -
Conveyance of Real
Property 3.6
Off-Track Betting . -
Tax on Leaded Gasoline -
Others 31.4WATER CHARGES
LICENCES, FINES, FEES 50.6
FRANCHISES, PERMITS AND
PRIVILEGES 65.2
FARES, TOLLS, RENTS,
INTEREST AND SERVICES 82.5
OTHER REVENUES 96.0
FEDERAL ASSISTANCE 96.0
STATE ASSISTANCE 1103
454.9
TOTAL$2,453.0
% Increase
41.9%
12.3
7.3
1.1
1,1
2.3
0.1
1.3
2.1
2.7
3.4
3.9
4.5
18.5
100.0%
- -
--
- -
--
....
0
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City Revenue Structure (in millions)
Fiscal Period 1961-1975
Fiscal Year 1962
Amount % of Total
REAL ESTAI'E TAX LEVY $1,070.9
SALES TAX 318.0
PERSONAL INCOME TAX -
GENERAL CORPORATION TAX 191.1
OTHER BUSINESS TAXES 26.7
Commercial Rent-Occupancy
Tax " s
Utility Tax 26.7
Financial Corporation Tax
Unincorporated Business
Tax
Insurance Corporation Tax
SPECIAL CITY TAXES 54.8
Cigarette Tax 24.4
Tar and Nicotine Tax ...
Conveyance of Real
Property 4.6
Off-Track Betting
Tax on Leaded Gasoline
Others 25.8
WATER CHARGES 58
LICENCES, FINES, FEES 51.4
FRANCHISES, PERMITS AND
PRIVILEGES
FARES, TOLLS, RENTS, 76.5
INTEREST AND SERVICES
OTHER REVENUES 08.4
FEDERAL ASSISTANCE 73.1
STATE ASSISTANCE 144.3
483.7'
TOTAL $2,578.9
41.5%
12.3
7.4
1.0
1,0
2.1
0.2
2.0
3.0
3.4
2.9
5.6
18.8
100..0%
% Increase
4.1%
4.9
6.8
1.5
1,5
-3.9
27.7
-17.9
1.5
17.3
7.1
-23.9
30.8
6.3
5.1.%
A-
_T
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City Revenue Structure (in millions)
Fiscal Period 1961-1975
Fiscal Year 1963
Amount % of Total
REAL ESTAIE TAX LEVY $1,134.5
SALES TAX 326.3
PERSONAL INCOME TAX -
GENERAL CORPORATION TAX 234.6
OTHER BUSINESS TAXES 27.3
Commercial Rent-Occupancy
Tax -.
Utility Tax 27.3
Financial Corporation Tax
Unincorporated Business
Tax
Insurance Corporation Tax
SPECIAL CITY TAXES 55.5
Cigarette Tax 23.,
Tar and Nicotine Tax
Conveyance of Real
Property 4.5Off-Track Betting
Tax on Leaded Gasoline
Others
WATER CHARGES 27,8
LICENCES, FINES, FEES 52.1
FRANCHISES, PERMITS AND
PRIVILEGES
FARES, TOLLS, RENTS, 69.9
INTEREST AND SERVICES
OTHER REVENUES 95.5
FEDERAL ASSISTANCE 44.0
STATE ASSISTANCE 165.9
564.0
TOTAL
$2,?69.6'
(.C. ~-
40.9%
11.8
,8. 5
1.0
1.0
2.0
0.2
1.0
1.9
2.5
3.4
1.6
6.0
20.4
100.0%.
% Increase
5.9%
2.6
22.7
2 2
2,2
1,2
-37U
-2,2
7.7
1.3
-8,7
8.0
-39.9
14.9
16.6
7. 3%
IA N j '"'
2 ~
- 144 -
City Revenue Structure (in millions)
Fiscal Period 1961-1975
Fiscal Year 1964
Amount % of Total % Increase
REAL ESTRPE TAX LEVY $1,220.2
SALES TAX 417.4
PERSONAL INCOME TAX ~
GENERAL CORPORATION TAX 194.9
OTHER BUSINESS TAXES 95.2
Commercial Rent-Occupancy 65.9Tax 2.
Utility Tax 29.3
Financial Corporation Tax ~~
Unincorporated Business
Tax
Insurance Corporation Tax
SPECIAL CITY TAXES 73.1
Cigarette Tax 39.0
Tar and Nicotine Tax
Conveyance of Real
Property 4.5
Off-Track Betting ..
Tax on Leaded Gasoline
Others 30.6
WATER CHARGES 53.6
LICENCES, FINES, FEES
FRANCHISES, PERMITS AND
PRIVILEGES 80.8
FARES, TOLLS, RENTS,
INTEREST AND SERVICES 102.0
OTHER REVENUES 95.4
FEDERAL ASSISTANCE 182.6
STATE ASSISTANCE 599.1
TOTAL $3,114.3
39.2%
13.4
6.3
3.0
2.1
0.9
2.3
1T7
0.1
1.0
1.7
2.6
3.3
3.1
5.9
19.2
100.0%
7.5%
27.9
-17.0
248.7
.--
7.3
31.7
.T.
0
10.0
2.8
15.5
6.8
116.8
10.0
6.2
12.4%
)C)Y' '( t F 'I \(
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City Revenue Structure (in millions)
Fiscal Period 1961-1975
Fiscal Year 196.5
Amount 7. of Total % Increase
REAL ESTI'E TAX LEVY
SALES TAX
PERSONAL INCOME TAX
GENERAL CORPORATION TAX
OTHER BUSINESS TAXES
Commercial Rent-Occupancy
Tax
Utility Tax
Financial Corporation Tax
Unincorporated Business
Tax
Insurance Corporation Tax
SPECIAL CITY TAXES
Cigarette Tax
Tar and Nicotine Tax
Conveyance of Real
Property
Off-Track Betting
Tax on Leaded Gasoline
Others
WATER CHARGES
LICENCES, FINES, FEES
FRANCHISES, PERMITS AND
PRIVILEGES
FARES, TOLLS, RENTS,
INTEREST AND SERVICES
OTHER REVENUES
FEDERAL ASSISTANCE
STATE ASSISTANCE
TOTAL
$1,313.9
441.8
247.5
101.0
70.0
31.0
79.1
u 9
5.3
32..9
53.4
78.6
101.8
36.7
218.3
655.6
$3,327.7
K- '~' c'?' t\ ' 1C ( C- vk ' 0"~ (iL t4 X 111
39.5%
13.3
7.4
3.0
2.1
0.9
2.4
0.2
1.0.
1.6
2.4
3.0 -
6.6
19.7
100.1,0%
7.6%
5.8
26.9
6.0
6.2
5.8
8.2
17.7
7.5
-0.4
-2.8
-0.2
-61.6
19.5
.94
6.8%
Cl & I *-
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City Revenue Structure (in millions)
Fiscal Period 1961-1975
Fiscal Year 1966
Amount QX of Total % Increase
REAL ESTATE TAX LEVY $1,409.4
SALES TAX 382.1
PERSONAL INCOME TAX --
GENERAL CORPORATION TAX 213.5
OTHER BUSINESS TAXES 102-.5
Commercial Rent-Occupancy
Tax 71.8
Utility Tax 30.7
Financial Corporation Tax
Unincorporated Business
Tax
Insurance Corporation Tax
SPECIAL CITY TAXES 53.1
Cigarette Tax 3
Tar and Nicotine Tax --
Conveyance of Real
Property 4.9
Off-Track Betting -
Tax on Leaded Gasoline
Others 15.7
WATER CHARGES 49.4
LICENCES, FINES, FEES
FRANCHISES, PERMITS AND
PRIVILEGES 76.3
FARES, TOLLS, RENTS,
INTEREST AND SERVICES 86.6
OTHER REVENUES 8.8
FEDERAL ASSISTANCE 307,9
STATE ASSISTANCE 1010.1
TOTAL
A C.
$3,699.7
Ak,, 'v..' V
38.1%
10.3
5.8
2.8
2.0
0.8
1.4
.0.1
0.4
1.3-
2.4
0.2
8.3
27.3
100.0%
7.2%
-13.6
-13.8
1,4
2.5
-1.0.
-32,9
- 7.6
-52.3
- 7.5
- 3.0
-15.0
-76.1
41, 0.54.0
11, 1%
-.ThVvEI ~ V.
'ills~i) --
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City Revenue Structure (in millions)
Fiscal Period 1961-1975
Fiscal Year 1967
Amount % of Total % Increase
REAL ESTRME TAX LEVY
SALES TAX
PERSONAL INCOME TAX
GENERAL CORPORATION TAX
OTHER BUSINESS TAXES
Commercial Rent-Occupancy
Tax
Utility Tax
Financial Corporation Tax
Unincorporated Business
Tax
Insurance Corporation Tax
SPECIAL CITY TAXES
Cigarette Tax
Tar and Nicotine Tax
Conveyance of Real
Property
Off-Track Betting
Tax on Leaded Gasoline
Others
WATER CHARGES
LICENCES, FINES, FEES
FRANCHISES, PERMITS AND
PRIVILEGES
FARES, TOLLS, RENTS,
INTEREST AND SERVICES
OTHER REVENUES
FEDERAL ASSISTANCE
STATE ASSISTANCE
TOTAL
il,573.3
379.6
130.4
182.0
-141.8
72T
40.8
16.8
11.7
51.8
4.7
12.2
91.2
81,7
102,2
89.2
576.8
1161,4
$4'561.4
\LI rcr~~ \ 1C_ CC~.~- Ne 01tLC l--
4jC
34.5%
8.3
2.9
-4.0
3+.1
j..b
0.9
.0.3
0.3
1.1
1.-g
0.1
0,2
2,0
1.8
2.2
2.0
12.6
25.4
100.0%
11.6%
-0.7
-14.8
-38.3
-U.9
32.8
-2.5
7-3
-4.1
-22,3
84,6
7,0
18,0
913.6
87.3
* 14,9
23,2%
ik ~
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City Revenue Structure (in millions)
Fiscal Period 1961-1975
Fiscal Year 1968
Amount % of Total % Increase
REAL ESTME TAX LEVY
SALES TAX
PERSONAL INCOME TAX
GENERAL CORPORATION TAX
OTHER BUSINESS TAXES
Commercial Rent-Occupancy
Tax
Utility Tax
Financial Corporation Tax
Unincorporated Business
Tax
Insurance Corporation Tax
SPECIAL CITY TAXES
Cigarette Tax
Tar and Nicotine Tax
Conveyance of Real
Property
Off-Track Betting
Tax on Leaded Gasoline
Others
WATER CHARGES
LICENCES, FINES, FEES
FRANCHISES, PERMITS AND
PRIVILEGES
FARES, TOLLS, RENTS,
INTEREST AND SERVICES
OTHER REVENUES
FEDERAL ASSISTANCE
STATE ASSISTANCE
TOTAL
$1,648,1
409,8
170.2
203.6
188.2
78,6
41.3
26.4
29.8
12,1
53.9
34.77
5.7
13,5
77.0
10 6.6
120.3
746.0
14 6 7,2
$5 ,273,8
~t \ ~; . N C (~ ~ ~ ( V L (~
31. 27
7.8
3.2
3.9
3,6
0.8
0.5
0.6
00.2
1,0
U377
0.1
0,2
1.6
1.5
2 0
2 3
14:1
27.8
100.0%
4.7%
7.9
30.5
11.8
32.7
8.4
1.2
77.3
3.4
4.0
21.2
10.6
-9.2
-5,8
4,3
34.8
29.3
26.3
15.6%
q~*
I..j
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City Revenue Structure (in millions)
Fiscal Period 1961-1975
Fiscal Year 1969
Amount % of Total % Increase
REAL ESTME TAX LEVY
SALES TAX
PERSONAL INCOME TAX
GENERAL CORPORATION TAX
OTHER BUSINESS TAXES
Commercial Rent-Occupancy
Tax
Utility Tax
Financial Corporation Tax
Unincorporated Business
Tax
Insurance Corporation Tax
SPECIAL CITY TAXES
Cigarette Tax
Tar and Nicotine Tax
Conveyance of Real
Property
Off-Track Betting
Tax on Leaded Gasoline
Others
WATER CHARGES
LICENCES, FINES, FEES
FRANCHISES, PERMITS AND
PRIVILEGES
FARES, TOLLS, RENTS,
INTEREST AND SERVICES
OTHER REVENUES
FEDERAL ASSISTANCE
STATE ASSISTANCE
TOTAL
$1,737.9
444,2
201.4
215.8
212,7
41,8
40.3
38,0
11.5
49.6
3JTU
7.6
9.0
91.2
80,1
120,5
95.8
$9919
1991,3
$6 140,4- 106,0%
~NL f'(<'
i~RCt
28.3%
7,2
3.3
3.'5
3.5
r;3
0,7
0,7
0,.4
0.2
0,8
0,1
0,.2
1 .'5
1,3
2,'O
1,6
14.,6
32 A
5,4%
8.3
18.3
5,9
13.0
3. I
1.,2
35.2
27.5
-5.0
-8.0
33,3
33,4
10,0
4.0
13,0
-20,4
20.6
35, 7
16,4%
UCI
A N; f\) (') A t.
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City Revenue Structure (in millions)
Fiscal Period 1961-1975
Fiscal Year 1970.
Amount % of Total % Increase
REAL ESTMTE TAX LEVY
SALES TAX
PERSONAL INCOME TAX
GENERAL CORPORATION TAX
OTHER BUSINESS TAXES
Commercial Rent-Occupancy
Tax
Utility Tax
Financial Corporation Tax
Unincorporated Business
Tax
Insurance Corporation Tax
SPECIAL CITY TAXES
Cigarette Tax
Tar and Nicotine Tax
Conveyance of Real
Property
Off-Track Betting
Tax on Leaded Gasoline
Others
WATER CHARGES
LICENCES, FINES, FEES
FRANCHISES, PERMITS AND
PRIVILEGES
FARES, TOLLS, RENTS,
INTEREST AND SERVICES
OTHER REVENUES
FEDERAL ASSISTANCE
STATE ASSISTANCE
TOTAL
$1,892.7
466.9
205.4
205.1
207.8
93.5
44.0
42.9
15.8
11.6
49.5
32.6
7.6
9.3
103.9
96.4
103.3
185.3
1059.8
1992.7
$6.568.8
('~~ ;~Ar Rkc 1-- VP\ ('I
( 1- ~I(
28.8%
7.1
3.1
3.1
3.2
1.4
0.7
0.6
0.2
0.2
0.8
OTS
0.1
0.2
1.6
1.5
1.6
2.8
16.1
30.3
100.0%
8.9%
5.1
2.0
-5.0
-2.4
5.2
6.4
-58.5
0.9
-0.3
0
-
w
a..
3.3
13.9
20.3
-14,3
93.4
17,7
0.1
6.9%
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City Revenue Structure (in millions)
Fiscal Period 1961-1975
Fiscal Year 1971
Amount % of Total 7. Increase
REAL ESTME TAX LEVY
SALES TAX
PERSONAL INCOME TAX
GENERAL CORPORATION TAX
OTHER BUSINESS TAXES
Commercial Rent-Occupancy
Tax
Utility Tax
Financial Corporation Tax
Unincorporated Business
Tax
Insurance Corporation Tax
SPECIAL CITY TAXES
Cigarette Tax
Tar and Nicotine Tax
Conveyance of Real
Property
Off-Track Betting
Tax on Leaded Gasoline
Others
WATER CHARGES
LICENCES, FINES, FEES
FRANCHISES, PERMITS AND
PRIVILEGES
FARES, TOLLS, RENTS,
INTEREST AND SERVICES
OTHER REVENUES
FEDERAL ASSISTANCE
STATE ASSISTANCE
TOTAL
$2,080.4
493.6
199.4
183.3
256.7
139'.5
49.6
38.3
17.3
12.0
49.1
6.4
19.2
157.9
98.4
85.2
185.8
1286.6
2360.6
$7,437.0
~\ ~*~~\)
28.0%
6.6
2.7
2..5
3.5
1.9
0,7
0.5
0,2
092
0,7
- .
0.1
0.2
2,1
1,3
1,1
2,5'
17,3
31,7
100.,0%
9,9%
5.7
-3.0
-10.0
23.5'
49. 1
12.7
-10.8
9.4
3.4
-0.9
2T.7
.- 15.8
106,4
51.9
-2.1
17,6
0.2
21.4
. 18.4
13.2%
C:f .
; ('j 
' 
J' "
t- (2 - tL
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City Revenue Structure (in millions)
Fiscal Period 1961-1975
Fiscal Year 1972
Amount X of Total
REAL ESTRIE TAX LEVY
SALES TAX
PERSONAL INCOME TAX
GENERAL CORPORATION TAX
OTHER BUSINESS TAXES
Commercial Rent-Occupancy
Tax
Utility Tax
Financial Corporation Tax
Unincorporated Business
Tax
Insurance Corporation Tax
SPECIAL CITY TAXES
Cigarette Tax
Tar and Nicotine Tax
Conveyance of Real
Property
Off-Track Betting
Tax on Leaded Gasoline
Others
WATER CHARGES
LICENCES, FINES, FEES
FRANCHISES, PERMITS AND
PRIVILEGES
FARES, TOLLS, RENTS,
INTEREST AND SERVICES
OTHER REVENUES
FEDERAL ASSISTANCE
STATE ASSISTANCE
TOTAL
K~c
$2,188.9
519.7
443.1
239.9
341.8
153-.3
54.0
69.1
52.4
13.0
95.6
'UD~ 9
21.0
13.3
2,.4
8.0
20.0
180.2
15295
119.8
206.2
1524.4
2516.8
$8q528,9
K- It
25.7
6.1
5.2
.2.8
4,8
0,6
0.8
0.6
Q..2
1..1
0.2
0.1
22
2,1
1,8
2.4
17, 9
29.5
100, 0%
K, I YC
5,2
5.2
122.2
30.8
33 , 1
9,8
8,8
80.4
202.8
8.3
94,7
107,8
4,1
14.1
54,9
40,6
10.9
18,4
6,6
14,6%
(C 0 C LL -E /2
I 'I /1 7 2
. Increase
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City Revenue Structure (in millions)
Fiscal Period 1961-1975
Fiscal Year 1973.
Amount -% of Total % increase
REAL EST.I'E TAX LEVY
SALES TAX
PERSONAL INCOME TAX
GENERAL CORPORATION TAX
OTHER BUSINESS TAXES
Commercial Rent-Occupancy
Tax
Utility Tax
Financial Corporation Tax
Unincorporated Business
Tax
Insurance Corporation Tax
SPECIAL CITY TAXES
Cigarette Tax
Tar and Nicotine Tax
Conveyance of Real
Property
Off-Track Betting
Tax on Leaded Gasoline
Others
WATER CHARGES
LICENCES, FINES, FEES
FRANCHISES, PERMITS AND
PRIVILEGES
FARES, TOLLS, RENTS,
INTEREST AND SERVICES
OTHER REVENUES
FEDERAL ASSISTANCE
STATE ASSISTANCE
TOTAL
$2,468.1
551.3
439.5
247.2
348.4
166.1
62.5
61.8
45.0
13.0
138.1
~~7
22.5
19.5
34.2
11-1
21.1
176.9
139.5
102.1
258.7
2,048.9
2,547.4
$9,466.1
C C
(7iT-/ 7 31
26.1%
5.8
4.6
2.6
3.7
1.7
0.7
0.7
0.5
0.1
1.5
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.4
0.1
0.2
1.9
1.5
1.1
2.7
21.6
26.9
100.0%
12.7%
6.0
-0.9
3.0
1.9
8.3
15.7
-10.6
-14.2
0.
44.4
7.1
46.6
1325.0
~ 8-7
5.5.
-1.9
-8.6
-14.8
25.4
34.4
1.2
10.9
T~
/ q
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City Revenue Structure (in millions)
Fiscal Period 1961-1975
Fiscal Year 1974
Amount % of Total %. Increase
REAL ESTLE TAX LEVY
SALES TAX
PERSONAL INCOME TAX
GENERAL CORPORATION TAX
OTHER BUSINESS TAXES
Commercial Rent-Occupancy
Tax
Utility Tax
Financial Corporation Tax
Unincorporated Business
Tax
Insurance Corporation Tax
SPECIAL CITY TAXES
Cigarette Tax
Tar and Nicotine Tax
Conveyance of Real
Property
Off-Track Betting
Tax on Leaded Gasoline
Others
WATER CHARGES
LICENCES, FINES, FEES
FRANCHISES, PERMITS AND
PRIVILEGES
FARES, TOLLS, RENTS,
INTEREST AND SERVICES
OTHER REVENUES
FEDERAL ASSISTANCE
STATE ASSISTANCE
TOTAL
A j\ '1t;I 4~Kf'
$2,655.5
575.3
454.8
254.6
355.4
177.1
70.1
58.9
36.1
13.2
2.9
21.0
18.4
44.5
22,4
124.7
153.8
116.8
319.5
2,049.6
2,749.0
$9,956.8
26.77
5.8
4.6
2.6
3.6
1.8
0.7
0.6
0.4
0.1
1.4
0.2
0.2
0.4
0.2
1.3
1.4
1.2
3.2
20.6
27.6
100. 0%
7.5%
4.3
3.4
2.9
2.0
6.6
12.1
-4.7
19.8
. 1.5
7.0
-6.7
-5.7
30.1
4.6
-29.6
10.2
14.3
23.5
0.1
.7.9
5.1%
N *%JQ~ C+;~'Qi~ j~QLCC ~
j(v1
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City Revenue Structure (in millions)
Fiscal Period 1961-1975
Fiscal Year 1975
Amount % of Total % Increase
REAL ESTLE TAX LEVY
SALES TAX
PERSONAL INCOME TAX
GENERAL CORPORATION TAX
OTHER BUSINESS TAXES
Commercial Rent-Occupancy
Tax
Utility Tax
Financial Corporation Tax
Unincorporated Business
Tax
Insurance Corporation Tax
SPECIAL CITY TAXES
Cigarette Tax
Tar and Nicotine Tax
Conveyance of Real
Property
Off-Track Betting
Tax on Leaded Gasoline
Others
WATER CHARGES
LICENCES, FINES, FEES
FRANCHISES, PERMITS AND
PRIVILEGES
FARES, TOLLS, RENTS,
INTEREST AND SERVICES
OTHER REVENUES
FEDERAL ASSISTANCE
STATE ASSISTANCE
$2,986.1
791.1
465.8
268.1
455.2
190.5
90.1
114.2
42.3
18.1
156.8
14.9
14.2
67,1
21.2
190,5
155.3
118.4.
303,6
2,473,7
3,726.4
TOTAL
CtlC P) t I-i 'A (k
12,001.0 100,0% 20.5%
N C E1 ~ 5
-7:
24.1%
6.6-
3.9
2.2
3.8
1.6
0.7
0'.9
0.4
0..2
1.3
0.1
0'l
.0.6
0,1
.0.2
1.6
1.3
1.0
2.5
20.6
31o
9.0%
37.5
2.4
5.3
28.0
7.5
28.5
93.8
17.1
37.1
6.0
-0. 4
-29.1
-22.9
50...2
-17.3
- 5.9
52.7
0.9
1.3
5.0
20.6.
35.5
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City Revenue Structure (in millions)
Fiscal Period 1961-1975
REAL ESTATE TAX LEVY
SALES TAX
PERSONAL INCOME TAX
GENERAL CORPORATION TAX
OTHER BUSINESS TAXES
Commercial Rent-Occupancy
Tax
Utility Tax
Financial Corporation Tax
Unincorporated Business
Tax
Insurance Corporation Tax
SPECIAL CITY TAXES
Cigarette Tax
Tar and Nicotine Tax
Conveyance of Real
Property
Off-Track Betting
Tax on Leaded Gasoline
Others
WATER CHARGES
LICENCES, FINES, FEES
FRANCHISES, PERMITS AND
PRIVILEGES
FARES, TOLLS, RENTS,
INTEREST AND SERVICES
OTHER REVENUES
FEDERAL ASSISTANCE
STATE ASSISTANCE
TOTAL
Aggregate
% Change
1961-75
181-.6%
161.0
257 .2a
160.4
1630.8 C
189.1 d
242.6f
332.6;
151.89
54.79
175,1 h
35
.
4i
-29.1
294.44
96.1f
20. O
-32.5
276.5
Aggregate
% Change
1961-66
37.0%
26.1
19.3
289.7
9 .0e
16.8
-6.9
47.7
36.1
-50 .0k
- 2.4
138,2 17.0
43.5
216.2
2142,7
719,2
389,2
5.0
--90.8
179.1
122.0
50.8
( CIM 'T iV
V\N(c(AL ~
I -~ *If L~(~ ~(/
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City Revenue Structure (in millions)
Fiscal Period 1961-1975
REAL ESTAVE TAX LEVY
SALES TAX
PERSONAL INCOME TAX
GENERAL CORPORATION TAX
OTHER BUSINESS TAXES
Commercial Rent-Occupancy
Tax
Utility Tax
Financial Corporation Tax
Unincorporated Business
Tax
Insurance Corporation Tax
SPECIAL CITY TAXES
Cigarette Tax
Tar and Nicotine Tax
Conveyance of Real
Property
Off-Track Betting
Tax on Leaded Gasoline
Others
WATER CHARGES
LICENCES, FINES, FEES
FRANCHISES, PERMITS AND
PRIVILEGES
FARES, TOLLS, RENTS,
INTEREST AND SERVICES
OTHER REVENUES
FEDERAL ASSISTANCE
STATE ASSISTANCE
TOTAL
Aggregate
% Change
1966-71
4 7. 6%e-
29.2b
52.9
-14.2
150.4
94.3
61.6
45.1
2.9m
2.6
-7.6
- 3.1
30.6.
22.2k
219.6
28.0
-1.7
2011.4
317.9
101.0
Aggregate
% Change
1971-75
39.2%
60.3
133.6
46.3
77.3
36.6
81.7
198,2
144.5
50.8
219.3
-29.11
121., 9
96,1J
20.6
57.8
39.0
. 63. 4
92.3
- 57.9
61..4
L A j i Ak-(- \1 C 0 L_
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City Revenue Structure (in millions)
Fiscal Period 1961-1975
A
%,
REAL ESTME TAX LEVY
SALES TAX
PERSONAL INCOME TAX
GENERAL CORPORATION TAX
OTHER BUSINESS TAXES
Commercial Rent-Occupancy
Tax
Utility Tax
Financial Corporation Tax
Unincorporated Business
Tax
Insurance Corporation Tax
SPECIAL CITY TAXES
Cigarette Tax
Tar and Nicotine Tax
Conveyance of Real
Property
Off-Track Betting
Tax on Leaded Gasoline
Others
WATER CHARGES
LICENCES, FINES, FEES
FRANCHISES, PERMITS AND
PRIVILEGES
FARES, TOLLS, RENTS,
INTEREST AND SERVICES
OTHER REVENUES
FEDERAL ASSISTANCE
STATE ASSISTANCE
TOTAL
verage Annual
Change
961-75
7.9%o
7.3
16,5a
3.1
21.8
10. 2 d
9
.
4 f21.6
12.Og
5.7g
77 h
-11.6
10. 5 j
34.01
6.2k
-3.0
10.1
Footnotes
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
I.
J.
K.
L.
M.
FY 67 through FY 75.
FY 67 through FY 71.
The number of taxes
in this group grew
from 1 to 5 during
this period.
FY 64 through FY 75.
FY 64 through FY 66.
FY 68 through FY 75.
FY 67 through FY 75.
The number of taxes
included in this
category varied for
the period.
FY 72 through FY 75.
FY 73 through FY 75.
Includes 13 different
taxes at different
periods of time.
See Addenda A.
FY 68 through FY 71.
FY 67 through FY 71.
6.6
2.8
8.8
23.7
16.1
12. 1
kt ~'e~'Z\ )
r K
C C. (I ~jv 1. IL
(Best copy available)
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City Revenue Structure - Addenda A
Fiscal Period 1961-75
Other Taxes and Years in Effect
FY
61
ensating Use Tax X
ement Tax X
uit Tax X
on Occupancy of Hotel Rooms X
n Conercial Motor Vehicles X
R:ce Admissions Tax X
1an Ieiail Liquor Licenses
ri T::icab Rides
no Couin-Operated Amusement
Vi c. :
pii.-v T:x (Transferred from
ci:iI rtiuld)
al V'atilt Charge
a:port a inn Corporation Tax
ia i'Taxen - General
X
X
FY FY FY FY FY
62 63 464 65 66
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY
67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75
X
X
X
X
X
X X X
X
X
X
X
X X X
X X X X
X X X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X
X X X X X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X X
X
X X
X X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
RFjNL7f
~I
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TABLE I-l
New Issues, Redemptions
of Short-Term Debt
1961-1975
($ Millions)
Increase
(Decrease)
Redeemed in Amount
or Out-
Issued Cancelled standing
$ 687.7
842.2
807.7
1,166.7
1,470.0
1,645.0
2,076.0
2,427.7
3,271.0
4,400.9
6,512.2
5,749.0
4,003.3
7,305.9
8,395.7
685.7
815.7
704.3
1081.8
1260.1
1704.5
1907.9
2369.4
3217.0
3860.0
5481.1
4918.1
4136.0
6407.6
7271.4
20
27.1
105.4
85.0
209.9
(58.9)
168.2
58.3
54.0
540.9
1031.2
330.9
(132.7)
898.4
1124.3
Source: Annual Report of the
1961-1975
Notes
Issued/
Redeemed
1.0029
1.0331
1.1463
1.0786
1.1658
0.9653
1.0886
1.0244
1.0167
1.1398
1.1881
1.0673
0.9678
1.1403
1.1547
New York City Comptroller,
Fiscal
Year
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
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TABLE I-2
New Issues, Redemptions
of Long Term Debt: Fiscal Years 1961-1976
($ Millions)
Redeemed
or Cancelled
326.2
333.6
126.6
361.0
364.8
402.6
438.0
510.0
476.9
498.3
504.7
615.3
618.4
756.5
827.3
1069.9
Increase
(Decrease)
in Amount
Outstanding
1 32,5
125.1
126.6
111.5
165.3
314.5
51.1
(26.0)
36.3
155.5
399.5
744.4
536.8
735.2
114.7
(339.1)
Bonds Issued/
Redeemed
0.9002
1.3748
1.3908
1.3088
1.4530
1.7810
1.1166
0.9489
1.0762
1.3119
1.7915
2.2010
1.8681
1.9717
1.1385
0.068
Source: Annual Report of the Comptroller, 1961-1976
Fiscal
Year
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
Issued
293.7
458.7
450.4
472.5
530.1
717.1
489.1
484.0
513
653.8
904.2
1360.0
1155.2
1491.7
942.0
730.0
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TABLE 1-3
Short-Term Debt as Percentage of Long-Term, Total Outstanding Debt
($ Millions)
Short
Term
Out-
stand-
ing
100.4
127.5
230.9
315.8
525.7
466.7
634.9
693.2
747.3
1288.2
2319.4
2650.2
2517.5
3415.9
4540.4
4866.7
Long
Term
Out-
Stand-
ing *
4176.0
4301.1
4427.7
4539.2
4704.5
5018.9
5070.0
5044.0
5080.2
5235.9
5635.3
6380.0
6916.3
7652.0
7766.6
7427.5
Short Term
% of
Long Term
2.4%
3.0
5.2
7.0
11.2
9.3
12.5
13.7
14.7
24.6
41.1
41.5
36.4
44.6
58.5
65.5
Source: Annual Report of the New York
1961-1975
City Comptroller,
aDecrease in long-term debt.
bDecrease in short-term debt.
Fiscal
Year
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
Total
(1+2)
4276.4
4428.6
4658.6
4855.0
5230.2
5485.6b
5704.9
5757.2a
5827.7
6524.1
7954.3
9030.0
9434.3 b
11067.9
12306.7
12294.2 a
Short Term
as %
of Total
2.3%
2.9
5.0
6.5
10.1
8.5
11.1
12.1
12.8
19.7
29.2
29.3
29.3
30.7
36.9
39.6
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TABLE I-4
Comparison of Outstanding Debt and Legal Debt Ceilings
($ Millions)
Fiscal Debt
Year Ceiling1
1961 $2814.9
1962 3548.2
1963 3893.3
1964 4100.9
1965 4378.1
1966 4607.0
1967 4823.6
1968 5497.6
1969 5766.3
1970 6251.8
1971 6551.5
1972 6935.8
1973 7701.8
1974 8161.7
1975 8207.7
1976 8370.3
Total Debt
Outstanding
$ 4276.4
4428.6
4658.6
4855.0
5230.2
5485.6
5704.9
5737.2
5827.7
6524.1
7954.7
9030.2
9434.3
11067.9
12306.7
122994.2
Borrowing,
Beyond Limits
$1461.5 (51.9%)
880.4 (24.8)
819.3 (21.3)
754.1 (18.4)
852..1 (19.5)
878.6 (19.1)
881.3 (18.5)
239.6 (4.4)
61.4 (1.1)
272.3 (4.4)
1403.2 (21.4)
2094.4 (30.2)
1732.5 (22.5)
2906.2 (35.6)
4099.0 (49.9)
3923.0 (46.9)
Unencumbered
Margin 4
341.8
224.4
156.7
154.8
279.3
248.0
587.4
746.5
458.6
659.2
220.4
603.3
444.3
558.2
256.4
1098.2
Debt Ceiling includes combined housing (2 percent) and general
2Total debt outstanding includes short term obligations; long
term debt within and outside the combined (housing and gen-
3eral) ceiling.
Borrowing bdyond limits shows outstanding debt in excess of
limits; i.e., in 1963 outstanding debt equalled T21.3 percent
4of combined ceilings.
Unencumbered margin includes unencumbered housing and gen-
eral obligation capacity.
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TABLE 1-5
Growth of Capital Funding for Operating Budget, 1965-1976
($ Millions)
Year Amount Year Amount
1965 26 1971 195
1966 57 1972 226
1967 68 1973 274
1968 68 1974 564
1969 84 1975 724
1970 151 1976 697
Source: Citizen's Budget Commission Inc.
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TABLE II-1
Estimated Burden-Combined State and Local Big Three Taxes
At Various Income Levels
New York vs. National, City Averages
Income Tax
$.7,500 Real Property
Personal
Income
Sales Tax
Total
U.S.
Average
3.6%
1.1
1.6
T. 3
City
Average
6.6%
1.2
1.8
9.6
New York
City
7.8%
2.0
2.6
N.Y./U.S. = 197% N.Y./CITY = 129%
12,000 Real Property
Personal
Income
Sales Tax
3.4%
1.8
1.4
6.6%
4.6%
2.0
1.6
8.72%
5.4%
5.4
2.3
.1%
N.Y./U.S. = 168% N.Y./CITY = 204%
50,000 Real Property 2.5% 2.1% 2.2%
Personal
Income 3.7 4.3 11.1
Sales Tax 0.7 0.8 1.2
7.1
N.Y./U.S. = 210% N.Y./CITY = 204%
_6'.9% 14.5
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Sales
Persor
TABLE 11-2
"Big Three" Tax Rates
New York City vs. Selected Metropolitan Areas
West-
New Connec- chester N
Jersey ticut County C
Tax Rate 5% 7% 5%a
al Income Tax 2%-2.5% N.A. 2 %-2. 5 %c 0
Property Taxes
Per Capitad 228.09 514.85 233.72 3
ew York
ity
8%1j
.9%-4.3%
38.32
aCity/State combined tax. County rate is 1%.
bCity/State combined tax. Each receives 4%.
cWestchester has no local income tax. Listed rates are for
State income tax which is also paid by New York City resi-
dents.
dCalculated for 1974.
Source: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations.
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TABLE 11-3
After Tax Rate of Return Resulting
Selected New York Sites
from Expansion in
(Hypothetical Industry)
Arkansas
California
Connecticut
Indiana
Kansas
New Jersey
North Carolina
Ohio
Pennsylvania
Tennessee
Texas
Washington
Nassau
11.85
12.05
11.30
11.80
11.85
11.25
11. 15
11.25
12.15
11.25
1l.00
11.10
Onondaga
11.90
12.15
11.40
11.85
11.90
11.35
11.20
11.30
1Z.25
11.30
11.05
11.20
N.Y. 0
10.70
10.95
10.20
10.65
11.70
10.10
9.90
10.10
11.05
10.05
9.70
9.90
Schenecta
11.85
12.05
11.50
11.80
11.85
11.25
11.10
11.25
12.15
±1.20
10.95
11.10
Source: New York Economic Development Board.
(Continued on following page)
1977
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TABLE 11-3
After Tax Rate of Return Resulting from Expansion in
Selected New York Sites (Hypothetical Industry)
Arkansas
California
Connecticut
Indiana
Kansas
New Jersey
North Carolina
Ohio
Pennsylvania
Tennessee
Texas
Washington
Source: New York
(Continued on
Broome
11.85
12.05
11.30
11.50
11.85
11.25
ll.10
11.25
12.15
11.20
11.00
11.10
Chautauqua
11.95
12.15
11:40
11.90
11.95
li.35
il25
11.35
1. .25
11.35
11.10
11.25
Economic Development
following page)
Erie
11.90
12.10
11.3 5
1.80
41.85
11.30
11.£5
11.50
12.20
£1.25
11.00
11.15
Board.
Monro .
11.80
12.00
11.25
11.75
11180
11.20
11.10
11.20
12.10
11.20
10.95
11.05
1977
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TABLE A-i
COMPOSISION OF NYC SHORT-TERM DEBT
RANS BANS
%52.01961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
TOTAL
(100%)
$ 86U.4
100.4
127.5
230.9
315.8
525.7
466.7
634.9
693.2
747.3
1288.2
2319.4
2650.2
2517.5
3415.9
TANS BUD. NOTE
% =.7 % 9.3
40.6
27.3
24.5
16.9
21.5
21.5
21.3
20.8
13.2
8.9
8.8
10.5
9.3
8.8
Source: Annual Report of NYC Comptroller 1961-1975.
12.7
22.6
9.6
14.8
13.5
17.2
41.7
47.3
44.5
35.2
52.6
56.4
51.5
49.3
45.3
42.9
58.0
59.0
58.2
54.1
36.3
25.3
25.9
38.0
26.6
34.6
7.8
14.7
14.0
13.1
4.5
13.3
17.4
12.2
9.0
OTHER
% 7U%
0
8.2
3.5
4.5
6.4
4.7
7.0
7.9
6.1
5.2
3.6
4.1
2.5
0.2
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TABLE A-2
Growth of Short-Term Debt for Operating Expenses 1961-1975
($ Millions)
TAN
1961 T2.9
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
51.8
63.1
77.4
88.8
100.3
236.5
147.5
155.5
170.0
206.0
232.0
265.0
317.0
1975 380.0
1976*
INCREASE
20.8
21.8
22.7
14.7
13.0
36.1
8.1
5.4
9.3
12.2
12.6
14.2
19.6
19.1
RANS
40.0
118.6
45.0
93.8
93.8
128.8
536.7
1096.3
1180.0
887.1
1798.3
2560.0
BUDGET
% INC. NOTES % INCR.
- 5.3
-62.1
208.4
37.3
416.7
204.3
7.6
-24.8
202.7
42.4
10.0
34.0
44.1
68.8
21.0
308.3
460.8
308.3
308.3
0
88.7
34.0
29.7
56.0
-69.0
-100.0
49.5
-33.0
0
-100.0
Source: Annual Report of NYC Comptroller, 1961-1975
*NYC has been unable to.market notes, since fiscal 1975.
(-) None outstanding
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TABLE B-1
Total Local Revenue by Major Sources, Fiscal 1976
($ Millions)
State Aid $2,732.2
Federal Aid 2,689.7
Total Intergovernmental 5,422.
Locally Raised Revenue 5,948.0
Total'Revenue 11,380.8
Locally Raised Revenue
Real Property Taxes 2,966.6
General Fund Revenue 2,981.4
Personal Income Tax 527.6
Sales Tax 445.1
General Corporation Tax 417.0
Stock Transfer Tax 269.8
Financial Corporation Tax 202.3
Commercial Occupancy Tax 197.9
Utility Tax 93.4
Water Charges 218.5
Forfeits, Fines, Penalties 107.3
Miscellenous 132.3
Other Revenue 368.8
Percent of Total
24.0%
23.6
47.6
52.4
100.0
Percent of Local Revenue
49.9%
50.1
8.9
7.5
7.0
4.5
3.4
3.3
1.6
3.7
1.8
2.2
6.2
Source: Annual Report of the NYC Comptroller 1975-76
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TABLE B-2
New York City Revenue Structure
($ Millions)
Total
Revenue
2453.0-
2578.9
2769.6
3114.3
3327.7
3699.7
4561.4
5273.8
6140.4
6568.8
7437.0
8528.9
9466.1
9956.8
12001.0
11380.8
Fed/State
Aid
565.2 (23.0)
629.3(24.4)
731.2
781.7
875.2
1317.1
1733.4
2209.7
2885.9
3047.9
3644.1
(26.4)
(25.1)
(26.3)
(35.6)
(38.0)
(41.9)
(47.0)
(46.4)
(49.0)
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
Local
Revenue
1888.0 (77.0)
1949.6(75.6)
2038.4(736)
2332.6
2452.5
2382.6
2828.1
3064.1
3254.4
3520.9
3792.9
4486.2
4875.0
5157.6
5796.5
5947.8
4)
5)
2)
7)
8)
(74.9)
(75.7)
(64.4)
(62.0)
(58.1)
(53.0)
(53.6)
(51.0)
(52.6)
(51.1)
(51.8)
(48.3)
(52.2)
1961-1976
Local
Prop. Tax
1028.341. 9)
1070.9(41.5)
1134.5(40.9)
1220.2(39.2)
1313.9 (39.5)
1409.4(38.1)
1573.3(34.5)
1648.1 (31. 2)
1737.9(28.3)
1892.7 (28. 8)
2080.4(28.0)
2188.9(25.7)
2468.1(26.1)
2655.5(26.7)
2986.1(24.1)
2966.6(26.0)
General
Fund Revenue.
861.0 (35.1)
879.4(34.1)
905.7(32.7)
1111.8(35.7)
1138.6 (32.2)
973.2(26.3)
1254.8(27.5)
1416.0 (26.9)
1516.5(24.7)
1628.2(24.9)
1712.5(23.0)
2297.3(26.9)
2406.9 (24.2)
2502.1(25.1)
2810.4(24.Z)
2981.2(26.2.)
Report of the New York City Comptroller
4042.7(47.
4591.1(48.
4799.2(48.
6204.5(51.
5440.0(47.
Source: Annual 1961-1976
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TABLE B-3
Trend of Real Estate Tax Collections
Fiscal
Year
1960-1961..
1961-1962..
1962-1963..
1963-1964..
1964-1965..
1965-1966..
1966-1967..
1967-1968
1968-1969..
1969-1970..
1970-1971..
1971-1972..
1972-1973..
1973-1974..
1974-1975..
1975-1976..
Year
of Levy
$1,057.354.083
1,103,513,183
1,163,347,557
1,255,810,783
1,350,022,870
1,432,640,320
1,587,662,912
1,661,299,588
1,748.601,102
1,101,471,k72
2,089,650,042
2,204,595,908
2,468,676,173
2,657,256,842
2,897,460,153
3,246,786,520
95.91
95.34
95.57
95.63
95.59
95.31
94.04
94.22
94.40
94.98
94.25
94.10
93.38
92.77
90.38
89.11
First Year
After Year
of Levy
1.58
1.58
1.40
1.52
1.43
1.38
2.44
1.91
1.52
0.88
1.25
1.04
0.85
0.90
1.66
... 0
2nd Year
After Year
of Levy
0.25
0.17
0.20
0.17
0.16
0.30
0.27
0.31
0.26
0.30
0.19
0.14
0.11
0.40
.... a
....
Source: Annual Report of New York City Comptroller 1975-1976
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SUMMARY OF
THE CITY IN TRANSITION:
PROSPECTS AND POLICIES FOR NEW YORK
The Final Report of the
Temporary Commission on City Finances
June 1977
Summary
The central conclusion of the Final Report of the Tem-
porary Commission on City Finances may be summarized as follows:
The City of New York must be fundamentally reformed before its
fiscal problems and the larger economic problems of New York City
can be solved; incremental reform of the local governmental process
will not suffice, even in the event that the State of New York and
the Federal government assume increasing responsibility for
functions performed by the City of New York.
Until the local private economy reaches a new equili-
brium, the prospects for the City of New York and New York City
will remain cloudy. Economic development represents the critical
link between reform of the local governmental process and improve-
ment of the larger city. Economic development is dependent upon
increased investment.
While the developmental strategy proposed in the
Final Report concludes that increased private investment ultimately
holds the key to the city's future, its central focus is on
the need to reform local public policies and managerial practices so
that they promote rather than, as in the past,, retard private
investment. The developmental strategy is a broad plan for
political action that will increase private investment in New York
City by first increasing public investment.
The basic idea of the developmental strategy is that slack
or uncommitted resources must be acquired and then invested by the Cit,
of New York in ways that promote the competitiveness of the
local private and public economies. The City can acquire slack
resources by reducing expenditures, improving management, and
2obtaining fiscal relief from the State and Federal
governments. The City's investment of slack resources, if it
is to promote long-term developmental needs rather than short-
term maintenance needs, primarily should be for the purposes
of tax cuts, debt reduction, and improvement of the City's
infrastructure or physical plant.
- The effect of the developmental strategy would be to
make the City of New York's public polities and managerial
practices more rational in an economic sense. In the past, parti-
cularly after the mid-1960s, the local political system behaved
in an economically irrational fashion by attempting to. contra-
vene some fundamental economic forces. The attempt failed, as
demonstrated by- the onset of fiscal crisis in 1975. Further
attempts to conserve the existing structure of local political
costs and benefits also will fail.
The Final Report of the Temporary Commission on City
Finances is divided into three parts. Part One identifies the
causes of the fiscal crisis. Part Two analyzes New York City's
prospects. Part Three contains recommendations for the future.
In addition, three appendices are included in the Report. Appen-
dix I lists the major recommendations of the Final Report.
Appendix II summarizes the sixteen Interim Reports issued by the
Commission between November 1975 and June 1977. Appendix III
presents historical data on New York City finances.
3A. Causes of the Fiscal Crisis
Part One of the Final Report examines the nature and
causes of the City of New York's problems. The central finding is
that the City's problems are not essentially fiscal but manifesta-
tions of deep-seated problems stemming from highly interactive
developments in the socioeconomic structure of the city, inter-
governmental relations, and the local governmental process. These
three underlyitig causes are examined, respectively, in Sections
II, III, and IV.
1. Socioeconomic Developments
The recent history of New York City as a socioeconomic
entity is divided into three periods: an "equilibrium" period
during the 1950s; a "modest growth" period during the 1960s; and a
"depression" period which began in 1969 and has not ended. The
composition, but not the size, of the city's population changed
throughout the post-World War II era. The central characteristic
of population change was the out-migration of largely white, middle-
class New Yorkers and the in-migration of persons with lower incomes,
less education, and different job skills. During the 1950s and 1960s,
high birth rates and heavy in-migration offset the out-migration
of an estimated two million New Yorkers and produced relative
stability in the size of the population. However, when the local
economy entered its depression period, the city began to lose large
numbers of people for the first time in its history. Between 1970
and 1975, New York City's population declined 4 percent.
4The composition of the local economy also changed
throughout the post-World War II era. During the equilibrium
period of the 1950s, decline in manufacturing was offset by
growth in other sectors of the local economy, primarily the
private service and financial sectors. . The city's export base,
those firms or individuals that sell their goods or services to
customers located outside the city, continued its secular
transformation from the production of goods to the production of
services. In the 1960s, several forces combined to produce modest
growth in the local economy: a very strong national economy;
"one-shot" events, like Wall Street's "go-go" years, that boosted
selected sectors of the private economy; and a substantial increase
in local revenues and intergovernmental assistance that permitted
large employment gains in the public sector, particularly in the
local government. In the 1960-1969 period, almost 80 percent of
the jobs added to the local economy were government jobs. However,
when the 1969-1970 recession began, the city's economy started a
sharp contraction that has not stopped. In the 1969-1977 period,
employment has fallen nearly one-sixth from its historic high of
3.8 million to under 3.2 million.
Demographic change in New York City increased the
share of persons who needed government services and decreased
the share of persons able to finance government services. The effect
of demographic change on the local public economy was offset somewhat
by the modest growth of the local economy in the 1960s; however,
the sharp contraction of the local economy after 1969 contributed to
a serious imbalance in local government finances.
52. Intergovernmental Relations
The City of New York's unique intergovernmental problems
were a major reason for its near-collapse in 1975. The City's
unusually broad functional and financial responsibilities are not
entirely the product of recent origin or Federal and State mandates.
In the 19th century, partially in response to the needs of its huge
immigrant population, the City initiated, among other things,
municipal university and hospital systems. When consolidation of
Greater New York City occurred in 1898, the City assumed the
functional responsibilities of the five counties it now com-
prises as well as those of the old City of Brooklyn. The City
entered the post-World Was II period with heavy service responsi-
bilities plus a strong home-rule tradition that encouraged local
functional and financial responsibility.
When the Federal government defined urban problems as -
a national responsibility in the 1960s under the general rubric
of the Great Society, the City began to receive enormous amounts
of new intergovernmental funds, particularly for social welfare
programs. In the 1960s, the share of the City's expense budget
funded by intergovernmental aid doubled from 23 percent to 46
percent. While intergovernmental aid permitted the City to
expand services for its rapidly growing dependent population,
it also put the City in a unique financial bind compared to other
major American cities. The overwhelming share of Federal aid
was provided through programs that required state matching grants
(or state and local matching grants at the discretion of the state).
The State of New York required local governments to finance
higher shares of nonfederal costs than any other state in the nation.
This requirement created an enormous financial problem for the
City of New York, particularly in the areas of public assistance
and Medicaid where the City was required to finance 25 percent
of total program costs. In addition, the State mandated the
highest welfare and medical assistance benefits in the country.
State financing and benefit mandates, coupled with the "open-ended"
nature of welfare and medical assistance programs, ensured
enormously high social welfare costs for the City.
The effect of evolving intergovernmental programs was
not limited simply to increasing the City's expenditures. Partly in
order to finance its share of matching grant requirements the City
substantially increased local taxes and engaged in heavy deficit
financing. Also, the City began to reduce the share of local
financial and manpower resources it allocated to the four most
basic functions of local government: police, fire, sanitation,
and education. Thus the effects of intergovernmental change com-
pounded those of socioeconomic change, providing service-demanders
with additional incentives to stay in or come to New York City and
revenue-providers with additional incentives to leave.
3.- The Local Political Process
Certain key policies and practices of the
City of New York constituted, collectively, one of the
underlying causes of the fiscal crisis. Between fiscal
years 1966 and 1971, the City of New York's expenditures increased at an average
annual rate of 15.9 percent compared to 8.6 percent in the 1961-1966
fiscal period and 10.2 percent in the 1971-1975 fiscal period.
Rather than focus its attention on expenditure reduction, which
always is difficult. politically, the City sought to increase the
supply of noney by raising local taxes and borrowing beginning in the mid-1960s.
The City's tax policy gradually shifted the local revenue
structure away from its traditional bases -- the real estate
and sales taxes -- to more progressive and business-oriented
taxes. Not surprisingly, this contributed to the exodus
of people and businesses with the means to finance
the local government and invest in the local economy. By
1974, municipal taxes in New York City were more than three
times higher on a per capita basis than in Chicago and Los
Angeles. Compounding the local tax burden was the fact
that the State also had the highest per capita taxes in the
nation.
The City's debt management policies also facilitated
maintenance of existing expenditure commitments
at the expense of important future interests. In the 1966-1971
fiscal period, the City's short-term debt jumped from less than
$.5 billion to over $2.3 billion, and in the next four years it
almost doubled to $4.5 billion. In the 1966-1975 fiscal period,
short-term debt grew from 8.5 percent to 36.9 percent of total
City debt. Long-term as well as short-term debt was used to
sustain day-to-day operations. In fiscal year 1965, $26 million
of operating expenses was capitalized; by fiscal year 1975, when
the City's finances almost collapsed, $724 million of capital
funds, over one-half of- the entire capital budget, was used
to finance operations.
The third important failure of the local political pro-
cess was the City's loss of influence over both the compensation
and management of its employees. In the 1966-1971 fiscal period,
labor costs almost doubled from $2.1 billion to $4 billion.
The largest percentage increases occurred in fringe and pension
benefits rather than salaries. The cost of liberalizing pen-
sions, of course, can be deferred into the future, as evidenced
by the $8.5 billion of unfunded pension liability that exists
today. However, the pay of City workers also increased rapidly,
particularly in contrast to workers in the city's private sector.
Between 1970 and 1976, during the worst years of the local depres-
sion period, real pay of patrolmen increased 10.3 percent,
a higher rate of increase than during the largely expansionary
1965-1970 period.. Real wages of selected private sector workers
in the 1970-1976 period ranged.from an increase of 4.5 percent to
a decline of 7.9 percent.
The City's inability or unwillingness to moderate gains
in the compensation of City employees in the midst'of obvious
(and increasing) financial scarcity resulted in a political, or
managerial, trade-off of serious consequence when the City in
the 1970s chose to finance negotiated wage and benefit increases
by reducing the work force, particularly in the essential services.
9During the 1971-1975 fiscal period, for example, local taxes
for police services increased almost 50 percent, and compensation
of individual police officers increased over 50 percent. The number
of police officers, however, fell 2 percent, and the number
of hours of police service actually delivered fell 4 percent.
The financial implications of the City's management
failures were enormous. During the 1961-1975 fiscal period,
the annual average increase in labor costs was 10.65 percent.
If through a combination of slightly better collective bar-
gaining and slightly more efficient management, the City some-
how had been able to hold the average annual increase in labor
costs to just one-half of one percent less than actually occur-
red, the City would have saved $1.9 billion cumulatively.
The socioeconomic and intergovernmental changes could be
construed to support a "captive-of-events" theory of the fiscal
crisis in which the City of New York is viewed as having little
or no control over the events that caused the crisis. The
"captive-of-events" theory is a popular interpretation that is
true in some important respects. Certainly, the City of New York
was incapable of influencing socioeconomic and intergovernmental
change in a substantial fashion during the post-World War II era.
However, the "captive-of-events" theory also is popular
because it tends to absolve the local political process of
responsibility for the fiscal crisis and buttresses the also-
popular view that solution to the City's financial problems
10
lies in increased State and Federal aid rather than local politi-
cal reform. The "captive-of-events" theory has a stronger politi-
cal underpinning than it does a theoretical underpinning. Prac-
tices and policies of the City of New York also contributed substantially
to the fiscal crisis, particularly in the post-1965 period:
tax policies increased the financial incentives for mobile
businesses and individuals to leave New York City; debt manage-
ment and labor relations policies drove up the cost of local
government (and thus local government taxes) and reduced the supply
of essential public services, thereby diminishing the "quality
of life" in New York City.
In order to understand better the extent to which the
City of New York contributed to its own fiscal crisis, it is
useful to examine the City's expenditure pattern in the year
the fiscal crisis began, 1975. Over 85 percent of the City's
total expenditures were for three groups -- the recipients of
public and medical assistance benefits, 27.9 percent; City
employees, 42.4 percent; and the holders of City bonds and notes,
14.9 percent. Mandated public assistance and medical assis-
tance costs were $3.6 billion; but combined debt service and
pension costs of $3.1 billion were not mandated in the same
sense as welfare and Medicaid. Beyond that, the
State and Federal governments picked up 75 percent of welfare
and Medicaid costs. The overwhelming share of the $3.1 billion
expenditure for debt service and pensions was provided from
the City's own tax-levy funds. If the City had not bargained
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or borrowed so liberally, or if the Federal and State govern-
ments, particularly the latter, had not discriminated against
the City with respect to welfare and Medicaid financing, the fis-
cal crisis would not have occurred in 1975 and perhaps never
would have occurred.
B. Prospects for New York City
Part Two examines the same three factors analyzed in
Part One from a prospective rather than retrospective basis.
The assumption in Part Two is that the same factors that caused
the fiscal crisis also will affect the future in important ways.
Moreover, Part Two assumes planning should be based on reasonable
assumptions about the future. Socioeconomic prospects, prospects
for intergovernmental fiscal relief, and strategic policy options
for the future are discussed in Sections V, VI, and VII,
respectively.
1. Socioeconomic Prospects
Several important conclusions are reached concerning
the city's socioeconomic prospects. First, the city's future
is indeterminate.' The view that the future of the city is
not a foregone conclusion is contrary to the views of many,
including pessimists who believe the city is either dead or
dying and optimists who believe recovery is "right around the
corner." Second, there is no reasonable basis to assume
that the city's economy will experience a major recovery in
the next decade. Third, there is a reasonable basis to as-
sume that the decline of the local economy can be slowed
significantly and perhaps even halted in the next decade.
iLz
Fourth, the City of New York can play a major role, positively
or negatively, in determining the future of the local economy.
The fourth conclusion is critically important. The
performance of the local economy is explained by two variables,
the performance of the national economy and the "competitiveness"
of New York City as a location for business enterprise. Three
estimates of local employment in 1980 and 1985 are provided. In
each estimate, the assumption about the performance of the national
economy (slow recovery from the 1973-1975 recession) is held
constant. The Commission's "most-likely" employment forecast
assumes improvement of competitive conditions but of small pro-
portions. Under this assumption, the 1976 employment level,
3.18 million, will fall to 3.105 million in 1980 and 3.05 million
in 1985. Under the assumption that rapid deterioration of local
competitiveness will continue, the low employment forecast was
2.99 million in 1980 and 2.78 million in 1985. However, if
pronounced improvement in New York City's competitive position
is assumed, the high forecast, employment will reach 3.27 million
in 1980 and 3.32 million in 1985.
Most significant is the considerable variance be-
tween the high and low employment forecasts: 280,000
jobs in 1980 and 540,000 jobs in 1985. This does not mean, of course,
that the.City's policies alone can affect an employment swing
of over one-half million jobs by 1985. Some factors that determine
the competitiveness of New York City as a location for business activ-
ity are beyond the influence of the local government. However,
many determinants of competitiveness are directly affected
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by the decisions of the City of New York: the "quality of life"
in the city, including schools, other essential services, and the
condition of the city's infrastructure; local tax, labor, rental
and energy costs; and municipal budgetary conditions, to mention
several.
Analysis of the city's socioeconomic prospects provides some im-
portant policy assumptions. On tihe one hand, there is no reasonable bas:
for policy-makers to assume that the local economy will experience a
major recovery; on the other hand, there is strong evidence that
policy-makers can substantially improve the performance of the
local economy. However, it is clear that a reorientation of
City policies is required if the City is to improve the local
economy. The City's'public policies and managerial practices, if not
fundamentally changed, will continue to contribute to economic
decline in New York City.
2. Intergovernmental Prospects
The prospects for major reform of intergovernmental
relations in the next few years are not bright. Public as-
sistance financing and medical assistance financing represent
the two most important intergovernmental fiscal problems;
neither appears likely to be resolved until at least the early
1980s. Other intergovernmental programs, particularly Federal
programs, are yielding additional monies to the City but not in
amounts required to improve materially either the City's fiscal
14
problems or the performance of the local economy.
3. A Developmental Strategy for the City
If substantial change in the local economy or sub-
stantial reform of intergovernmental relations are not likely,
the chances for correction of the City's fiscal problems are
extremely low in the absence of substantial change in the
local political system. Section VII introduces the Com-
mission's developmental theory for the City of New York and
contrasts it with two other strategic options, bankruptcy
and decrementalism.
The developmental strategy would require reform of the
local.political process for the explicit purposes of improving
the local economy and maximizing the impact of'whatever
additional intergovernmental monies the City receives. The
nexus between the developmental strategy and improvement
in the local economy is straightforward: by investing
slack public resources in ways that promote the competitive-
ness of the local economy, private investment will increase.
Increased private investment ultimlately holds the key to
stability in the local economy.
The developmental strategy does not assume that reform
of intergovernmental relations is likely within the necessary
time period. But in the event that fundamental reform of the
intergovernmental system does occur, the developmental strategy
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does not see this as a sufficient basis for meeting the city's
future investment needs without fundamental reform of the lbcal
political process also occurring.
The critical issue is the use to which the City of New
York would put slack resources resulting from increased inter-
governmental assistance. If slack resources are used in the
future as they have been used in the past, that is, in an
attempt to maintain an inherently imbalanced local governmental
system, the long-term potential of intergovernmental reform
largely and quickly will be dissipated. However, if slack re-
sources are invested to promote the economy, intergovernmental
reform will have a positive and enduring impact. This. is why
the City of New York must be fundamentally reformed before its
fiscal problems and the economic problems of New York City can
be solved; and why incremental reform of the local political
process will not suffice, even in the event the State of New
York and the Federal government assume increasing responsibility
for functions provided by the City of New York.
Bankruptcy is the most radical of the three strategies.. Its
proponents assume that the City's fiscal problems are so enormous,
and its adaptive potential is so limited, that judicial inter-
vention is required. The Final Report concludes that, while bank-
ruptcy may occur in the future, it is not presently a constructive
option. First, it is not a democratic solution. Second, it would
prevent the City from reentering the credit market for an extended
period of time. Third, the substantial uncertainties about the
16
formal and informal characteristics of bankruptcy suggest that it
may not solve anything.
Decrementalism.is the most conservative of the three
strategies. It is also the prevailing strategy, primarily
because it emphasizes change in intergovernmental relations
and preservation of the existing governmental system in New
York City. The decremental strategy clearly has roots in the
"captive-of-events" theory of New York City's decline. Its
underlying assumption is that fiscal reforms such as those imple-
mented in the past two years, will buy the time required to
restructure intergovernmental relations, thereby negating the
need to change fundamentally the local governmental process.
The developmental strategy lies between the radicalism
of the bankruptcy approach and the conservatism of the decre-
mental strategy. Unlike the bankruptcy option, the developmental
strategy assumes that the local governmental process still
retains the capacity to adapt constructively to the larger
develovmental needs of New York City. Unlike the decremental
option, the developmental strategy calls for fundamental
reform and questions whether intergovernmental reform
is a likely or sufficient basis for meeting the city's future
investment needs. The developmental strategy emphasizes the
interdependency of reform locally and intergovernmentally.
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C. Developmental Policies for the Future
Sections VIII and IX identify three of the basic purposes
to which slack resources should be invested -- tax reduction,
debt reduction, and maintenance of the city's infrastructure.
Sections X, XI, and XII examine the three principal means
of acquiring slack resources -- management improvement, expen-
diture reduction, and increased intergovernmental fiscal relief
through the assumption by the State and Federal governments
of responsibilities presently assumed by the City.
1. Tax Reduction
Economic development considerations increasingly should
inform local tax policy, and fiscal considerations, the histori-
cally dominant concern, should be less important. Three under-
lying principles must guide future tax policy. First, tax re-
duction must be substantial because of the size of existing tax
disincentives. Second, tax reduction must be selective, aimed
at those areas where stimulative effects will be greatest. Third,
the commitment to tax relief must be long-term. The Commission's
proposals represent a "bullet" approach to tax relief rather than
a "shotgun" approach whereby small amounts of tax relief are
distributed to relatively large numbers of taxpayers.
Five major tax reforms are proposed in the Report:
(1) a five-year reduction in-the corporate income tax from
its present rate. of 10.05 percent to 5.05 percent in order
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to reduce costs in and demonstrate the City's commitment to
the core of its vitally important export base; (2) a substantial
and immediate tax cut for manufacturers in order to stimulate goods
production, which is particularly sensitive to local taxes;
(3) phased elimination'of rent control'and rent stabilization in
order to increase real estate taxes and improve the long-term
quantity and quality of the city's housing stock; (4) elimina-
tion of discriminatory real property assessment practices that
discourage investment in commercial and industrial properties
and result in substantial subsidies by the owners of such
properties to the owners of residential housing and vacant land;
(5) reduction of the State personal income tax over the course
of five- years from its current rate of 15 percent on taxable
incomes in excess of $25,000 to 10 percent on taxable incomes
in excess of $15,000.
The basic purpose of the tax policies recommended by
the Commission is to improve the competitiveness of New York
City as a place in which to do business. The underlying assump-
tion, of course, is that maintenance of existing taxes will
diminish the existing business and individual tax base, there-
by producing lower tax receipts and reduced private investment.
The proposals concerning rent control and real estate assess-
ment practices would, if implemented, increase local revenues,
thereby providing some cushion against the short-term fiscal
impact of the other tax cuts.
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2. Debt Reduction and Infrastructure Maintenance
Prior to the fiscal crisis, the City had two basic debt problems, the
total size of its outstanding debt and the huge amount of short-term
debt that constantly needed to be rolled over because it could
not be repaid. The ability of the Municipal Assistance Corpora-
tion (MAC) to convert a substantial amount of the City's short-
term debt into long-term obligations of its own, plus the
Federal seasonal financing program, have resolved the short-
term debt problem, at least temporarily. However, the City's
total outstanding debt, including MAC debt which is secured
by City revenues, has increased over $1 billion since the
beginning of the fiscal crisis.
The Commission recommends that the City pursue a debt
management policy whereby it issues less debt each year than
it amortizes. Reduction of outstanding debt in this fashion
gradually will reduce debt service costs that inhibit the
City's ability to provide essential services. Also, debt
reduction will make it possible to reduce substantially real
estate taxes, a key developmental goal that presently is
frustrated by excessive debt service costs, over $2.3 billion
in fiscal year 1977. Finally, reduction of outstanding debt
will speed the City's return to credit markets at competitive
interest costs.
The mechanism for reducing outstanding debt, each year
borrowing a fraction of the amount that is anortized, requires
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linking the City's debt management to its capital budget
process. The essential goals of reducing outstanding debt
and maintaining the City's infrastructure are interrelated.
New York City's infrastructure is one of its most important
resources for the future. The city's physical plant badly
needs the maintenance that was deferr,ed during the post-1965
period when a substantial share of capital monies was diverted
for operating purposes and the bulk of legitimate capital expen-
ditures was for construction rather than renovation or mainte-
nance.
In order to reduce outstanding debt, it is necessary to
constrain the -issuance of bonds (assuming, for the moment, that
the City regains the ability to sell its bonds competitively).
At the same time, the city's legitimate capital needs are
enormous. In order to increase the likelihood of achieving
both goals, the Commission recommends that the process of
phasing out expense budget items from the capital budget
be accelerated. The Commission also recommends that the focus
of capital expenditure be on maintenance rather than new con-
struction except in instances like the Convention Center where
an important economic development interest would be served.
Finally, the Commission recommends that the Federal
seasonal loan program be extended beyond the end of fiscal year
1978. If the developmental strategy recommended in the Final Report of the
Commission is- pursued, there 'is no..reason why, the extension of
the Federal seasonal loan program should be dependent upon the
extension of the statutory powers of the present Emergency
Financial Control Board.
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3. Management Improvement
The basic challenge facing management in the City of New
York is to provide adequate services (which is essential to main-
taining the "quality of life" in New York City) at reduced
levels of expenditure (which is essential to freeing up resources
for investment). Unfortunately, the key element in the City's
retrenchment program, reduction of the municipal work force
through a combination of attrition and layoffs, has negatively
affected the City's work force in some basic ways. The
collective impact of these changes greatly complicates the
managerial challenge facing the City of New York. As a result
of the City's policies since the beginning of the fiscal
crisis, the work force is 21 percent smaller, older, less
representative of the City's people in terms of race and sex, and
better compensated than in 1975.
Four basic reforms must occur if the City is to be able
to maintain services at reduced levels of expenditure. First,
at the mayoral level, fiscal and managerial control must be
centralized. Second, an effective management service must be
created. Third, the formal and informal rules that govern the
selection, training, and deployment of the work force
must be modernized. In connection with this, the Commission
recommends that the City develop a new municipal wage
policy. City employees should receive general wage
22
increases in return for the City's regaining managerial
control over deployment and utilization of the work force.
Fourth, experimentation in the means of organizing and delivering
municipal services must occur.
To illustrate that management improvement can yield
substantial savings while maintaining services, the Commission
identifies eight reforms that, if implemented, would permit
maintenance of police services at a savings of $100 million a
year. The fact that none of the eight reforms has yet been accom-
plished even in the midst of fiscal crisis indicates that
resistance to change in the City's managerial and bureaucratic
processes is substantial.
4. Expenditure Reduction
Expenditure reduction is the second major method of
acquiring resources for investment in the future. The City
of New York lacks the resources to maintain its existing cost
structure and functional scope. The most obvious area for
expenditure reduction is the nearly $2 billion the City spends on
the fringe and pension benefits of its employees. In the
past two years, while the City was pursuing a conscious policy of
reducing its work force and its services, only one substantial
reduction has occurred in the.fringe and pension benefits of
City employees, a halving of the Increased-Take-Home-Pay (ITHP)
benefit by which the City made its actuarial retirement
systems virtually noncontributory- for employees.
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The Commission recommends the elimination of three pension
benefits that cost the City a total of $135 million annually:
the remainder of the ITHP benefit, the Heart Bill, and
those union annuity funds that are not constitutionally
protected. These three recommendations, if implemented,
would reduce overall retirement costs by a.modest 8 per-
cent. Furthermore, five recommendations are -made to
reduce or eliminate selected fringe benefits that, if imple-
mented, would save the City approximately $100 million annually.
The City's'subaidy policies also are examined
in the areas of mass transit and municipal hospitals, where
the City's subsidy provides over one-quarter of revenues,
and public housing. In all, the annual cost of City sub-
sidies is nearly $600 million for these three functions.
The strongest case that can be made for expenditure reduction
in these areas is in the-City's private and public hospital
systems. Every independent study that has been made in recent
years indicates the existence of excess bed capacity in New
York City ranging from 4,000 to 7,000 beds. The closure of
5,000 beds, as recommended by the Commission, would reduce
City tax-levy expenditures by $13 million to $37 million
immediately (the range depends on whether individual beds or
entire hospitals are closed). This could be done without ad-
versely affecting patient care, and the savings would increase
each year. One-half of the beds should be closed in the municipal
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hospital system, which has an occupancy rate of only 75 percent,
and one-half should be closed in the proprietary and voluntary
systems.
The Commission identifies approximately $300 million
of expenditure reductions that should be made. While this
is a substantial sum, expenditure reduction accomplished by
functional load-shedding is-a potentially more important area.
5. Intergovernmental Reform.
The principal recommendation of the Commission in the
area of intergovernmental relations is for assumption of
local public assistance and Medicaid costs by the State and
Federal governments. Ideally, both programs would be financed
by the Federal government because of its inclusive, progressive
tax structure and its ability to relate benefits to cost-of-
living differences. Until this happens, and it appears to be
something that will happen in the 1980s rather than in the 1970s
the State of New York should assume gradually increasing shares
of the City's welfare and Medicaid costs. While the State's
finances are not trouble free, they are in much better condition
than the City's.
Beyond the issue of the relative ability to pay, is
the basic fact that the State of New York is responsible for
the City of New York's financial problems to the extent that they
reflect welfare and Medicaid costs. There are many areas in
which the City of New York not only warrants criticism for its
past and present failures and bears the primary responsibility
for reform as well; in the areas of welfare and Medicaid, the
State and Federal governments are responsible, not the City.
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The Commission also recommends that the State assume
the full cost of the senior colleges of the City University
system. However, the University should remain an independent
system oriented to the special higher educational needs of
New York City. It is also recommended that the State honor
its earlier decision to assume the cost of the local court
systew over a four-year period. Correction and
probation services also should be assumed by the State, not
only to.improve the City's finances but to provide better over-
all administration of the presently fragmented court, corrections,
and probation systems in New York.
If the Commission's recommendations for intergovern-
mental reform are followed, over $1.2 billion in City expen-
ditures would be absorbed by the State and Federal governments.
Eventually, most if not all of these functional transfers will
occur. The question is how fast they will occur.
With respect to the various Federal and State block
grant programs, including revenue sharing, the City generally
receives a fair proportion of funds. This is more the case
with respect to Federal programs than it is to State programs.
The most serious inequities in State programs concern aid to
education and, less importantly, mass transit.
The conclusion of the Final Report examines the issue of
whether or not the developmental strategy it proposes is politically
viable. Pursuing the developmental theory involves a reordering of
local political priorities. The developmental approach would
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engage the City of New York in policies that may not be rational
in a political sense if the political values of the post-1965
period continue. How well public officials in the City, State
and Federal governments are able to integrate economic and
political rationality in the next few years will determine much
about New York City's future.
In planning'for the future, care should be taken not to
define the city's recovery in terms of regaining the past.
From the perspective of New York City, what it needs most from
the City of New York are policies and practices that will con-
tribute to the future rather than mistakenly. attempt to recapture
the past or even maintain the present.
APPENDIX D-2
Major Recommendations of the
Temporary Commission on City Finances
The 22 major recommendations of the Commission for
implementing its "developmental strategy" are as follows:
A. Tax Reduction
1. The City's General Corporation Tax should be reduced
by one percentage point a year over the next five
years from its present rate of 10.05 percent to
5.05 percent.
2. Tax reductions and credits for the city's manufac-
turers should be implemented. Specifically:
a. The general corporation (business income) tax
as it applies to manufacturers should be reduced
from 10.05 percent to 5.05 percent immediately.
b. The 4 percent sales tax on the purchase of
machinery, equipment, fuel and utilities should
be eliminated.
c. A 5 percent investment credit against the general
corporation (business income) tax should be
instituted for the purchase of new manufacturing
machinery, equipment and structures.
d. The commercial rent occupancy tax should be
reduced from its present effective rate of 7.5
percent to a flat 2.5 percent on all rentals in
excess of $1,000 per annum.
e. The exemptions from the property tax for newly
constructed manufacturing facilities provided
under the recently enacted Padovan-Steingut
legislation should be increased to 95 percent
of the assessed value added to the property,
declining by 5 percent annually over 19 years
from the present 50 percent exemption which
declines by 5 percent annually over 10 years.
(more)
3. Rent control and rent stabilization should be
eliminated. The City should move to eliminate
assessment disparities that discriminate against
commercial, industrial and apartment properties.
4. The maximum rate of New York State's Personal
Income Tax should be reduced by one percentage
point a year over the next five years from its
present maximum rate of 15 percent on taxable
income over $25,000 to 10 percent on taxable
income over $15,000.
B. Improving Debt Management
1. The City should gradually reduce its outstanding
debt by issuing less debt than it retires each
year.
2. The Federal government should continue its seasonal
financing program to the City of New York after
June 10, 1978.
3. The State Legislature should reexamine the debt
limits in the New York State Constitution to
ascertain whether, in the light of the City's
experience, they should be revised.
C. Improving the City's Infrastructure
1. The limited amount of funds available for capital
expenditures in the coming years should primarily
be used. to rehabilitate and maintain the city's
physical plant. Exception should only be made
(more)
for projects like the Convention Center where new
construction would provide a definite stimulus to
the city's economic development.
2. The City should accelerate the rate at which it
withdraws expense budget items from the capital
budget.
D. Management Improvement
1. Fiscal and managerial control must be centralized
in the hands of officials who are politically
accountable.
2. The City must ensure that an effective managerial
service is created.
3. The City's personnel policies should be reformed to
enable it to deploy its labor force in as productive
and cost efficient a manner as possible.
4. The City must support innovative means of organizing
and delivering municipal services in ways that
promote greater citizen responsiveness and lower
costs.
E. Expenditure Reduction
1. The City's pension and fringe benefit systems
should be revised. Specifically:
a. The Increased-Take-Home-Pay (ITHP) benefit
should be permitted to expire by the State
Legislature.
b. The Heart Bill should be permitted to expire
by the State Legislature.
(more)
c. Union annuity benefits should be ended.
d. Health insurance costs should be shared by the
City and its employees at a 75-25 percent
ratio while health insurance should be provided
for retired employees only when they reach
age 62.
e. Welfare fund benefits now provided to retired
employees should be discontinued.
f. Uniform allowances should be reduced by one-
half after five years for uniformed employees
and three years for other municipal employees.
2. The City should consider methods of limiting the
subsidies it presently provides for housing, mass
transportation and the municipal hospital system.
3. The 'City's hospital capacity should be immediately
reduced by 5,000 beds, one-half of which should be
closed in the municipal hospital system and one-
half in the city's private and voluntary hospitals.
4. The City should make substantial reforms in its leasing,
purchasing and contracting procedures.
F. Intergovernmental Relations
1. The Federal and State governments should assume the
cost of public assistance and Medicaid presently
borne by the City.
2. The State should assume corrections and probation
costs in conjunction with the four-year staged
assumption of local court costs already in progress.
3. The State should move to assume the full cost of
the City University system.
(more)
A
4. The Federal government should commit itself to
developing and implementing a comprehensive national
urban policy to deal with the economic and social
problems afflicting not only New York City, but
cities everywhere in the nation.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. Local
Revenue Diversification. Washington, U.S. Governmental
Printing, 1974.
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. State
Legislative Program. Washington, U.S. Governmental
Printing, 1975.
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. City
Financial Emergencies; The Intergovernmental Dimension.
Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973.
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. Under-
standing the Market for State and Local Debt. Washing-
ton, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976.
City of New York. Annual Report of the Comptroller. 1961-
1976.
City of New York. The Municipal Assistance Corporation.
1976-76.
City of New York. The Executive Expense Budget. 1961-1976.
City of New York. Financial Plan of the City of New York and
Covered Organizations. 1976.
Commerce Clearinghouse Inc. 1977 Guidebook to New York
Taxes. Chicago, 1977.
Eisenmenger, Robert. Options for Fiscal Structural Reform
in Massachusetts. Boston. Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston Research Report 57, 1976.
Maxwell, James J. Richardson. Financing State and Local Gov-
ernment. Washington, Brookings Institute. 1977.
Moody's Investor Services. Analytical Factors in Municipal
Bond Ratings. New York City, 1975.
Securities Industry Association. Fundamentals of Municipal
Bonds. ed. by Gordon L. Calvert. Baltimore, French-
Bray.
State of New York. Employment Review. August 1976.
Task Force on Municipal Bond Credit Ratings. The Rating
Game. Twentieth Century Fund of New York, 1974.
United States Bureau of Labor Statistics Employment and
Earnings, States and Areas 1939-1974. Washington,
U.S. Government Printing Office. 1976.
United States Department of Commerce. Standard Industrial
Classification Manual 1972. Washington, U.S. Govern-
mental Printing Office. 1972.
